Análisis de mercado

In addition to the framework Jakobsen makes six claims about the advantages of the

ideal policy compared to existing theories. The first claim is that it can explain coercive diplomacy outcomes more accurately with fewer variables.43 Although he states

‘explain’; an implied claim is that if both sides act rationally then the ideal policy will

42_{Ibid. pg.43.}

43

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work; so it is a prediction of success. However, as mentioned previously the problems of individual constructions of the system and their perception of their position within it, psychological biases, cognitive limitations and asymmetric information will affect the ability of the state to calculate the most rational choice in a crisis. Therefore, the ideal policy is unlikely to be a reliable method for predicting outcomes. However, as will be seen in the cases studies, it is useful as an analytical framework to explain why states acted in a particular way.

The second claim is that ‘it can explain coercive diplomacy outcomes just as accurately but with fewer conditions representing the operationalisation of Schelling’s five

necessary conditions and George and Simons’ ‘particularly significant’.44 Furthermore that operationalisation enables policy-makers to decide whether they are present or not in a given crisis.45 To verify the first element of this claim it would be necessary to examine several case studies using a framework derived from Schelling’s work and George’s framework. Then the analysis would need to be compared in order to attempt to determine which framework yields the most accurate analysis. However, the

difficulty with this is that as discussed earlier in the chapter it would be difficult to determine which analysis is closer to the truth to bench mark this assessment against.

Furthermore, Jakobsen’s assertion of clarity for policy makers by clearly operationalising the variables, is over emphasised as there is still an element of subjectivity. For example what exactly constitutes a threat? Often the US makes statements such as ‘no options have been left off the table’, this is clearly an implied threat that force may be used, but does it meet the criteria for the ideal policy or not?

44_{Op.cit. Jakobsen (1998), pg.31.}

45

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The third claim is that the ideal policy framework is testable. This will be evaluated in more depth later in the thesis. The fourth claim is that the focus on implemented policy avoids the mixture of contextual variables and success conditions that limit the

explanatory power of George and Simons’ framework. Again without, testing George and Simons’ framework against the given cases and then comparing the results against the ideal policy this claim cannot be fully verified. However, the implemented policy in reality will clearly be dependent on the context of the situation. Therefore, whether the policy implemented looks like the ideal policy will depend on the context.

The fifth claim is that keeping messages clear and simple reduces the scope for misperception and miscalculation.46 This would seem a logical claim. However, the simplicity of the message sent is dependent on the context and complexity of the crisis that it is being applied to and the interpretation of the opponent of the signal. For acts of aggression it is easy to see the opponent’s response to demands i.e. the withdraw or halting of an advance. However, in the case of nuclear proliferation it may not be possible to verify fully compliance. The increased uncertainty of such crises makes signalling more difficult and increases the chances of miscalculation and misperception.

The final assertion is that ‘the framework requires little knowledge about the opponent’ and that ‘one can explain and predict outcomes of coercive diplomacy attempts against aggressors by focusing on the policy pursued by the coercer and black boxing the opponent’. Jakobsen further asserts that:

To test this part of my argument I only need to determine whether the

implementation of the ideal policy results in success and its absence in failure. There is no need to analyse the behaviour of the opponent in great detail. The only thing I need to decide in the case studies is whether the opponent

46 _{Jakobsen, Western use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, A Challenge for Theory and} Practice, pg.5.

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understands the game of coercion to ensure that both players are playing the same game.47

Although it is recognised that ‘incorporating the behaviour of the coercer and opponent’ would lead to increased accuracy, the limit of information on the target forces

assumptions and educated guesses on the opposition to be made.48 Whilst this approach is understandable in a vacuum of data on the opponent, it does limit the depth of

analysis that can be done and the explanatory power of the policy. It also limits

determination of whether the ideal policy worked because of the implementation of the policy or because of another reason. However, in order to determine whether it was truly the coercer’s choice to comply the opponent has to be examined and incorporated into the analysis as much as possible.

Case Selection

George emphasises that the primary criterion for case selection should be relevance to the research objective of the study, whether it includes theory development, theory testing, or heuristic purposes.49 Furthermore, the cases should also be selected to

provide the kind of control and variation required by the research problem. This requires that the universe or subclass of events be clearly defined so that appropriate cases can be selected.50

Jakobsen used two criteria to decide whether a crisis constituted a case of coercive diplomacy: 47_{Ibid. pg.31.} 48 Op.cit. Jakobsen (1998). pg.31. 49_{Op.cit. George&Bennett(2005), pg.83.} 50_Ibid.

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1. The coercer must send a message to the aggressor(s) demanding that the use of force is stopped and/or consequences undone.

2. A threat to punish non-compliance must accompany this demand. This threat may or may not be accompanied by a carrot for compliance.51

These criteria were formulated specifically for the scenario of coercive diplomacy with the aim of undo/stopping an act of aggression. As this thesis is examining coercive diplomacy employed to prevent nuclear proliferation the first criteria needs to be amended to the following:

1. The coercer must send a message asking the target state to stop/or undo their nuclear programme.

Furthermore, in order to reduce the variables to understand the resulting outcome for my study, cases must also fit some additional criteria:

1. The selected case must have developed, or have been perceived by the USA to have developed, a nuclear programme since 1964.52

2. The USA must be the primary coercer of the selected case. By maintaining the US as the primary coercer it reduces the variables, as different states will have different capabilities, strategic culture and political systems that may affect the cost calculus within it.

51_{Op.cit. George&Bennett(2005), pg.7.}

52 _{China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964 and was the last state to be recognised as a nuclear state}

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3. There needs to be evidence of a completed outcome i.e. compliance or rejection of the demand. As part of the puzzle that this study looks to solve is what leads to successful outcomes; any case that is still ongoing, such as Iran53, has been discounted.

Table.1 in appendix C shows states that had or still have a nuclear programme and could be considered as cases. The following states were identified as meeting the criteria:

1. North Korea (1993-2006) 2. Libya (1992-2003) 3. Iraq (1992-2003) 4. South Korea (1970-2004) 5. Taiwan (1960-1980) 6. Pakistan (1976-1998)

NK and Libya have been chosen as between 1993-2006 as both were the targets of US coercive diplomacy that had the goal of stopping them attain nuclear weapons. NK continued its programme and tested its first nuclear device in 2005; therefore, ultimately US policy can be seen as a failure. Libya surrendered its WMD programme in 2003; therefore, it appears to be a demonstration of successful US coercive diplomacy.

As the coercive diplomacy in both cases occurred roughly at the same time, the specific military and diplomatic power of the US was the same in both cases; therefore, the difference on outcome must be dependent on other factors. By comparing and

contrasting the case studies it is envisaged that the key factors that led to successful and unsuccessful outcomes can be determined. Furthermore, NK was specifically mentioned as members of the ‘axis of evil’, and Libya was mentioned in a speech titled ‘beyond the axis of evil’; this is relevant because Iraq, also identified as part of the ‘axis of evil’ was subsequently invaded by a US; which demonstrated its willingness to use force.

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Iraq also had coercive diplomacy applied over the same period as NK and Libya. However, the outcome of this is unclear as eventually more than limited force was applied and it appears that Iraq did not have a WMD programme. Furthermore, as will be explained within the study, the invasion of Iraq is likely to be factor in why NK continued its nuclear programme and Libya decided to surrender its. Therefore, Iraq is a contributing factor to the outcomes in the two case studies.

South Korea, Pakistan and Taiwan do meet the selection criteria but have been

discounted for two reasons. Firstly, they were only subjected to withdrawal of US aid or support, rather than a more forceful threat. Secondly, it is felt by focusing on Libya and NK a more detailed study can be achieved that will delve more deeply into the differing outcomes to form more profound explanations of the two cases.

There are several states such as South Africa54, Sweden, Kazakhstan55_{, Ukraine and}

Belarus who started nuclear programmes and then stopped; however, there is no evidence to suggest that coercive diplomacy was used to encourage these states to roll back their program. Furthermore, there have been states such as India who have developed and tested nuclear weapons; but again there is no evidence of a failed strategy of coercive diplomacy to prevent them becoming a nuclear power.

Libyan and North Korean Nuclear Proliferation Case Studies

This thesis is the only study that conducts a structured focussed comparison of NK and Libya using Jakobsen’s ideal policy as a framework. The detailed analysis of the cases

54

Terence Mcnamee & Greg Mills, ‘Denuclearizing a Regime: What South Africa's Nuclear Rollback Might Tell Us About Iran’, Defense & Security Analysis, Vol. 22, No.3, (2006), pg.330.

55 _{Kassymzhomart Tokaev, ‘Kazakhstan: From Renouncing Nuclear Weapons to Building Democracy’,} American Foreign Policy Interests Vol.26, No.2, (2004), 93-98.

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will occur in chapter 3 (Libya) and chapter 4 (NK); with the subsequent structured focussed comparison in chapter 5. However, in the next section I will review the key academic studies of the Libyan and NK nuclear crises. In both cases there is literature covering the narrative of the cases; however, I have focussed on the literature that has relevance to this thesis

Libyan nuclear proliferation case studies

There are two major competing theories within the literature over Gaddafi’s decision to surrender his nuclear weapons. One that argues Libya’s decision was partly due to the Bush administration’s tough non-proliferation policy and credible threat of force demonstrated by the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.56 A second theory is that it was due to decades of economic sanctions, recent economic incentives and diplomacy.57 Robert Joseph; the key US negotiator in the 2003 discussions that led to Libya

surrendering its WMD, in his book Countering WMD the Libyan Experience (2009) highlights several lessons that fall out of the ‘Libyan model’ identifying ‘essential to success’:

1. Demonstrate Seriousness. 2. Insist on a strategic decision.

3. Employ all the tools (Diplomacy, Economic, Financial, Interdiction, Military)

4. Create the perception and reality of a Win-Win outcome. 5. Assurance of complete and continuing access for verification.58

56 _{Robert Joseph, Countering WMD the Libyan Experience, (Fairfax, National Institute Press, 2009), pg.}

1.

57

Randall Newnham, ‘Carrots, Sticks, and Bombs: The End of Libya’s WMD Program’, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol 20, No.3 (2009), pg.77; Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A Whytock, ‘Who “Won” Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy’, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2005), pg. 47–86; Ronald Bruce St John, ‘Libya is not Iraq: Preemptive Strikes, WMD and Diplomacy’, Middle East Journal, Volume 58, No.3, (2004), pg.402; Alexander Montgomery, ‘Ringing in Proliferation, How to dismantle an Atomic Bomb network’, International Security, Vol 30, No.2 (2005), pg.180; Flynt L Leverett, “Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb,” New York Times, 23 January 2004.

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In an earlier chapter Joseph also includes ‘avoid bargaining’; arguing that:

Instead of negotiating X for Y, US and UK representatives insisted that Libya acknowledge and abandon its WMD and longer –range missiles. In doing so, they also made it clear that Libya would remove a major obstacle to improved relations and greater economic and political benefits for the Libyan people.59 However, as I will argue in chapter 3 it is difficult to see how a deal was not done; this view is amplified in several other studies.60

Another theme in the literature is that Bush’s administration did not set the objective of Libyan regime change.61_{Whilst many of the studies cover the narrative and make} recommendations for policy or single factor contributions62 _{towards coercive theory,} there are only a two that identify a coercive framework from the Libyan case. Jentleson and Whytock argue that the Libyan case demonstrates that ‘credible coercion and deft diplomacy’ require three criteria ‘proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive

credibility’.63 _{They also assert that ‘the extent of target state vulnerability as shaped by} its domestic political and economic conditions, including the transmission belt or

59

Op.cit. Joseph (2009), pg. 95.

60

Robert S Litwak, Regime Change, US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11, pg.170; Author’s interview with Professor Jentleson, by telephone, 11 April 2013 - Jentleson stated ‘there is a definite deal, Tony Blair announces the deal in December 2003, he talks about what the next steps will be, first of all to implement the deal are part of a bargain, what access British, American and internationals would have to take away materials and technology, secondly the whole process that led to normalisation of relations for a period was defiantly part of a deal, one can say the official position of the United States is we will do this deal and then talk about it, but that is just public cover.’

61 _{Robert S Litwak, Regime Change, US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11, pg.199; Wyn Q Bowen,} Libya and Nuclear Proliferation, Stepping back from the brink, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2006), pg.12;

Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, ‘Who “Won” Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy’, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2005), pg. 82.

62 _{Randall Newnham, ‘Carrots, Sticks, and Bombs: The End of Libya’s WMD Program’, Mediterranean} Quarterly, Vol. 20, No.3 (2009), pg.93.

63_{Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A Whytock, ‘Who “Won” Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate} and Its Implications for Theory and Policy’, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2005), pg. 79.

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circuit-breaker role of elites and other key political actors’.64 _{The key aspect of this} strategy being the specific targeting of elites in order to influence their decision making.

As discussed in chapter 1; Jakobsen puts forward a model, similar to that of the ideal policy, stating that Libya model demonstrated Coercion, Carrots and Confidence

building measures (3Cs).65 _{Furthermore, he argues that ‘asking which policy instrument} “won Libya”, as the vast majority of studies do, leads to flawed conclusions and policy recommendations as the necessary contributions made by other tools are ignored’.66 _He also points out that Jentleson and Whytock’s coercive diplomacy framework downplays ‘the role played by coercion’.67 Furthermore, Jakobsen argues that the Libya case ‘highlights that analysts and policy-makers would do well to focus more on how different policy tools can be used in combination to achieve desired outcomes than on how individual tools can be employed with decisive effects. It also demonstrates that the Libya success will be hard to replicate’.68

A common theme in the various studies is that the Libyan model will be hard to replicate.69 _{Bowen, points out that the ‘Libyan example attests, the prevailing political-}

64_{Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, Who “Won” Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate} and Its Implications for Theory and Policy, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2005), pg.79.

65

Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Reinterpreting Libya's WMD Turnaround – Bridging the Carrot-Coercion Divide’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 35, No.4(2012), pg. 16.

66 _Ibid.

67_{Ibid. pg.5.}

68 _{Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Reinterpreting Libya's WMD Turnaround – Bridging the Carrot-Coercion}

Divide’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 35, No.4(2012) , pg. 1.

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strategic context is crucial to the efficacy of such measures. Replicating this in a non- Libyan environment is likely to prove very difficult, if not impossible’.70

North Korea nuclear proliferation

There are two NK crises; one in 1994, that concludes with the signing of the Agreed Framework (AF), and a second in 2003 when the US cancels the AF because of NK secret Uranium based programme. Most of the literature tends to focus singularly on a specific crisis; and although many offer policy recommendations and single factor contributions to coercive theory, there are no coercive frameworks/models developed. The key arguments within the literature are whether the AF was successful; and the wisdom of the Bush administration’s decision to break the AF in 2003 due to NK cheating.

The key source for any study of the first nuclear crisis is Going Critical by Wit, Poneman and Gallucci; who were the principal negotiators with NK that led to the AF. They point out several lessons; however, one of the significant points they make, is that you have ‘to integrate carrots and sticks into a strategy of coercive diplomacy’71 _further adding that:

If offered only carrots, the North Koreans will conclude that the other side is more desperate for a deal than they are and will likely continue on a path of defiance and increasing negotiating demands. Offering only sticks will tell the North Koreans that there is not benefit from complying with international demands, except avoidance of pain.72