Análisis de la Matriz del Marco Lógico

a.

ThePROs

Asmentionedabove,althoughmusicalcompositionswereexpresslymadesubjectto copyrightprotectionstartingin1831,Congressdidnotgrantmusiccreatorsthe exclusiverighttopubliclyperformtheircompositionsuntil1897.108 _{Thoughthisright}

representedanewwayforcopyrightownerstoderiveprofitfromtheirmusicalworks, thesheernumberandfleetingnatureofpublicperformancesmadeitimpossiblefor copyrightownerstoindividuallynegotiatewitheachuserforeveryuse,ordetectevery caseofinfringement.109 _{ASCAPwasestablishedin1914,followedbyotherPROs,to}

ofitsprovisionsregardingtemporarycopiesandrecognitionthatinteractivestreaminginvolves themakingofDPDs. Id. at1277‐81.

105_{See Reforming Section 115 of the Copyright Act for the Digital Age: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on}

Courts, the Internet, and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,110thCong.4(2007) (“Reforming Section 115 Hearing”)(statementofRep.HowardCoble).

106_{See generally Copyright Office Views on Music Licensing Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on}

Courts, the Internet, and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,109thCong.21‐36(2005) (“Copyright Office Views on Music Licensing Reform Hearing”)(statementofMarybethPeters, RegisterofCopyrights).

107_{Id. at56‐57(letterfromJonathanPotter,ExecutiveDirector,DiMA); id. at59‐60(letterfrom}

StevenM.Marks,RIAA); id. at99(commentsofASCAP); id. at62‐64(commentsofNMPA).

108_{See SteveWilf, The Making of the Post‐War Paradigm in American Intellectual Property Law,31}

COLUM.J.L.&ARTS139,176(2008);NoelL.Hillman, Intractable Consent: A Legislative Solution to the Problem of Aging Consent Decrees in United States v. ASCAP and United States v. BMI,8FORDHAM INTELL.PROP.MEDIA&ENT.L.J.733,737(1998).

109_{BMI v. CBS,441U.S.1,4‐5(1979); see also Alden‐Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP,80F.Supp.888,891}

addressthelogisticalissueofhowtolicenseandcollectpaymentforthepublic performanceofmusicalworksinawiderangeofsettings.110

Today,thePROsprovidevariousdifferenttypesoflicensesdependinguponthenature oftheuse. Anyonewhopubliclyperformsamusicalworkmayobtainalicensefroma PRO,includingterrestrial,satelliteandinternetradiostations,broadcastandcable televisionstations,onlineservices,bars,restaurants,liveperformancevenues,and commercialestablishmentsthatplaybackgroundmusic.

Mostcommonly,licenseesobtainablanketlicense,whichallowsthelicenseetopublicly performanyofthemusicalworksinaPRO’srepertoireforaflatfeeorapercentageof totalrevenues.111 _{Someusersoptforablanketlicenseduetoitsbroadcoverageof}

musicalworksandrelativesimplicityascomparedtoothertypesoflicenses. Large commercialestablishmentssuchasbars,restaurants,concertvenues,stores,andhotels oftenenterintoblanketlicensestocovertheiruses,payingeitherapercentageofgross revenuesoranannualflatfee,dependingontheestablishmentandthetypeandamount ofuse.112 _{TerrestrialradiostationsobtainblanketlicensesfromPROsaswell,usuallyby}

meansoftheRMLC.113 _{Manytelevisionstations,throughtheTMLC,alsoobtainblanket}

licenses.114

Lesscommonlyusedlicensesincludetheper‐programorper‐segmentlicense,which allowsthelicenseetopubliclyperformanyofthemusicalworksinthePRO’srepertoire forspecifiedprogramsorpartsoftheirprogramming,inexchangeforaflatfeeora percentageofthatprogram’sadvertisingrevenue.115 _{Unlikeablanketlicense,theper‐}

programorper‐segmentlicenserequiresmoredetailedreportinginformation,including programtitles,thespecificmusicselectionsused,andusagedates,makingthelicense moreburdensomeforthelicenseetoadminister.116

Userscanalsolicensemusicdirectlyfrommusicpublishersthroughadirectlicenseora sourcelicense. Adirectlicenseissimplyalicenseagreementdirectlynegotiated

110_{BMI v. CBS,441U.S.at4‐5; see also Alden‐Rochelle,80F.Supp.at891.} 111_{Meredith Corp.,1F.Supp.3dat190; BMI v. CBS,441U.S.at5.}

112_{See KOHNat1263,1275‐80. TheCopyrightActexemptsmanysmallcommercialestablishments}

fromtheneedtoobtainapublicperformancelicense. See 17U.S.C.§110(5).

113_{DavidOxenford, What is the RMLC, And Why Should a Radio Station Pay Their Bill?,BROAD.L.}

BLOG(Aug.24,2012),http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2012/08/articles/what‐is‐the‐rmlc‐and‐

why‐should‐a‐radio‐station‐pay‐their‐bill.

114_{Meredith Corp.,1F.Supp.3dat189‐90.}

115_{See generally LaurenM.Bilasz, Note: Copyrights, Campaigns, and the Collective Administration of}

Performance Rights: A Call to End Blanket Licensing of Political Events,32CARDOZOL.REV.305,323& nn.111‐112(2010)(descriptionsofeachlicense).

betweenthecopyrightownerandtheuserwhointendstopubliclyperformthemusical work. Sourcelicensesarecommonlyusedinthemotionpictureindustry,becausethe PROsareprohibitedfromlicensingpublicperformancerightsdirectlytomovietheater owners.117 _{Instead,filmproducerslicensepublicperformancerightsforthemusicused}

infilmsatthesametimeasthesynchronizationrights,andpasstheperformancerights alongtothetheatersthatwillbeshowingtheirfilms.118 _{Inthecontextofmotion}

pictures,sourcelicensesdonottypicallyencompassnon‐theatricalperformances,such asontelevision. Thus,televisionstations,cablecompanies,andonlineservicessuchas NetflixandHulumustobtainpublicperformancelicensesfromthePROstocoverthe publicperformanceofmusicalworksintheshowsandmoviestheytransmittoend users.119

b.

AntitrustOversight

Basic Antitrust Principles

Unlikethemechanicalright,thepublicperformanceofmusicalworksisnotsubjectto compulsorylicensingundertheCopyrightAct. But,asdescribedbelow,ASCAPand BMIaresubjecttogovernmentantitrustregulationthroughlongstandingconsent decrees. AndwhileneitherSESACnorGMRissubjecttosuchdirectantitrust

regulation,each,ofcourse,mustabidebygenerallyapplicableantitrustlaw,whichis enforceablebythegovernmentorthroughprivatecausesofaction. SESAC,forexample, hasrecentlybeenthesubjectofprivateantitrustsuits,asdiscussedbelow. Adetailed explanationoftheantitrustrationalethatunderliesthePROconsentdecreesisbeyond thescopeofthisstudy. Butabriefdiscussionofsomebasicantitrustprinciplesmaybe helpfulinunderstandingthemotivationbehindthedecrees.

Section1oftheShermanAntitrustActprohibits“[e]verycontract,combinationinthe formoftrustorotherwise,orconspiracy,inrestraintoftradeorcommerceamongthe several[s]tates.”120 _{AstheSupremeCourthasopined,however,“Congresscouldnot}

haveintendedaliteralinterpretationoftheword‘every,’”andasaresult,courts

117_{Thisprohibitionwasaresultofantitrustlitigationbroughtbymovietheaterownersinthe}

1940s. Alden‐Rochelle,80F.Supp.888;see also ChristianSeyfert, Copyright and Anti‐Trust Law: Public Performance Rights Licensing of Musical Works into Audiovisual Media 6,20(Sept.1,2005) (unpublishedLL.M.thesis,GoldenGateUniversitySchoolofLaw), available at http:// digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/theses/13at19.

118_{See id. at19.}

119_{Id.; see also NetflixFirstNoticeCommentsat1‐2; ASCAP Reports Increased Revenues in 2011,}

ASCAP(Mar.8,2012),http://www.ascap.com/press/2012/0308_ascap‐reports.aspx(reflecting blanketlicenseswithNetflixandHulu). LicensingofperformancerightsfromSESACandGMR occurswithoutdirectantitrustoversight,andthosesmallerPROsmayrefusetolicensetheir repertoirestopotentiallicensees.

“analyze[]mostrestraintsundertheso‐called‘ruleofreason.’”121 _{Theruleofreasontest}

requiresacourttonotonlyfindarestraintoftrade,butalsodeterminewhetherthat restraintisunreasonable.122 _{TheSupremeCourthasalsorecognized,however,that}

“[o]nceexperiencewithaparticularkindofrestraintenablestheCourttopredictwith confidencethattheruleofreasonwillcondemnit,ithasappliedaconclusive

presumptionthattherestraintisunreasonable.”123 _{Thus,certainarrangements—}

includingprice‐fixingagreements—aredeemedperseviolationsofsection1.124

A“tying”arrangementisanotherkindofbusinesspracticethatraisesantitrustconcerns. Atyingarrangementis“anagreementbyapartytoselloneproductbutonlyonthe conditionthatthebuyeralsopurchasesadifferent(ortied)product.”125 _Such

arrangementsareunlawful“ifthesellerhas‘appreciableeconomicpower’inthetying productmarketandifthearrangementaffectsasubstantialvolumeofcommerceinthe tiedmarket.”126 _{ButastheFederalTradeCommission(“FTC”)observes,“[t]helawon}

tyingischanging.”127 _{WhiletheSupremeCourt“hastreatedsometie‐insasperseillegal}

inthepast,lowercourtshavestartedtoapplythemoreflexible‘ruleofreason’toassess thecompetitiveeffectsoftiedsales.”128

Department of Justice Consent Decrees

Since1941,ASCAPandBMI’slicensingpracticeshavebeensubjecttoantitrustconsent decreesoverseenbytheAntitrustDivisionoftheDOJandenforcedbyfederaldistrict courtsinNewYorkCity.129 _{Thoseconsentdecreeswereimplementedinreactionto}

allegedanticompetitivepracticesofASCAPandBMI. Specifically,whenoriginally formed,bothPROsacquiredtheexclusiverighttonegotiatemembers’public performancerights,andforbadetheirmembersfromenteringintodirectlicensing

121_{Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y,457U.S.332,342‐43(1982).} 122_{Associated Press v. United States,326U.S.1,27(1945).}

123_{Arizona,457U.S.at343‐44.} 124_{Id. at344‐45.}

125_{N. Pac Ry. Co. v. United States,356U.S.1,5(1958).}

126_{Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc.,504U.S.451,4662(1992).}

127_{Tying the Sale of Two Products,FTC,http://www.ftc.gov/tips‐advice/competition‐guidance/}

guide‐antitrust‐laws/single‐firm‐conduct/tying‐sale‐two‐products(lastvisitedJan.26,2015).

128_Id.

129_{See generally United States v. BMI,275F.3d168,171‐72(2dCir.2001)(describingthehistory); see}

also Antitrust Consent Decree Review,U.S.DOJ,http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascap‐bmi‐decree‐

arrangements. Additionally,bothofferedonlyblanketlicensescoveringallofthemusic intheirrespectiverepertoires.130

Inthe1930s,theDOJ’sAntitrustDivisioninvestigatedASCAPforanticompetitive conduct—specificallythatASCAP’slicensingarrangementsconstitutedprice‐fixing and/orunlawfultying.131 _{Thegovernmentsubsequentlyfiledfederalcourtactionsin}

1934and1941,arguingthattheexclusiveblanketlicense—astheonlylicenseofferedat thetime—wasanunlawfulrestraintoftradeandthatASCAPwaschargingarbitrary pricesasaresultofanillegalcopyrightpool.132 _{Whilethefirstcasewasneverfully}

litigatedafterthegovernmentwasgrantedamid‐trialcontinuance,thelatteractionwas settledwiththeimpositionofaconsentdecreein1941.133 _{Thatconsentdecreehasbeen}

modifiedtwice,firstin1950andmostrecentlyin2001.134 _{TheUnitedStatesalso}

pursuedantitrustclaimsagainstBMI,resultinginasimilarconsentdecreein1941.135

The1941BMIconsentdecreewassupersededbyanewdecreein1966,whichwaslast amendedin1994.136

AlthoughtheASCAPandBMIconsentdecreesarenotidentical,theysharemanyofthe samefeatures. Asmostrelevanthere,thePROsmayonlyacquirenonexclusiverightsto licensemembers’publicperformancerights;mustgrantalicensetoanyuserthat

applies,ontermsthatdonotdiscriminateagainstsimilarlysituatedlicensees;andmust acceptanysongwriterormusicpublisherthatappliestobeamember,aslongasthe writerorpublishermeetscertainminimumstandards.137

ASCAPandBMIarealsorequiredtoofferalternativelicensestotheblanketlicense. Oneoptionistheadjustablefeeblanketlicense,ablanketlicensewithacarve‐outthat reducestheflatfeetoaccountformusicdirectlylicensedfromPROmembers. Under theconsentdecrees,ASCAPandBMImustalsoprovide,whenrequested,“through‐to‐

the‐audience”licensestobroadcastnetworksthatcoverperformancesnotonlybythe networksthemselves,butalsobyaffiliatedstationsthatfurthertransmitthose

130_{ChristianSeyfert, Copyright and Anti‐Trust Law: Public Performance Rights Licensing of Musical}

Works into Audiovisual Media at6,20; see also Wilfat177.

131_{Seyfert, Copyright and Anti‐Trust Law: Public Performance Rights Licensing of Musical Works into}

Audiovisual Media at20‐21.

132_{BMI v. CBS,441U.S.at10.}

133_{Seyfert, Copyright and Anti‐Trust Law: Public Performance Rights Licensing of Musical Works into}

Audiovisual Media at20‐21.

134_{BMI v. CBS,441U.S.at11.} 135_{BMI v. CBS,441U.S.at12n.20.}

136_{Seyfert, Copyright and Anti‐Trust Law: Public Performance Rights Licensing of Musical Works into}

Audiovisual Media at22; see also BMIConsentDecree.

performancesdownstream.138 _{ASCAPandBMIarealsorequiredtoprovideper‐}

programandper‐segmentlicenses,asaredescribedabove.139

ASCAPisexpresslybarredfromlicensinganyrightsotherthanitsmembers’public performancerights(i.e.,ASCAPmaynotlicensemechanicalorsynchronization rights).140 _{AlthoughBMI’sconsentdecreelacksasimilarprohibition,inpracticeBMI}

doesnotlicenseanyrightsotherthanpublicperformancerights.141

Finally,andperhapsmostsignificantly,prospectivelicenseesthatareunabletoagreeto aroyaltyratewithASCAPorBMImayseekadeterminationofareasonablelicensefee fromoneoftwofederaldistrictcourtjudgesintheSouthernDistrictofNewYork.142 _The

ratecourtproceduresarediscussedingreaterdetailbelow.

InresponsetorequestsbyASCAPandBMItomodifycertainprovisionsoftheirdecrees, theDOJ’sAntitrustDivisionannouncedinJune2014thatitwouldbeevaluatingthe consentdecrees,andhassolicitedandreceivedextensivepubliccommentsonwhether andhowthedecreesmightbeamended.143 _{Specifically,bothASCAPandBMIseekto}

modifytheconsentdecreestopermitpartialgrantsofrights,toreplacethecurrent ratesettingprocesswithexpeditedarbitration,andtoallowASCAPandBMItoprovide bundledlicensesthatincludemultiplerightsinmusicalworks.144 _TheDOJhas

expresseditsintentto“examinetheoperationandeffectivenessoftheConsentDecrees,” particularlyinlightofthechangesinthewaymusichasbeendeliveredandconsumed sincethemostrecentamendmentstothosedecrees.145 _{Atthesametime,theDOJis}

138_{ASCAPConsentDecree§V;BMIConsentDecree§IX.}

139_{ASCAPConsentDecree§§II.J‐K,VII;BMIConsentDecree§VIII.B. Notethatunderthe}

ASCAPconsentdecree,theper‐segmentlicensehasanumberofconditionsthatmustbemet beforeitcanbeused. ASCAPConsentDecree§VII.

140_{ASCAPConsentDecree§IV.A.}

141_{See BMI,CommentsonDepartmentofCommerceGreenPaperat4‐5(Nov.13,2013), available}

at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/bmi_comments.pdf.

142_{ASCAPConsentDecree§IX;BMIConsentDecree§XIV.}

143_{Antitrust Consent Decree Review,U.S.DOJ,http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascap‐bmi‐decree‐}

review.html(lastvisitedJan.26,2015).

144_{ASCAP,CommentsSubmittedinResponsetotheDOJ’sAntitrustConsentDecreeReviewat}

18,22,31(Aug.6,2014), available at

http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307803.pdf(“ASCAPAntitrustConsent DecreeReviewComments”);BMI,CommentsSubmittedinResponsetotheDOJ’sAntitrust ConsentDecreeReviewat2(Aug.6,2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/ comments/307859.pdf(“BMIAntitrustConsentDecreeReviewComments”).

145_{Antitrust Consent Decree Review,U.S.DOJ,http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascap‐bmi‐decree‐}

conductingarelatedinvestigationtodeterminewhethertherehasbeenacoordinated effortamongmusicpublishersandPROstoraiseroyaltyrates.146

Key Antitrust Cases

InadditiontotheDOJactionsthatledtotheadoptionoftheconsentdecrees,PRO practiceshavebeenthesubjectofprivateantitrustactions,includinganumberrelatedto theconsentdecrees. Thedecisionsinthesecasesservetohighlightcourts’approachto thecollectivelicensingofpublicperformancerightsandadministrationoftheconsent decrees.

Inthe1979SupremeCourtcaseofBMI v. CBS,CBShadsuedASCAPandBMI,alleging thattheblanketlicenseviolatedantitrustlawsbyconstituting“illegalpricefixing,an unlawfultyingarrangement,aconcertedrefusaltodeal,andamisuseofcopyrights.”147

Ratherthandeclaringtheblanketlicensesperseunlawful,theCourtheldthatthey shouldbeevaluatedundera“ruleofreason”test,observingthatablanketlicensecould beusefultoaddresstheproblemofnegotiatingthousandsofindividuallicenses. The Courtalsonotedasrelevantthefactthattherewereno“legal,practical,orconspiratorial impediment[s]”toobtainingdirectlicenses,indicatinglicenseeshavearealchoiceinthe directlicenseasanalternativetotheblanketlicense.148 _{Onremand,thecourtofappeals}

upheldtheblanketlicenseundertheruleofreason,explainingthatitdidnot unreasonablyrestraincompetitionbecauseCBScouldfeasiblyobtaindirectlicenses fromcopyrightowners.149

AftertheBMI v. CBS litigation,anumberofothercourtsexaminedtheblanketlicense, andsustaineditagainstantitrustchallengesunderrule‐of‐reasonanalysis. InBuffalo Broadcasting v. ASCAP,theSecondCircuitconcludedthat,inthecontextoflocal televisionstations,theblanketlicensedidnotviolatetheShermanActbecauseper‐

programlicenses,directlicenses,andsourcelicenseswererealisticalternativestothe blanketlicense.150 _{AfederaldistrictcourtintheDistrictofColumbiareachedasimilar}

conclusionwithrespecttocablestations.151

146_{EdChristman, Dept. of Justice Sends Doc Requests, Investigating UMPG, Sony/ATV, BMI and}

ASCAP Over Possible “Coordination,” BILLBOARD(July13,2014),http://www.billboard.com/biz/ articles/news/publishing/6157513/dept‐of‐justice‐sends‐doc‐requests‐investigating‐umpg‐

sonyatv. MembersoftheDOJAntitrustDivisionattendedandobservedtheOffice’sroundtables forthisstudyinNashvilleandNewYork.

147_{BMI v. CBS,441U.S.at6.} 148_{Id. at24.}

149_{CBS v. ASCAP,620F.2d930,938‐39(2dCir.1980).}

150_{Buffalo Broad. v. ASCAP,744F.2dat926‐32; see also id. at934(Winter,J.,concurring)(“[S]olong}

Morerecentlitigationhasinvolvedroyaltyratedisputes. In2012,theSecondCircuit addressedratedisputesinvolvingASCAPandBMI,ontheonehand,andDMX,a backgroundmusicservice,ontheother,regardingtheratetobepaidforanadjustable‐

feeblanketlicense.152 _{Inarguingforalowerrate,DMXpointedtodirectlicensesithad}

enteredintowithanumberofcopyrightowners,mostofthemsmallerpublishers,on relativelyfavorabletermsforDMX.153 _{DMX,however,alsoreliedonadirectlicense}

fromSony/ATV,amajormusicpublisher. ThatdealgaveSony/ATVaproratashareof thesameannualrateasothersmallerpublishers,butalsoprovidedSonya$2.4million advanceanda$300,000administrativefee.154 _{Thecourtfoundthisandtheotherdirect}

dealsenteredintobyDMXtobepersuasivebenchmarksandthattheratecourts

reasonablyconsideredDMX’sdirectlicensesintheirratedeterminations. Althoughthe PROsarguedthatthesubstantialadvancepaidtoSony/ATVrenderedthatlicensean inadequatebasistosetratesfortheremainderofpublisherscoveredbyPROlicenses, thecourtofappealsaffirmedtheratesadoptedbytheratecourts.155

TherehasalsobeenrecentlitigationbetweenthePROsandPandora,theinternetradio

In document LAS SALIDAS PEDAGÓGICAS COMO HERRAMIENTA DIDÁCTICA PARA LOGRAR UN APRENDIZAJE SIGNIFICATIVO GUÍA DE LUGARES PEDAGÓGICOS E INTERACTIVOS APLICADO A LAS DOCENTES DEL JARDÍN FISCAL DR JOSÉ RICARDO CHIRIBOGA VILLAGÓMEZ, UBICADO EN EL DISTRITO METROPOLITANO D (página 48-54)