Análisis de conceptos y variables turísticas

Article 23. (2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. Article 25. (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Because each person is at least entitled to these human rights, it is not left to the discretion of any dominant people or hegemony to deny these rights to others on the basis of gender, race or class differences. Thus, regardless of gender, class, or cultural disparity, each person is warranted in her claim to be guaranteed these provisions. This understanding in conjunction with the education requirement helps to build upon a global intolerance against the unequal treatment of women across cultural divides.

While the human rights discourse seems a sound basis from which to battle against oppression, there are several criticisms that raise pertinent points about this framework. Inderpal Grewal objects to this paradigm in her essay “On the New Global Feminism and the Family of Nations: Dilemmas of Transnational Feminist Practice.” Grewal argues that the human rights framework does not avoid the very hegemonies that prove so detrimental to women’s rights, and

84

Mallika Dutt, “Reclaiming a Human Rights Culture: Feminism of Difference and Alliance,” Talking Visions: Multicultural Feminism in a Transnational Age, 238.

39 instead functions as a universalizing discourse that continues to estrange Third-World women. She claims that arguing for women’s rights as human rights is meant “to assert the rights of the individual as a private, autonomous being” and many women in various parts of the globe are not seen as independent, autonomous individuals.85 Thus, according to Grewal, the human rights discourse reinforces the marginalization of Third-World women.

Grewal further criticizes the human rights discourse for promoting the “moral

superiority” of Western women who, she claims, will inevitably use this paradigm to create a false sense of sisterhood, so as to remain the older and wiser sister to the unknowing and underdeveloped Third World sisters.86 Grewal argues that the human rights paradigm can be used to enhance unjust power relations between the Western world and so-called developing countries. She claims that there is no guarantee that the superpower mentality of some will be dispelled given the emphasis on or the organizing around the human rights paradigm.87

This criticism of the human rights discourse is also present in Chandra Talpade Mohanty’s “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses.” Mohanty argues that while it is important for women to organize across boarders, it is necessary to keep in mind the differences of women and to resist promoting a homogenization of women’s

experiences under a problematic hegemony. Mohanty centers her discussion on three analytic principles which she observes and which she urges Western women to avoid when extending their academic discourse across international borders.88

85

Inderpal Grewal, . “On the New Global Feminism and the Family of Nations: Dilemmas of Transnational Feminist Practice,” Talking Visions: Multicultural Feminism in a Transnational Age, 505.

86

Ibid., 511.

87

Ibid.

88

Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses,” Boundary 2. Vol. 12, No. 3, On Humanism and the University I: The Discourse of Humanism. (Spring-Autumn, 1984): 336-7.

40 Addressing first the legitimacy of the category “women,” Mohanty questions whether it is appropriate or even desirable for women to organize around gender. She finds the category of “women” problematic for two reasons. First, she argues that to assume that women exist as an already coherent group sharing “identical interests and desires, regardless of class, ethnic or racial location” further strengthens the patriarchal dichotomy that is posed between women and men.89 This method of promoting the collective identity of women seems to reflect the reduction of difference and the perpetuating of the “absolute other” that were the concern of both Young and Grewal. Moreover though, Mohanty argues that if women are organizing under this category as a result of their shared oppression, then the focus of the feminist discourse

surrounding this category shifts to proving the shared oppression rather than working to combat it.90 Thus, Mohanty wants to move away from an oppression-based organizing, citing that it dwells too heavily on women as objects, as universal dependents or as victims.91 Instead, she argues for the need to formulate a Sisterhood that takes into account the historical and political differences among diverse women.

Mohanty’s argument here illustrates the final of Haslanger’s concerns: that feminist, anti- racist theory must include accounts of gender and race that will appreciate the agency of all women regardless of the country or culture to which they belong and that will foster the empowerment of these peoples in combating their diverse experiences of oppression. Furthermore, Mohanty’s critique builds upon that of Grewal, offering criticism that is absent empty and unsupported claims and presenting key warnings and suggestions for the human rights discourse. Grewal’s arguments, by contrast, prove more accusatory than constructive, making such claims as that the United States “assumes that certain foreign cultures are very oppressive to 89 Ibid., 337. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid., 338-41.

41

women, unlike [itself]” and that the United States considers itself a “unified nation free of violent practices against women, except for domestic violence and rape.”92

Making unsupported accusations against the United States detracts from an important claim underlying Grewal’s work—a claim which Mohanty more clearly defines; namely that by promoting a universalizing discourse, Western women continue to ostracize women in

developing countries by refusing to recognize these women as capable of naming and leading their own struggles against oppression. Highlighting this need to examine the motivations underlying Western methodology, Mohanty argues that Western feminism makes “a colonialist move in the case of a hegemonic first-third world connection in scholarship.”93 According to Mohanty, as a result of this commitment to universalizing “women’s” oppression, Western feminism neglects the historical contexts of the diverse women and cultures that it examines. She argues that organizing women around their common oppression is not only unjustified, but it continues to perpetuate the very dichotomy that it attempts to dispel. Mohanty claims, therefore, that this Western agenda ultimately sets up the United States and European feminists as subject, while designating “third world women” as objects to be analyzed from a supposedly superior or at least more informed perspective.

While this common criticism from Grewal and Mohanty is important, it does not necessarily discount the effectiveness of the human rights position, though it calls attention to and warns against a potential downfall of the framework. Both Grewal and Mohanty are correct in questioning who will be enforcing the human rights discourse and what power relations will come into play during its use. However, neither examines the potential for the human rights

92

Inderpal Grewal, . “On the New Global Feminism and the Family of Nations: Dilemmas of Transnational Feminist Practice,” Talking Visions: Multicultural Feminism in a Transnational Age, 513-4.

93

Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses,” Boundary 2. Vol. 12, No. 3, On Humanism and the University I: The Discourse of Humanism. (Spring-Autumn, 1984): 349.

42 framework to deconstruct those unjust power structures as is a main point with Dutt’s argument in favor of this paradigm.

Dutt anticipates the criticism that Grewal and Mohanty pose, saying that “universalisms such as human rights are criticized either because all individual experience is said to be

contingent on the location of the person involved and/or because cultural or other differences between people need to be respected.”94 While it is indeed important to acknowledge the criticism offered by Grewal and Mohanty warning against a Western cultural imperialism, the fact remains that Western dominance is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient condition of applying the human rights framework to feminist struggle. In her words, Dutt claims “There need not be a contradiction in the assertion that human rights are universal and that they

recognize difference.”95 I do think that Dutt is correct here. The human rights framework is not mutually exclusive with acknowledging and accepting diversity.

It seems that, particularly in the work of Grewal and Young, there is a misunderstanding that permeates the discussion surrounding the human rights framework and that needs some clarification. That is, Grewal and Young, and surely many others, need to understand that claiming that women experience oppression all across the world does not constitute the claim that there is one particular form of oppression against all women as one type. The human rights framework both acknowledges and defends the diversity as well as the unity among not only women, but humanity. A human rights discourse demands that no matter what the culture, no matter who the oppressed, everyone is entitled to specific rights regardless of race, gender or class.

94

Mallika Dutt, “Reclaiming a Human Rights Culture: Feminism of Difference and Alliance,” Talking Visions: Multicultural Feminism in a Transnational Age, 231.

95

43 Without neglecting difference, “we must connect our experiences and organize with people in other parts of the world to better counter the economic, social and political forces at play.”96 In this way, the human rights paradigm is not a commitment to universalizing in the way that Grewal and Mohanty suggest, and it is not a way by which Western feminism may project its own sentiments about oppression onto other women and other cultures; rather, the human rights framework organizes individuals in order to have the numbers and the voices necessary to guarantee that the problems of feminism be heard and that they be understood as the serious local and global threats that they are.

As such, so long as Western feminism stops projecting local conceptions of oppression onto other women and other cultures, the human rights framework is a way by which to build solidarity among women and among humanity. This discourse proves an effective method for breaking down unjust power relations by demanding the recognition of the most basic rights of all people and by refusing to acknowledge the positing of any group as superior to any other. If, as is argued in the first chapter, the foundation of oppression is a hierarchical, binary thinking that is reflected in social group identity and behavior, then the human rights framework is the necessary construct through which to defuse the prejudiced thinking that allows for people to construct unjust power relations in accordance with misguided, biased perceptions.

96

44

Conclusion

The human rights framework provides the tools necessary to overcome and eliminate oppression. If used correctly, this framework disallows any justification of powerlessness, exploitation, violence, marginalization and cultural imperialism. That is, provided that individuals are held to the minimal requirements of the rights as stated in the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, there cannot be a universalizing of experiences, nor grounds for a

dominant country or people forcing its beliefs or its perceptions onto any other country or people. The effectiveness of this framework lies precisely in its eliminating any justification for problematic universalizing or for uncontested cultural imperialism.97 The human rights

methodology deconstructs the hierarchical binaries that are the foundation of oppressive

relations, and as such creates grounds for building a solidarity among people that is necessary for the complete elimination of oppression.

A great deal of feminist literature expresses the view that oppression cannot be defeated unless people collectively struggle against it without denying their diversity. Cudd claims that the object cannot be for humanity to live a meaningful life “in spite of or in the face of

oppression,” but that people must collectively work to end oppression.98 Hooks also supports this call to collectively organize saying that “establishing a unity among people will defeat hierarchical dualities and will replace these dualities with an ethic of communalism, shared responsibility, and mutuality.”99

97

By saying that we should avoid a “problematic universalizing” of experiences, I do not mean to suggest that there are no instances in which women share similar experiences. The act of universalizing, as I understand it, includes the silencing of diverse voices; it stymies the presence of an open dialogue by projecting the experiences of one group (usually a dominant social group) onto the experiences and ideas of another group. In my view,

universalizing adheres to and indeed requires the presence of hierarchical, binary thinking where having an open discourse over shared experiences does not.

98

Ann Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, 243 footnote 8.

99

45 A problem throughout the feminist movement has been that forming this unity always allowed for the silencing of voices and the oversight of the experiences of some women, whether it was/is ignoring the circumstances of black women by white women, or overshadowing women of “developing countries” by Western women. This issue has become of particular interest and concern in feminist theory, but the literature surrounding this problem seems more focused on pointing out this flaw rather than suggesting ways to address it.

It is my view that the best way to form unity while acknowledging disparity is through the human rights framework. This methodology is certainly no “quick-fix:” with problems as large and as deep as racism and sexism, there is no quick fix. The human rights framework, however, offers a solid ground upon which people can collectively struggle against and eventually end oppression while maintaining their sense of diversity. If people begin to recognize the harm that can be caused by hierarchical, binary thinking, and they accept the human rights discourse as the appropriate footing upon which to dispel that prejudiced thinking, then we will begin to gain ground in the battle against oppression.

From here, people need to build upon a collective commitment to end oppression, and perhaps the most powerful and effective way by which to foster that commitment is through education. In addition to stating that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should be “disseminated, displayed, read and expounded principally in schools and other educational institutions, without distinction based on the political status of countries or territories,” Article 26 of the Declaration states:

Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

46 There is no more powerful tool, no more effective method to build upon a global intolerance of the exploitation and maltreatment of people than through education. The Declaration should be something that children are taught throughout school in order to cultivate this intolerance and to promote change. Of course this means that the changes will be seen from generation to

generation and will not occur as rapidly as we would like, but the change will be occurring. People will begin to live and to teach their children to value and respect human rights, and eventually an ideal like Wasserstrom suggests will have the potential to come into effect.

It is important to note that intolerance in this instance, while a term that is usually avoided when talking about a non-racist and non-sexist methodology, is meant to urge people against an unquestioning multiculturalism. In order to accept diversity and to respect cultural disparity, we need not also accept or be tolerant of the abuse, neglect, and mistreatment or misrepresentation of particular groups of people. By adopting the human rights framework, we become intolerant of violations of those rights in the sense that we reject any justification for human rights violations based on the binary, hierarchical thinking that supports oppressive practices. It is important to differentiate that being respectful and mindful of difference does not mean being tolerant of the ways in which some cultures or some groups of people violate the human rights of others.

In order to dispel hierarchical, dichotomous thinking, feminist theory that serves as a catalyst for social change must urge people to appreciate diversity as well as to recognize the power and the significance of unity. By removing the justification for the mistreatment of particular social groups, the human rights paradigm makes concrete what so many wrongly see as malleable. It unifies people and creates solidarity at the human level, eliminating the notion that “different” means “inferior.” Thus, educating people about the importance of human rights

47 rather than a willing or grudging acceptance of hierarchical, binary thinking will ultimately empower people and stir them into collective action over a principle of entitlement.

Not even Ghandi or Martin Luther King, Jr. could be said to have ended oppression on their own; it was their ability to lead masses to protest the oppression that changed the world. 100

-Ann Cudd

100

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