ANÁLISIS DE RESULTADOS

At the other extreme, there is an interpretation according to which forms are universal (or, alternatively, forms are species), and hence Aristotle does not intend to deny that any

universal is a substance. On this line of interpretation, the form or essence of the particular is shared by all particulars of the same species. This idea – i.e., a universal form shared by all members of the same species – is in scholarly literature often called the species-form.

This interpretation implies that Aristotle reverses in the Metaphysics the order of priority defended in the Categories. The secondary substances (or at least the species) of the Categories are now promoted to the status of primary substances, so there is a “renewal of sympathy” with Plato on this score.148 _{This line of interpretation is easily}       

147 _{The view that universals are thought-dependent is defended, most notably, by Lloyd (1981). Lloyd} thinks that universals are “mental generalizations” of particular forms, committing Aristotle thus to the view that could be labeled as “conceptualism with real basis”. The view that universals exist only in the soul is criticized, to my mind definitely, by Tweedale (1987) and Heinaman (1982). I have considered the difficulties with the view that forms are abstractions also in my “Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Account of Universals and its Problems” (forthcoming). The main difficulty is to explain what guarantees that the abstraction does not become (fictitious) invention.

148 _{This line of interpretation was particularly popular in 1960s and ’70s. See, most notably, Owen (1965b),} Woods (1967), but also Driscoll (1981). The expression “renewal of sympathy” with Plato is taken from Owen (1965b, 137).

compatible with Aristotle’s requirements for knowledge and definition, but it is rather difficult to reconcile it with his arguments in Z 13 for the conclusion that no universal is a substance.

One way to reconcile the view that forms are universal with the slogan that no universal is a substance is to appeal to Aristotle’s essentialism and suggest that Aristotle wants to exclude as substances only those things that can be analyzed in terms of “one thing being said of another” (Z 4, 1030a10). This requirement excludes accidents, the Platonic Forms, and perhaps also genera. But it does not exclude species, which can be said to be peculiar to the thing in that it determines the very being of the thing of which it is predicated. Socrates, for instance, is not a particular that can be first picked out and then have “human being” predicated of him – his being a particular substance is his being human. So being human is inextricably tied up, we might say, with his being. The genera, on the other hand, do not determine the being of a thing as intimately as species – Socrates is an animal only because he is a human being, and his remaining the same animal is, for him, remaining the same human being. This interpretation thus implies that Aristotle did not really mean to argue in Z 13 that no universal is a substance. Rather, he intends to rule out genera as substances but allows that species can be substances.149

The problem with this interpretation is that it makes Aristotle’s arguments in Z 13 lose much of their force. Although there is some evidence that in Z Aristotle is willing to distinguish between species and genera,150 one might fairly ask why he would rely upon

149 _{This type of interpretation is developed by Ross (1997 [1924]) and, most notably, by Woods (1967). See} also Lear (1987) and Albritton (1957), who argue that the whole discussion in Z 13 is carried out on the level of universals, i.e., Aristotle wants to deny that genera can be substances of species. Another possible way to reconcile Z 13’s thesis with the view that forms are universal is to argue that Aristotle equivocates on “substance”. The sense of “substance” in which a species-form is a substance is not that in which no universal is substance. See, e.g. Lacey (1965, footnote 142), and Loux (2008, chap. 6).

150 _{See Z 12, for example, where Aristotle appears to maintain that the genus does not exist independently} of the form and should be thought of along the lines of matter (1038a5-9).

such a distinction and, nevertheless, neglect to mention it in Z 13. Further, Aristotle does say that no universal is a substance: “For it seems to be impossible for any of the things which are predicated universally to be substance” (1038b8-9); “nothing universal is substance” (1038b35); “nothing common is substance” (1040b23; cf. 1040b23, 1041a4, 1042a21, 1060b21, 10871a2, 1087a12).151 But having said all that, it is also worth noting that Aristotle’s conclusion does not resound as an inconvertible truth. His language is also cautious: “For it seems impossible (eioke gar adynaton) for any of the things which are predicated universally to be substance” (1038b8-9).

Thus, neither (1) the interpretation that forms are particular nor (2) the interpretation that forms are universal seems to be fully satisfactory. The prospects of finding a fully

satisfactory interpretation is, of course, controversial.152 But it seems that on these lines of interpretation we need to give up too much; the problems with these interpretations are precisely the ones Aristotle has outlined in his formulation of an aporia in Metaphysics B 6. If forms are particular and universals lack any status, then there is a danger of having to conclude that no knowledge of them is possible. If they are universal, then it is hard to see how they could be substances (and peculiar to the thing). However, in addition to these extreme interpretations, we can also distinguish between two more subtle interpretations.