Análisis de los resultados de las encuestas

AAA v. HON. ANTONIO A. CARBONELL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City, La Union

and ENGR. JAIME O. ARZADON

G.R. No. 171465, June 8, 2007, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

What the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor.

Facts:

Judge Carbonell dismissed a criminal case of rape for lack of probable cause on the ground that the complainant and her witnesses failed to take the witness stand to convince him that there was probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, citing Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause “to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.”

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Carbonell committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal case.

Ruling:

Yes. The constitutional provision cited by Judge Carbonell does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses. What the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor.

There is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper—whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged—is the function of the investigating prosecutor.

True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judge’s personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses. But it must be emphasized that such personal examination is not mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause. Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor, provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof.

RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 199032, November 19, 2014, PER CURIAM

Human remains can be a proper subject of a search warrant.

Facts:

PS/Supt. Fajardo applied with the RTC Manila for a warrant to search caves located inside the Bienbenido Laud’s compound in Davao City where the alleged remains of the victims summarily executed by the Davao Death Squad was buried. Applicant presented a witness who testified that he personally witnessed the said killing. The RTC issued the warrant. Laud filed an urgent motion to quash and suppress illegally seized evidence, claiming that human remains sought to be seized are not proper subject of a search warrant.

Issues:

Whether or not human remains are personal property thus subject of a search warrant.

Ruling:

Yes. Under section 3 rule 126, a search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property: (a) Subject of the offense; (b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense or used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense.

Considering that human remains can generally be transported from place to place and considering further that they qualify under the phrase

“subject of the offense” (given that they prove the crime’s corpus delicti), it follows that they may be valid subjects of a search warrant under the criminal procedure provision.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA),

respondents.

G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.

The right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police power.

Facts:

Sec. 36 of RA 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses. Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party challenges the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that it violates the constitutional right of a person against unreasonable searches.

Issue:

Whether or not Sec. 36(c) and (d) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 violates the constitutional right against unreasonable searches, and therefore unconstitutional.

Ruling:

No. The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees,

while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well-being of the citizenry. The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizureunder Sec. 2, Art. IIIof the Constitution. US jurisprudence is persuasive. What can be deduced from the US cases of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al. and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. Guided by such jurisprudence, the Court holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.

Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police power. As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held, "reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. The employee’s privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld. Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well -defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed

by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. Sec. 36 par. c and d are declared constitutional.

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014, SERENO, CJ.

The drug test in Sec. 15, Art. II of RA 9165 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165

Facts:

According to the prosecution, the agents of NBI received a complaint from Corazon and Charito that Ariel Escobido was picked up by several unknown male persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to them and they were instructed to go to the Police where they met “James” who demanded from them P100,000, later lowered to P40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel. The complainants reported it to the NBI-CEVRO which verified the text messages received by the complainants. A team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation. The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a pre-marked 500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder, which was made part of the amount demanded by "James" and handed by Corazon. Petitioner underwent forensic examination and was required to submit his urine for drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs. The petitioner denied the charges and he said he was required to extract urine for drug examination, but he refused. He was convicted for violating Sec. 15, Art.

II of RA 9165 because the following were established: (1) the accused was arrested; (2) the accused was subjected to drug test; and (3) the confirmatory test shows that he used a dangerous drug.

Issue:

Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.

Ruling:

No. The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of RA 9165. Note that accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion. Making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in

Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under RA 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime.

To overextend the application of this provision would run counter to our pronouncement in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, which states that mandatory drug testing can never be random and suspicionless. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195.

Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy. The court cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made. Petitioner is acquitted.

BRICCIO Ricky A. POLLO v. CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID

G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011, Villarama, Jr., J.

Government employee’s constitutional protection to privacy as to the computers they used in the work place may vary on a case to case basis. And in cases that there is reduced privacy expectation search incidental to work-related investigations must comply with the reasonableness and scope test.

Facts:

This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was charged administratively and eventually dismissed from the service. The employees personal files stored in the computer were used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct. Pollo is a government employee whose computer was searched pursuant to the anonymous letter complaint to the office of Chairperson David. Pollo now assailed the validity of the search and resulting evidence thereby being the fruit of the poisonous tree.

Issue:

Whether the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files without his knowledge and consent was reasonable

Ruling:

No. In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance the invasion of the employee’s legitimate expectations of privacy against the governments need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace. In our view, therefore, a probable cause

requirement for searches of the type at issue here would impose intolerable burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting the employee misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the agency’s work, and ultimately to the public interest. Thus, public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for no investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable. Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a two-fold inquiry: first, one must consider whether the action was justified at its inception; and second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a non-investigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. The search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the misconduct.

This to test was found to be fulfilled in the case at bar, considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the complaint was received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned regional office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the search was justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and store documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-related investigation.

JESSE U. LUCAS v. JESUS S. LUCA G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011, Nachura, J.

Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable.

Facts:

Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the RTC, alleging that he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus Lucas in Manila. The RTC dismissed his petition, because he failed to establish

compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely: (1) a prima facie case; (2) affirmative defences; (3) presumption of legitimacy; and (4) physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.

Issue:

Whether a prima facie showing of legitimacy is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing.

Ruling:

Yes. But it is not yet time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained:

“Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.”

The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

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