Of course a complex position of this kind, whose parts interlock so well as to form a kind of fortress, in which the different epistemological, metaphysical, and moral motives buttress each other while hiding their joint operation, will inspire attack from many sides. Not all will be concerned to articulate the underlying notions of the good. There is an influential line of attack today, which can loosely be called neo-Nietzschean, and of which the late Michel Foucault propounded an influential variant, which has its own strong reasons to deny articulation. The neo-Nietzchean position attacks the procedural ethic mainly for its implicit moral inspirations: 10 for the concep tion of freedom it defends, and for its attachment to a hypergood and consequent radical revisionism. In this it resembles my critique, because we
both want to show that this modern philosophy
has
moral motives, insteadof being uniquely determined by epistemic ones. But there the convergence ends. The neo-Nietzschean type of theory sees no value in this articulation other than the polemical one of unmasking the pretensions of modern moral philosophy and, indeed, of much of moral philosophy in general. It sees no value in this articulation itself. On the contrary, it has espoused its own version of projection theory. If intellectual positions are closely tied up with moral ones, this is because both are to be seen as orders which we have
imposed on reality, following a line of thinking drawn largely from
The Gay
Science.l l
No position is to be seen as more or less justified than any other.All are ultimately based on fiat. Such are the "regimes of truth" of which Foucault spoke. Needless to say, I find this view as deeply implausible as its empiricist cousins. The point of view from which we might constate that all orders are equally arbitrary, in particular that all moral views are equally so, is just not available to us humans. It is a form of self-delusion to think that we do not speak from a moral orientation which we take to be right. This is a condition of being a functioning self, not a metaphysical view we can put on or off. So the meta-construal of the neo-Nietzschean philosopher-'in holding my moral position, I am imposing (or collaborating in the imposition
?f)
a regime of truth on the chaos, and so does everyone'-is just asImpossible as the meta-construal of the empiricist-'in holding my moral position, I am projecting values on a neutral world of facts, and so does everyone'. Both are incompatible with the way we cannot but understand ou�selves in the actual practices which constitute holding that position: our delIberations, our serious assessments of ourselves and others. They are not COnstruals you could actually make of your life while living it. They clash, in other words, with the best available account of our moral life. And what meta-considerations can overrule our best account of our actual moral experience? The neo-Nietzschean position falls afoul of the BA principle, just as the crasser forms of naturalism do.12
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same kind of criticism as that which we both, it and I, level against mainstream moral philosophy: that of not coming quite clean about its own moral motivations. Only here the problem is not that it denies having any, as with modern meta-ethical theories which claim only epistemological grounds, but that it accords them a false status. It claims a kind of distance from its own value commitments, which consists in the fact that it alone is lucid about
their status as fruits of a constructed order, which lucidity sets it apart from
other views and confers the advantage on itself of being free from delusion in a way that the others aren't. This is, of course, strikingly similar to the claim made by naturalist theories, those which see that values are "merely" projections. The claim in one and the other case is unfounded, and is only kept aloft by a certain lack of self-lucidity, which keeps the relevant meta-construal from connecting with the terms in which we cannot but live our actual moral experience.
Of course neo-Nietzschean theories, just as those of obligatory action, have their own complex of underlying epistemological and moral motives. One of these is particularly worth noting, because it has led to some important insights. Writers in this stream have made us especially aware how visions of good may be connected to certain forms of domination. This was obvious in certain cases, e.g., the warrior ethic of fame and glory plainly exalted men and gave a subordinate and largely ancillary role to women. But various forms of more lofty, seemingly universal spiritual outlooks may also foster inequality and the suppression of supposedly lesser beings. Neo Nietzscheans build here on insights which were put forward in the Romantic era. Allegiance to certain kinds of hypergoods leads to a suppression of 'nature', and this introduces relations of domination within us.13 These relations then become fatally reflected in those between people. Thinkers of the Frankfurt school drew on this source as well as on Nietzsche.
There is obviously much truth, and of a very crucial sort, in this charge. Certain variants, at least, of the ideals of rational disengaged freedom and universal justice seem to exalt male ways of being over female.14 And I have mentioned other examples in section 3 .2..
But as with the theories of obligatory action, it is a confusion to infer from this either that views of the good are all simply enterprises of domination or that we can consider them all arbitrarily chosen. This would be to fail to recognize the manner in which one's own position or, indeed, that of any human being, is powered by a vision of the good.
In face of both these constricting meta-views, there is a great need for
undistorted articulacy about the visions of the good that actually underlie our
moral reactions, affinities, and aspirations. It would first of all help us to see our way clearer in the ongoing debate between different moral visions which murmurs or rages around us and frequently in us. In fact, getting clear on the