3.4 Análisis del proceso realizado por Aldesa Puesto de Bolsa S.A para la gestión del
3.4.3 Análisis de Emisores
3.4.3.1 Análisis de emisores del sector financiero
Large-scale product market entry refers to a situation in which
the existence of scale economies necessitates entry at a scale such
that the entrant must take account of the fact that its output would,
other things being equal, depress market price. Recent work has shown
that under such conditions there may be an advantage to being first in
the market. This result is of fundamental importance since, as we shall
see, it means that the initial conditions matter in the determination
of organisational form.
The advantage to first-movers is that they may be able to make
commitments such that potential entrants perceive that they cannot do
as well in the post-entry equilibrium as the incumbent achieves pre
entry. The earliest and most well-known of this class of models assumes
that the potential entrant expects the incumbent's output to remain
fixed (and that the incumbent knows this to be the case). This
particular assumption, the "Sylos Postulate", turns out to be generally
unsatisfactory but given its familiarity it is useful to illustrate
the essence of the argument. Dixit (1979) considers the optimal strategy
of an incumbent CF faced with an equally efficient CF potential
entrant. He demonstrates that in certain curcumstances the incumbent
would choose to accommodate the entrant into the market, but in others
it is optimal to set an output level which deters entry. In the latter
case, which is of particular interest to us, the incumbent continues
to earn positive profits pre-entry even although the entrant perceives
zero post-entry profits. Furthermore, such entry deterrence may
of the model a firm has an advantage simply by virtue of being first.
If the other firm had been first the equilibrium would be different.
Thus, as Dixit points out: "This suggests that we should pay more
attention to historical or even purely accidental factors when economies
of scale are important, since they can effect industrial structure in
a significant way" (1979, p.23). The same holds true if the potential
entrant is a LMF rather than a CF because, as shown by Miyamoto (1980),
the same output which deters a CF would deter a LMF of equal efficiency.
Given that the wage rate is assumed fixed, the organisational input is
ignored for both firms, and there are no differences in job satisfaction
in his model, this is easily seen since combining tt = R - wN - F and
R - F > > (7)
v = --- reveals that n = 0 as y = w. The problem N
with the Sylos postulate is that if entry were to occur the established
firm would find it best to reduce output. Knowing this, the potential
entrant would not regard the threat to maintain the pre-entry level
as credible. However, a number of models have been proposed in which
the incumbent makes a commitment which is binding. The commitment
may take a number of forms, including brand selection, capacity,
innovation and advertising. They operate in the same way as would
a commitment, if it was possible, to a given level of output. Thus
the major implication, as Salop (1979) points out in his short review,
is that an incumbent may be able to deter an entrant which is of equal (8)
or even superior efficiency. Although the models always examine
We have therefore the important possibility that CFs may be able to
deter entry by LMFs even if the latter are more efficient.
This analysis relates to entry into the product market. In the
case of labour-market monopsony power we suggested in Chapter 3 that
LMFs might be less easily deterred by an incumbent CF than would
If workers wish to buy an existing CF the purchase price must
take account of any future stream of profits that the capitalist is
giving up. Conversions will not therefore occur if labour-management
is less efficient than capitalist production; but if it is more efficient
there would appear to be the possibility of a mutually advantageous
trade. However, it is well known in general that, under certain
conditions, potentially advantageous exchanges may not take place
(Gravelle & Rees 1980, pp. 504-7). Two such conditions are pertinent
to our analysis: imperfect information concerning the good to be
traded, and "small numbers".
Certain kinds of information about the firm may be obtained
relatively costlessly by workers contemplating the establishment of a
LMF. Into this category would fall, for example, the prices and
quantities of existing inputs and outputs and the length of time which
contracts have to run. On the other hand, information such as the
possibility of new competitors on the horizon, forthcoming supply
difficulties and the stock of goodwill enjoyed by the firm is much more
difficult to obtain. The costs of acquiring such information could
exceed the gains from trade. Turning now to the second problem, it
is unlikely that negotiations over the sale of firms would involve
large numbers of identical potential buyers and sellers. This is
because, first of all, for any particular CF the existing workforce
are likely to have superior information regarding the sorts of issues
"small numbers" are therefore not necessarily independent. Secondly,
the existing workforce already have the appropriate production skills.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, an outside group of workers
would be faced with the problem of removing the incumbent workforce.
The situation facing the capitalist seller and LMF buyer is therefore
one where there is a multiplicity of terms which could make one or
both parties better off but, because of "small numbers", there is no
exogenous market price at which they must trade. The result may be
a period of lengthy and costly bargaining and there is the possibility
that they may not be able to agree at all. An important point of note
is that if there is no agreement on the sale it does not mean that the
two parties do not trade at all. They would still be faced with the
employment contract to negotiate and this typically involves bargaining.
Recognition of this may make the capitalist reluctant to provide
information which the workforce requires in order to evaluate the
possibility of purchase because, in the event of a failure to agree
terms, that information would weaken his or her bargaining position
concerning the employment contract. The possibility of a continuing
employment relation will therefore add to the difficulties of negotiating
a sale.
Our examination of large-scale entry and of the sale of firms
suggests that there may be advantages to being first. The first-mover
advantage may be sufficient to outweigh some degree of inefficiency
relative to a potential entrant or prospective purchaser. These types
of advantage are not advantages of one particular organisational form
Thus for example a LMF may be able to deter entry by a more efficient
CF and similarly a relatively inefficient CF will not necessarily be (9)
taken over by more efficient owners. However, our interest is
with an initial situation in which all existing firms are CFs and hence
for us the implication is that capitalist production might not be
replaced by labour—managed production, even if the latter were more
efficient. We now turn to another type of first-mover advantage