CAPITULO II MARCO TEÓRICO
ANÁLISIS E INTERPRETACIÓN DE RESULTADOS
There is a philosophical tradition, arguably beginning with Aristotle, which not only distinguishes mere heaps from integrated wholes, but which also does so on the basis of metaphysical priority.1 It says that integrated wholes are metaphysically prior to their parts, whereas mere heaps are not; and that the world’s most metaphysically basic material elements
1Topics 150a15-20; Physics 185b11-15; Metaphysics 1023b26-36, 1024a1-10, 1041b30-1042a3. See
are integrated wholes. Thus Aristotle connects the question of wholes’ integration to that of priority and substance:
Again, if the part are prior to the whole, and the acute angle is part of the right angle, and the finger part of the animal, the acute angle will be prior to the right angle, and the finger to the man. But it is considered that the latter are prior; for in the formula the parts are explained from them; and the wholes are prior also in virtue of their ability to exist
independently. The truth is probably that “part” has several meanings, one of which is “that which measures in respect of quantity.” However, let us dismiss this question and consider of what, in the sense of parts, substance consists.2
Here Aristotle notes that if certain parts are prior to wholes--such as an acute angle, which is part of a larger right angle; or a finger, which is part of an animal--then we will have the unacceptable result that geometric figures and animals cannot explain their parts in the ways that they are supposed to. And while there are different kinds of explanation, the one that concerns Aristotle in the Metaphysics, and which concerns us here, is that which is tied to metaphysical priority and primary substance. It is the question of when a whole is metaphysically something more than its parts. It is, in other words, the question “of what, in the sense of parts, substance consists.”
This philosophical tradition--which we will call material priority-theoretic ontology--has recently been defended by Jonathan Schaffer, who, like Aristotle, distinguishes mere heaps from integrated wholes on the basis of metaphysical priority; and who, like Aristotle, defends the view that the world’s most basic material elements are certain integrated wholes, rather than their parts. His view, in its fleshed-out form, is known as Priority Monism.3
2 Metaphysics 1034b27-1035a. 3 Schaffer (2009), (2010).
Schaffer introduces his Priority Monist view with a simple question about metaphysical priority. The question is this: between a material whole and its parts, which one is metaphysically prior to the other? Which one is more basic, metaphysically speaking? Thus Schaffer asks:
Which is prior, whole or part? Consider a circle. Imagine it divided into any two
semicircular parts. Is the circle prior, with the semicircles existing in virtue of the circle? Or are the semicircles prior, with the circle existing in virtue of the semicircles?4
Replacing the circle and semicircle with the material universe and its parts, Schaffer poses the question of Monism not in terms of circles, but in terms of the universe as a whole:
In place of the circle consider the cosmos (the ultimate concrete whole), and in place of the semicircles imagine the cosmos divided all the way down into particles (the ultimate concrete parts). Which is ultimately prior, the one whole or its ultimate parts?5
Thus we have a debate over the metaphysical priority of the cosmos as a whole: if Monism is true, the whole cosmos is prior to its parts; but if Pluralism is true, the smallest particles are prior to the whole cosmos. The question of Monism, then, is not the question of “which is prior, whole or part?” Rather, it is which is prior, the whole cosmos or its smallest particles? The latter question is more specific than the former, and its answer settles fewer questions in priority- theoretic ontology.
Rather than asking about the material cosmos alone, one might ask about wholes and parts in general. For if indeed the whole cosmos is prior to its parts, what does this say about all the other wholes and parts? Is every whole prior to its parts? Or, if a whole is only sometimes
4 Scahffer (2010).
5 Ibid. Despite its dramatic connotations, the word “cosmos” will serve as a mere synonym for the physical
prior to its parts, then when? Rather than asking about the cosmos, in other words, one might ask about the conditions for whole-to-part priority in general. When exactly, in other words, do we have an integrated whole rather than a mere heap? This is the question we will deal with in this chapter, and its answer will give us an argument for Classical Platonsim.
For the purposes of our discussion, the term “mere heap” will include many things in its extension that are not literally heaps. In particular, they will include classes of entities that we will call mere aggregates and mere portions. For like heaps, mere aggregates and mere portions are not integrated wholes. They are not sharply distinguished from their environment. Rather, they are--like heaps--arbitrary portions of stuff.
Mere aggregates are arbitrary collections of concrete objects, which need not be spatially close or related in any interesting way. The whole whose parts are the Eiffel Tower and
Betelgeuse, for instance, is a mere aggregate, as are all of the following: the whole whose parts are Antarctica and the planet Mars; the whole whose parts are my two thumbs and the three most threadbare rugs in Canada; the whole whose parts are a pair of plates and a certain walrus; and so on. What makes these items mere heaps in the technical sense is that they are not among the things we would classify as real objects, or as integrated wholes. On the contrary, they barely seem like objects at all, and seem much more like a philosopher’s invention.
Likewise for mere portions, or what Van Inwagen calls arbitrary undetached parts.6 Such entities include the middle two-thirds of a butter knife, the northernmost sixteenth of an office building, and the innumerably many overlapping portions of asphalt, which, despite being shaped exactly like Milo’s Venus, collectively make up US Highway I-5. Like mere aggregates,
mere portions will be counted in the extension of the term “mere heap” because they are no more cases of real objects than mere aggregates are. They seem more like philosopher’s inventions than constituents of the world, and they are certainly not sharply distinguished from their environment in the way that integrated wholes are.
In addition to being distinguished by priority relations, then, mere heaps and integrated wholes are also easily distinguished by example. Piles of sand, mere aggregates, and arbitrary undetached parts of material objects are all mere heaps; while organisms, machines, crystals, and tightly-knit ecosystems are integrated wholes. In ordinary English, we speak of a whole being “over and above” its parts, as well as being “more than the sum of” them; in so doing, we
distinguish integrated wholes from mere heaps. Mere heaps are things like piles of sand, the sum of the Eiffel Tower and Betelgeuse, and the middle two-thirds of a butter knife; integrated wholes are things like house cats, computers, mushrooms, and steamships. Mere heaps are just bits of
stuff, arbitrarily distinguished from their environs; whereas integrated wholes are well-defined, structured objects. They are what we might call “the real objects,” as opposed to mere materials. Table 1 below lists several intuitive examples, in addition to those just described.
TABLE 1.Examples of Mere Heaps and Integrated Wholes
Mere Heaps Integrated Wholes
A pile of snow A cat carcass Some scrap metal A puddle of mud
The sum of the Eiffel Tower and Betelgeuse
The middle two-thirds of a butter knife
An igloo A cat A steamship A tree
The Eiffel Tower
The fact that we can distinguish mere heaps from integrated wholes by example, as well as on the basis of metaphysical priority, then, is important to our investigation; for it allows us an opportunity to discover just what metaphysical priority is, and with it, what the primary substances are. In the last chapter we found that brute notions of metaphysical priority are unintelligible, and that, while promising and provocative, a teleological analysis of priority still lacks decisive arguments in its favor. The fact that we can distinguish mere heaps from integrated wholes by example, however, suggests a clear method for producing such an argument. For if mere heaps are distinguished from integrated wholes both by example and on the basis of metaphysical priority, the fact that there are examples permits us to check an analysis of metaphysical priority against intuitive cases. We can actually test an analysis of metaphysical priority, in other words, by seeing how well it conforms to our judgments about the examples. So if an analysis of priority treats organisms as mere heaps, for instance, while treating piles of sand as integrated wholes, we are within our rights to reject it as false; for if anything is an integrated whole, an organism is, and if anything is a mere heap, a pile of sand is. The fact that there are intuitive examples of mere heaps and integrated wholes, then, allows us to test different accounts of priority. For the sake of precision, we can treat such accounts as competing answers to a question about wholes’ metaphysical priority to their parts. We will call this question the Special Priority Question, or SPQ:
SPQ: Under which conditions, exactly, is a material whole metaphysically prior to its parts?
The word “conditions” in SPQ should be read loosely, so as to include not only relations that might obtain among the parts but also various environments that a whole might be in. It should
not be read, however, so as to allow a list of individuals--like in Table 1--to count as an answer to it. A proper answer to SPQ, in other words, must be general. For the same reason that Socrates dismisses Euthyphro’s first answer to the question of what piety is--“why, it’s what I’m doing right now!”--so should we dismiss such answers to SPQ. Rather than asking which particular wholes are prior to their parts, SPQ asks which necessary and sufficient general conditions
obtain for the priority of material objects to their parts.
This chapter’s thesis is that Classical Platonism correctly answers SPQ. What
distinguishes integrated wholes from mere heaps, in other words, is that the parts of an integrated whole are teleologically dependent on it. The parts of an integrated whole have the proper
function of being integrated into it; and not only their well-being but also their very existence requires them to be capable of this integration. The correct answer to SPQ, in other words, is “when the parts are teleologically dependent on the whole.” To see why Classical Platonism supplies the correct answer to SPQ, however, it is illustrative to examine less successful answers first; so that by noting where they fail, we better see how the teleological answer succeeds.