Análisis de la comparación de los resultados obtenidos del coeficiente

The Sunni Shia Divide

The two main sects in the Islamic world are the Sunni and the Shia, comprising 85 percent and 15 percent respectively of adherents. Fourteen centuries ago, the Sunni- Shia split started with a disagreement as to who was the legitimate successor to the prophet of Islam and how that decision should be arrived at. The Shia insisted that the rightful successor was Ali, a member of the prophet’s house. The Sunni, however, favoured using ijma(consensus) to determine who the rightful successor was, Khalifa (see; e.g. Nasr 2007; Madelung 2008; Hazleton 2010). For that reason, the distinguishing features of Shia and Sunni should be seen in ‘their political ethos,’ and in particular in ‘issues on Islamic history’ (Jabri 1979: 132; Enayat 1982: 19). Although other writers argue that the differences between the two sects should be studied as cultural (e.g. Lewis 1940) or social (e.g. Watt 1961), there is an argument that their difference can be seen as inherently political, out of which cultural and social differences then emerged. That is to say, the Shia have a specific political attitude towards religion which sets them apart from the rest of the Muslim population. To the Shia, one person (imam) embodies both political and religious authorities in the concept of imamat, while for the Sunni the two authorities are separate. This thesis proceeds on the understanding that the Shia constitute a political sect within Islam.

The Sunni-Shia divide has characterised Iraq’s history and politics for a considerable period. That division, particularly in the Arab context, has at times led to sectarian violence (see; Chapter 1). Given the Iraqi context, it is appropriate to regard the divide as a difference in political doctrine because, as identified earlier, the difference between the two sects is basically political in nature. Shia Arabs comprise 50-52 percent and Sunni Arabs 30 percent of the total population of Iraq, and if the Kurds, at 18 percent, and Turkmen, at 2 percent, the majority of whom are also Sunnis, are counted, the Sunnis a comprise 48-50 percent of the population (see table 5.1) Those percentages are disputed and the subject of controversy among the members of the Iraqi political elite. In the Iraqi context, however, the religious-sect divide relates to Arabs only, and although Kurds are Sunni they do not consider themselves a part of this divide as ethnically they are different from both Sunni Arabs and Shia Arabs.

TABLE 5.1 HE DISTRIBUTION OF RELIGIOUS SECT AND ETHNICITY OF IRAQ’S POPULATION SECTS OF ISLAM ETHNIC GROUPS

Arab Kurd Turkmen

SHIA 50% 1% 1%

SUNNI 28% 18% 2%

Islam and Politics

There are two different discourses on the relationship between Islam and politics as perceived by Islamic scholars in the Muslim world, and external observers and writers. Firstly, the prevailing view among Islamic scholars, both Sunni and Shia, is that Islam and politics are inseparable since, in addition to faith, Islam concerns social and political aspects of life (e.g. Mawdudi 1948; Qutb 1964; Khomeini 1970, Qardawi 1987). Reference to those scholars suggests that the political system of Islam is based on three principles: unity of God (tawhid), the prophethood of Mohammed (risalat) and vicegerency (khilafat). There is universal agreement among Islamic scholars on tawhid, risalat and khilafat. The divergence is only apparent on the type of khilafat, where their conceptions of khilafat differ on whom and how it should be arrived at; the difference is political. The Sunni believe political polity should be based on consensus, ijma, while the Shia believe the rightful successor must be a member of the household of the prophet.

The second discourse can be found in the growing literature that examines the relationship and interaction between Islam and politics (e.g. see; Martin 1987; Roy 1994; Choueiri 1997; Denoeux 2002; 2011; Mandeville 2007; Ayoob 2008; Volpi 2010; Tibi 2012; 2013). This includes two different stances: a view that acknowledges the interconnection between Islam and politics, and one that rejects such a contention and is, it might appear, ironically promoted by those on the right in terms of a political attitude towards Islam. It must be borne in mind that the question as to whether Islam is or is not political, or should or should not be a part of the political aspects of life, lie beyond the scope of this thesis.

In the context of Iraq, however, whether Islam and politics are separate or integrated does not merit a lengthy discussion. In Iraq, there is a socio-political reality that cannot be ignored; Islam has a significant presence within the state and is the official state religion. Islam limits the legislative power; the second Article in the constitution, for

example, reads, ‘no law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam.’ Moreover, Islamic individuals are members of state institutions. The majority of those who are in positions of power are Muslims, if not Islamic. Olivier Roy (1994: viii), identified the term Muslim as pertaining to a cultural reality, while the use of Islamic suggests a political connotation. The majority of the Iraqi political leaders are Islamic, this is to say, they are members of a certain Islamic political party in Iraq, with the exception of the Kurds, the majority of whom are Muslims but not Islamic.93

Thus, in Iraq, Islam and politics are linked and inseparable.

The above given, takes us back to a topic discussed at length in chapter 2, section 2.6, namely the cultural form of modernisation - Muslim-majority society and the feasibility of democracy. A key proponent of the modernisation theory, Daniel Lerner, believed that the rest of the world would follow the Western concept of modernity, 94

‘what America is... the modernising Middle East seeks to become’ (Lerner 1958: 79). Interwoven to his conception of modernity was a distinctive personality, a modern individual.95

Moreover, Lerner argues that the mass media plays a crucial role in the modernisation process (1958: 52). This thesis shows that the people of Iraq have constructed their particular roadmaps to modernity with regards to the meaning of democracy and that the meanings most top Iraqi decision-makers attach to democracy are entirely different from the meaning of democracy understood in its western sense, i.e. liberal democracy.

93 _{I do not tend to argue that all the Sunni or the Shia political elite are religious; of course there are} secular individuals and parties within the Sunni and the Shia groups. The Kurdish political parties and political elite are mainly secular but, again, in Iraqi Kurdistan there are two Islamic political parties that combined have 16 seats out of 111 parliamentary seats in the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament.

94

Using the case of six Middle Eastern countries (Muslim majority), he has tried to put forward a theory to show how and why the worldwide modernisation process is taking place. This work is comprised of a technique for measuring the process, and an application of theory in those countries.

95

The work present as a typology of cultural transition. 'Modern,' is sought to be urban, literate, financially stable, interdependent, and to have a rather secular worldview and able to understand various world situations. Traditional, on the contrary, is said to be rural, non-literate, living at a subsistence level, respectful of authority, to have a local worldview, and rather devout. In between, there is 'transitional.' It is put into different categories on their proximity to a modern lifestyle, ‘transitionals are people who share some of the empathy and psychic mobility of the moderns while lacking essential components of the modern style, notably literacy’ (Lerner 1957: 13).

Muslims and Democracy

The literature on Islam and democracy, which also includes Muslims and democracy, concentrates on the particular issue of the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Timothy D. Sisk (1992: xi) points out two main stances among Muslims on the compatibility issue, one that ‘places priority on a religious foundation for the state’ and another that sees the essential doctrine of Islamic thought and practice to be compatible with democratic ideas and institutions. In other words, among those Muslims who aspire to the idea of democracy there are two different tenets held: those believing the first hold that a democracy within Islam is feasible, while those adherents of the second argue that western democracy is a suitable political system for Islam.96

Therefore, the advocates of an Islamic democracy believe that Islam has both the freedoms and the political structure for a democratic system. Ahmad Shawqi Al-Fanjari argues in Islam that rhuma (kindness) is the equivalent of what is regarded as freedom in Europe and tarahum (mutual kindness) is synonymous with democracy (see; Al- Fanjari 1973). Along similar lines, John L. Esposito (1996: 18-29) argues that the concept of ijma (consensus) can both legitimatise and become the procedure for an Islamic democracy. Hamid Enayat (1982: 135) points out that Islam has the legal prerequisite for a democratic system; the rule of law. That argument can be seen to be based on the fact that in Islam the power of any government must be subject to, and limited by, the sharia law - a set of laws driven from the Quran and tradition.

Based on the above arguments it could be argued that Islam can produce its own unique democracy, distinct from western democracy both in notion and function. In parallel, albeit different to the above arguments, there is another view that asserts the democracy found in the west is the appropriate system for Islam. With reference to several verses in the Quran (49:13, 11:119, 6:12, 6:54, 21:107, 27:77, 29:51, 45:20), Khaled Abu El Fadel (2004: 5-36) points out three principles: pursuance of justice; a consultative non- autocratic method of governance; and the institutionalisation of mercy and compassion in social interactions. He concludes that ‘democracy is an appropriate system for Islam,’ because it endorses a form of government that is most effective in helping Muslims to

96 _{There are other views among Muslims that reject all notions of democracy –democratic ideas,} democratic values and democratic practices- e.g. the Wahabis who are a part of the Sunni sect mostly concentrated in the Saudi Arabia.

promote those principles. That is to say, a democratic system helps Muslims to promote their religious values; hence, democratic practices are not only compatible with but also enhance Islamic principles.

Concerning the different types of democracy (majoritarian and consensus) there is a view among Muslims who aspire to an Islamic democracy whose conception of an Islamic democracy is consensual rather than majoritarian which is based on an interpretation of Islamic history (e.g. Esposito & Voll 1996; Esposito 2000). Accordingly, Daniel Brumberg (2003: 269) pinpoints a lack of unity among Muslims and argues it is exactly this absence of unity that requires a form of power sharing and political institutions that emphasise agreement and cooperation with a promise of inclusion that could promote accommodation in Muslim majority countries. Therefore, some writers have argued that in studying the compatibility of different ideals of democracy with Islam the focus should be on what Muslims want, rather than what Islam is (e.g. Hashemi 2004; Graham 2002). Correspondingly, Bernard Haykel (2004: 80) has named two leading Muslim scholars, the Sunni scholar, Yusuf al-Qardawi, and the Shia scholar, Mohsen Kadivar, who accept the compatibility of Islam and democracy and argue Muslim rulers must be elected for a fixed term of office.

In the case of Iraq, the existing literature covers Islamic movements’ involvement in the democratisation processes (see; Bayat 1998; 2007; Clark 2004; Henfer 2011), but there is a gap in the literature which is twofold; firstly, on the conception of different democratic ideals with regard to different religious sects and ethnicities; and, secondly, on what type of democratic ideal Muslims in a Muslim majority country desire, in terms of institutional arrangements. This chapter, together with other empirical chapters, aims to fill those two particular gaps and constitutes in its own right an innovative and original contribution.