Análisis del diseño e implementación de la aplicación STMS 1,0

Transferred US soldiers to Yugoslav military officials and interrogation elements. 9. Exploited three US soldiers on Serb television with interviews and claim of capture in Serb territory.

10. Interrogated three US soldiers over first seven days of captivity in a containment facility in Serbia.

Continued physical and psychological abuse of three US soldiers.

11. Relocated three US soldiers to a prison facility in Serbia and isolated soldiers from each other, news of events in ongoing NATO air campaign, and any attempt for negotiating their release.

Allowed representatives of International Red Cross to visit three US soldiers. Allowed members of US religious delegation to visit three US soldiers.

12. Released three US soldiers to a US nongovernmental religious delegation.

ASSESSMENT.

The incident near Kumanovo was one minor episode in a much larger and long term US engagement in the region. US policy on southeastern Europe and the southern Balkans had been a significant interest for years. US ground forces experienced continuous deployments since 1993 in Task Force Able Sentry as part of a UN force in Macedonia. US Administration aims centered around three principles: support for broad European integration including NATO’s enlargement, securing peace in Bosnia, and encouraging regional cooperation.159

At the tactical level of military operations, three US soldiers were performing their duties and abiding by their rules of engagement. A recurring observation role and reconnaissance mission, with unloaded crew and individual weapons, was surprised by an overwhelming Yugoslav military force. The leader of the three soldiers made a decision to not resist when resistance in a crisis of combat with unloaded weapons may have resulted in their deaths.

Yugoslav military forces abused their prisoners. The three US soldiers were not treated in the initial minutes, hours, and days of their capture in accordance with the protocols of the Geneva Convention for handling prisoners of war.

159 _{Julie Kim, “Macedonia: Conflict Spillover Prevention,” CRS Report for Congress, July 23,1998,}

Kidnapping Case Vignettes

Yet, physical and psychological treatment varied on where the US soldiers were located and who was present as a captor. Gonzales “…saw the whole spectrum.” During the first week, the US soldiers were treated very rough. Some guards presented a more soldier to soldier understanding and talked briefly with the US soldiers. Eventually, Yugoslav officials allowed the International Red Cross access to the US soldiers. Actions in the prison ranged from abusive to passive depending on who a particular guard was on duty. Some guards were professional in manner; some were not.

Once Stone, Ramirez, and Gonzales were released and in US control, the junior member of the three soldier team declared a powerful statement about unit Army camaraderie and teamwork – “I knew those guys [fellow soldiers of his unit] were doing the best they could the moment they heard our distress call.”160

Immediate Aftermath.

The NATO air campaign, Operation Allied Force, continued to bomb targets primarily in Serbia and Kosovo. By June 9, the Yugoslav Republic accepted a Military- Technical Agreement (MTA) that described the elements of a peace plan for the region. On June 10, the NATO Secretary-General reported that Serb forces were beginning to withdraw from Kosovo and directed a suspension of the air campaign. Clear indications that the Yugoslav Republic was complying with the MTA prompted NATO to begin ground operations on June 12, 1999.

The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244, welcoming Yugoslavia's acceptance of a political agreement to end the violence and rapidly withdraw of its military, police and paramilitary forces. Placing Kosovo under UN administration, the resolution authorized the establishment of a UN mission in Kosovo and deployment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force (KFOR).161 _{KFOR (Kosovo Force) initiated a new} phase of peacekeeping with Operation Joint Guardian. On June 17, 1999, NATO terminated the air campaign based on the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces and police. 162 _{The KFOR mission was to continue for several years.}

Postscript: Milošević

In October 2000, Milošević’s attempts to manipulate presidential balloting prompted massive demonstrations and strikes throughout Yugoslavia. The election winner

160 _{“Freed US soldiers heading home with Purple Hearts,” CNN.com, May 7, 1999; available from}

http://www.cnn.com/US/9905/06/pows.return.home.02/; Internet; accessed 3 March 2008.

161 _{“Kosovo – timeline of events;” available from}

http://www.balkantimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/special/kosovo/contexts/t imeline; Internet; accessed 26 February 2008.

162 _{Steve Bowman, “Kosovo and Macedonia: US and Allied Military Operations,” July 8, 2003, CRS} Issue Brief for Congress, Congressional Research Service - The Library of Congress, 5 and 6.

15 September 2008 TRADOC G2 Handbook No.1.06 4-27 replaced Milosevic. In April 2001, Milošević surrendered to a Serbian special police unit under a warrant alleging suspicion of corruption, abuse of power, and embezzlement. However, the Yugoslav Republic sent him to The Hague and its International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for trial on war crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity. His trial ended without a verdict because he died during the proceedings. The tribunal issued a statement that, “Milošević was found lifeless on his bed in his cell at the United Nations detention unit…”163 _{Milošević suffered from heart ailments and high blood pressure. His cause} of death in March 2006 is reported as a heart attack.

163 _{Phillipe Naughton, “Slobodan Milosevic dies,” March 11, 2006; available from}

Kidnapping Case Vignettes

15 September 2008 TRADOC G2 Handbook No.1.06 4-29