Análisis de Dominio

One of the key aims of the present study was to compare children’s strategy choices across classical- and problem-analogies. If children used the same strategies on both types of analogy, then it may be that classical- and problem-analogies may require the same cognitive skills. Table 14 presents children's strategy choices across classical- and problem-analogies. The results in the problem analogies include those in the video condition only, because those in the control condition were not presented with the base problem, so their strategy choices were simply problem solving- and not analogical -strategies.

Table 14 reveals that children were choosing different strategies to solve the problems across the classical and problem analogies. In the classical tasks, children were relying more on the level 1 error, followed by level 2 errors, with the analogy based object with adaptation being chosen the least. The most frequent strategy in the problem analogies in both sessions were strategies other than analogy based object with adaptations. These included no object use and non-analogical action. Despite the high percentage use of these alternative strategies, children were choosing the strategy

more in the problem analogies than the classical analogies in session one (15 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively) χ2 (1) = 3.125; p<.05 and in session two (28 per cent and 39 per cent, respectively) χ2 (1) = 2.716; p<.05. This indicates that children found using analogy in classical analogies more difficult than in the problem analogies.

Children used similar amounts of level 2 errors strategies in both classical- and problem- analogies. This indicates that level 2 errors are included in children’s repertoire of problem solving in both classical and problem analogies to a similar degree. This strategy is easier to compare across both types of analogy because it meant that children take into account only one aspect of the transformation required. For example, in the classical analogies children only extract the change in shape and not change in pattern whereas in the problem analogies children only take into

account the length of object and not the function of the object. In the toy retrieval task for example, children selected the long stick which has no hooked end to drag the toy.

Children’s performance on classical analogues does not support Goswami and Brown’s (1989) findings. They found that 3-year-olds solved half of all analogies using the analogous card, and 4- and 6-year-olds solved almost two-thirds. In contrast, the present study found that children used the analogy based object strategy on just under a quarter of responses. It is uncertain why analogical use was so low in the current study compared to Goswami and Brown’s findings, because tasks in the current study were based on similar simple pictorial analogues. Children in the present study relied more heavily on level 1 errors, and although this supports Gentner’s suggestion of surface similarity, it is curious why children needed to select object matches when they possessed the required relational knowledge (shape and pattern change). This supports the notion that children had difficulty recognising the relations across the a and b and c and d terms. Even though children are told that they can use all terms to select the d term, they are unable to infer the relations, so they select a repeat of the c term. This supports Singer-Freeman’s (2005) findings that children have difficulty inferring the relations across terms. This also supports Gentner and Ratterman’s (1989) argument that children rely on surface similarity before relational similarity.

Table 14: The Percentage of Strategic choices in Sessions 1 and 2 Across Classical and Problem Analogies

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Classical Level 1 error Level 2 error Analogy Other

Session one 61 24 15 0

Session two 52 20 28 0

Problem

Session one 4 25 25 46

In contrast, children’s lack of reliance on level 1 errors in the problem analogies, highlights how difficult it is to compare classical and problem-analogies. For example, the object match (level 1 error) in the classical analogies was a repeat of the b and c term. Given that children did not receive any feedback as to whether or not their card choice was correct, many continued to select this choice on subsequent trials.

Although the object matches in the problem analogies were based on the same

premise (repeat of the b and c object/item), the nature of the problem analogies meant that children would gain feedback from the task, in that if they chose the incorrect strategy they were aware that they had failed the task. From a methodological point of view, because the object matches were not the most appropriate to solve the problem (not analogical), for example, in the toy retrieval task the level 1 error objects were a head scarf and a toy hedgehog, children did not select these object choices because they understood that these items could not retrieve an out of reach toy. Therefore, it is impossible to compare children’s selection of the level 1 errors across such different analogous tasks. Future research could match strategies so that the required the same object choice and function.

The evidence presented in both classical- and problem-analogies suggests that these two types of analogical reasoning do not use the same processes. As suggested by Singer-Freeman (2005), the problem of access and inference may explain why preschool children do not show a preference for the analogy based object with adaptation, and why children use alternative strategies. For example, children that were unable to infer relations (presented in the classical tasks) turned to level 1 errors, whereas children unable to access the relations (presented in the problem analogies) turned to level 2 errors. This can be explained in the following way; because the level 1 error does not require children to choose any transformation, just a repeat/copy of an object, children find inference more difficult than access because unlike problem analogies, children in classical analogies do not see the transformations across the terms take place. Furthermore, because children are drawn to surface similarity before relational similarity, this caused children to look for perceptual similarity. However, this only explains children’s performance on classical analogies. Even on problems that needed an auxiliary task, children did not turn to object matches they chose either level 2 errors or analogy based object but without adaptation.

In contrast, children are not faced with the limitation of inference in the problem analogies. Here, the relations are already made clear in the base problem. Therefore, it is the job of the child not to infer relations, but to access the relations and realise that they can be used to solve the target problem. However, unlike the classical analogies, where children are told that they can use the a:b terms, in problem analogies children are not given this information. Therefore, children are faced with the problem of spontaneously accessing the relations. In problem analogies children see that an out of reach object for example, can be retrieved with a long hooked object, but it is the act of accessing this information that causes difficulty. Children see the relations laid out in front of them and they select a object that resembles that used in the base.

However, children may not notice that the relations should be used in the target problem and fail to access the appropriate knowledge.

This suggests that when children are unable to infer the relations they rely on surface similarity because they do not take into account any relations – even lower-order relations. In contrast, children unable to access relations use relational similarity in the form of lower-order relations (level 2 errors) and non analogous action, but fail to access the base problem relations to create the higher-order relations needed for analogical reasoning. A further reason highlighted in the results section was the influence of relational knowledge. Before children can transfer relations from one task to another they must understand those relations to enable them to extract the analogy based object with adaptation to solve an analogous problem. Although the present study did not match classical- and problem analogies on their relations, only strategies, future research needs to match both strategies and relations before any firm

conclusions can be made about comparisons in children’s analogical ability between classical- and problem-analogies. If the relations across the classical and problem analogies are not the same then comparison of children’s performance across both is not viable.

In summary, children in the present study rely on surface similarity when faced with classical analogies, as shown in their preference for the level 1 error strategy, but rely more on relational similarity in problem analogies, as evident in their preference for level 2 errors and the analogy based object with adaptation.