Análisis del modelo dinámico en el contexto actual

Turyahabwe and Banana (2008) offer an overview of the history of forest policy and legislation in Uganda, describing a process of developments that were very similar to those which occurred in Ghana and Kenya:

Uganda’s forestry sector evolved from a highly regulatory colonial forest service (1898-1961), which was characterised by a centrally controlled and industry biased forest policy with limited local stakeholder participation; followed by the post-independence era (1962-1971) that maintained the forest estate in a reasonably good condition through the process of command and control; through a non-directional phase characterised by disruption of economy, insecurity and impaired delivery of goods and services (1972-1986); to a more decentralised, participatory and people oriented approach that has typified the focus of the policy over the last two decades (1987-to date)” (Turyahabwe &

45 Banana, 2008, p.641).

This evaluation of Uganda’s history is supported by Obua and Agea (2010), who also describe the current policies governing Uganda’s state forests and outline how the policy framework for Uganda’s forests has gradually shifted to one which aims to be supportive of community involvement in forest management and uses incentives such as revenue sharing to achieve this.

The National Forest Authority (NFA), a semi-autonomous government body, was

established in 1998, following the institutional restructuring that occurred as a result of the promulgation of the Constitution of Uganda in 1995 (Obua & Agea, 2010). In

response to severe forest degradation and deforestation, the Ugandan government classified forests into either local and central forest reserves, with the former decentralized to local governments and the latter (from 2003) managed by the NFA. Mandated by the Forest Policy of 2001, the NFA is a for-profit, semi-autonomous organisation that seeks to raise revenue while at the same time attempting to restore and conserve central forest reserves (CFRs) by, among other strategies, leasing parts of CFRs to private investors to establish commercial forest plantations (Ainembabazi & Angelsen, 2014, p. 48).

Aspects of forest revenue in Uganda, such as timber royalty, forest produce fees and licence fees, are controlled by the government through the Forest Fees and Licence Order of 2000 (Obua & Agea, 2010, p.76). These charges are levied in forest plantations and natural forests, but not private forests. Charges for round-wood production include a cutting charge for every pole harvested, which varies according to size, and a charge on the haulage or conveyance of firewood. Licences are required and charges are supposed to be levied for non-wood forest products such as charcoal, bamboo, seeds and seedlings, palms, rattan canes and forest services such as ecotourism, grazing and hunting (Obua & Agea, 2010, p.77). There are also charges for processed product production, such as the value added tax (VAT) paid by sawmillers and pit-sawyers (p.78) and although the NFA does not collect any charges on forest products trade, trading

46 licences are required to sell processed forest products and are issued by urban or local authorities. Ground rent is also charged for farmers wishing to use government forest reserve land to plant trees, which was charged at USh1500 per hectare per year according to the Forest Fees and Licence Order of 2000 (cited by Obua and Agea, 2010). In addition to the categories of fees listed here, there are fines and penalties for breaking forestry laws and regulations. However, according to Obua and Agea (2010, p.79), in many instances the fines charged were not sufficient to discourage unlawful behaviour. Because this was leading to forest degradation, the NFA started to enforce higher penalties from around 2001.

Causes of deforestation in Uganda include encroachment, land grabs and

degazettement of protected areas to agriculture. There is a growing trend of change in land use of protected areas from forest to sugar cane, palm oil, tea or tobacco growing, or industrial expansion. Obua and Agea argue that this is occurring because politicians and investors view protected areas as a ‘land bank’ for future appropriations of

investment (p. 80). Examples include the Bugala Islands, a protected area where an palm oil plantation has now been developed, Namanve central forest reserve (CFR) where an industrial park is now situated, and Pian Upe Wildlife Reserve which has been given over to large-scale agriculture. Other causes of deforestation include: high

population pressure (Uganda’s national human density average is 102 people/km2 compared to the world’s average of 42 people/km2), overexploitation of forest

resources, armed conflict, civil unrest and refugees, weak capacity of the forest sector and market failures (Obua & Agea, 2010, p. 80-82).

Ainembabazi and Angelsen (2014) argue that despite the forest policy reform that has taken place in Uganda in recent years, deprivation and exclusion of local forest users still occurs. For example, clan leaders can have undue influence by leading in decision making and defining rules that are followed by the rest of the community (Obua and Agea, 2010, p.85). In addition, a number of scholars have demonstrated that

decentralisation of forest reserves in Uganda has had the effect of reducing forest quality (Banana, Vogt, Bahati, & Gomba-Ssembajjwe, 2007; Jagger, 2010; Turyahabwe,

47 Geldenhuys, Watts, & Obua, 2007). All of these scholars describe the significant impact of institutional failures such as lack of capacity, funds and mandate in the case of local governments. They also argue that selective enforcement of rules takes place on CFRs managed by the NFA (Ainembabazi & Angelsen, 2014, p. 49). Weaknesses in policy such as failure to institutionalise sustainable community participation and the absence of detailed and adequately responsive guidelines to interpret policies, especially from a legal point of view, have affected state protected forests. Also, important decisions regarding forests have tended to be made by senior politicians rather than the NFA. A number of researchers note the lack of effective monitoring and enforcement of rules and regulations, particularly by the government organisations that were established to do this following decentralisation (Turyahabwe & Banana, 2008, p.641).

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