Análisis e interpretación de resultados

(Note: Can’t find case online and mali citation sa lahat ng nagcicite online, pati sa syllabus ni jack, pati sa SC!

So…presumed facts na lang based on the doctrines I found online [34 PLJ 598]).

FACTS: Alejo SANTOS is the Secretary of National Defense. Before an election, he was campaigning for Governor Tomas Martin, candidate of the Nacionalista Party in the Province of Bulacan. A case was filed against SANTOS for his supposed partisan political activity in violation of the Civil Service Act of 1959, which prohibits all officers and employees in the civil service, "whether in the competitive or classified, or non-competitive or unclassified service," from engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities or taking part in any election except to vote. Judge YATCO ruled that the Secretary of National Defense is embraced within the civil service who are prohibited to take part in partisan political activities. A preliminary injunction was issued by him restraining the secretary of National Defense to campaign. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court by the Office of the Solicitor General.

ISSUE: W/N Cabinet members/department secretaries are covered in the Constitutional prohibition against partisan political activity. – NO!

RATIO: The ban does not extend to those officers and employees outside of the civil service such as members of the Cabinet. The Secretary of National Defense is not embraced within the terms: "officers and employees in the civil service" (as disclosed in the proceedings in the Constitutional Convention wherein the attempt of Delegate Mumar to include the heads of executive departments within the civil service was rejected) who are prohibited to take part in partisan political activities. Cabinet Members serve at the behest and pleasure of the President. As such, their positions are essentially political. Although such campaigning is may be seen as improper (because of SANTOS’ supposed deleterious influence upon the members of the Armed Forces, who are administratively subordinated to the Secretary of National Defense, and who are often called upon by the Commission on Election to aid in the conduct of orderly and impartial elections), it is not considered as illegal. Injunction set aside.

Additional note so important reasons:

 SANTOS and GOV were discussing the issues before the electorate and defending the actuations of the Administration to which he belongs

 Since we have a presidential form of government set up in the Constitution and the democratic procedures established therein of determining issues, political, economic or otherwise, by election, allows political parties to submit their views and the principles and policies they stand for to the electorate for decision

P.S. The ban under the 1987 Constitution, Civil Service Law and Administrative Code of 1987 only covers officers and employees in the Civil Service.

SECTION 2

(5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.

DE LA CRUZ v. CA

Facts: Petitioners are public school teachers from schools in Metro Manila who were simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed by the DECS Secretary for participating in a mass action or illegal strike and defying the return-to-work order issued, which constitute grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, and gross violation of the Civil Service Law.

Petitioners appealed to the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) then to the CSC. The CSC found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposed upon them the reduced penalty of 6 months’ suspension. But in view of the length of time they were out of the service by the immediate implementation of the dismissal order, the CSC ordered their automatic reinstatement without back wages.

Petitioners were unhappy with the CSC decisions and filed petitions for certiorari, which the CA denied for lack of merit. Hence, they are before the SC, alleging that their only offense was to exercise their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of their grievances. They insist that the mass actions were not strikes, since there was no actual disruption of classes (since substitute teachers were appointed). They ask for exoneration or, in the alternative, award of back wages.

Issue: Whether the teachers must be exonerated or at the very least given back wages – NO

Ratio: The SC ruled in consolidated cases that the mass actions staged by the Metro Manila public school teachers amounted to a strike constituting a concerted and

unauthorized stoppage or absence from work, which it was their sworn duty to perform, carried out for essentially economic reasons – to protest and pressure the Govt. to correct what they perceived to be the unjust implementation of the salary standardization law, the delay in payment of fringe benefits, and the imposition of additional teaching loads and longer teaching hours. It held that for the constitutional liberty to peaceably assemble to be upheld, it must be exercised within reasonable limits. The teachers did not do so because they staged the mass protest on regular school days, abandoning their classes and refusing to go back despite being ordered to do so. Had the teachers availed of their free time – recess, after classes, weekends or holidays – to dramatize their grievances within the bounds of law, no one could have held them liable for their participation in the mass actions.

The ruling in the PMB case that the rights of free expression and assembly could not be lightly disregarded as they occupy a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties is not applicable here because what were pitted therein against the rights of free expression and assembly were inferior property rights, while the higher consideration involved in this case is the education of the youth, which at the very least, must be equated with the said rights.

The teachers were penalized not because they exercised their right to peaceably assemble but because of the manner by which such rights were exercised. The fact that substitute teachers were appointed to partially deflect the adverse effects of the mass protests did not erase the administrative liability of petitioner for the intended consequences thereof.

SECTION 7

No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

FLORES vs. DRILON & GORDON

FACTS The constitutionality of Section 13, paragraph d of RA 7227 or the “Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992” appointing Olongapo City Mayor Richard Gordon as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority is being assailed by the petitioners who are employees of the U.S. Facility, and members of Filipino Civilians Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, in their capacity as taxpayers. They

maintain that considering that Gordon is an elected official and the subject posts are public offices, such provision is repugnant to Section 7, paragraph 1, Article 9-B, of the Constitution which provides that: “[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure.”

ISSUE Whether or not Sec. 13(d) violates Art. 9-B, Sec.

7(1)?

RULING YES. Sec. 7 expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. The Appointment of the Mayor of Olongapo, an elective official, to another governmental post as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent. The fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment.

The contention that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code allows the appointment of a local elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office is fallacious. No legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land. Moreover, as Sec. 94 of the LGC is not the issue in the case, the Court found it unnecessary to rule on its validity. In any case, the above contention ignores the clear cut difference the clear-cut difference in the two paragraphs of Art. 9-B, sec.

7:

No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

While the second paragraph authorizes the holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to he rule against appointments or designation of an elective official to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself. The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be allowed to be extended to elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph.

It was further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Olongapo City Mayor. This argument however is based on a wrong premise.

Congress did not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed”

unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not an adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Otherwise, Congress should have used the word “ex officio” instead of appointed.

Although ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and CEO of SBMA, Gordon may however resign from his elective post to cast-off the constitutionally-attached disqualification. Otherwise, he remains Mayor of Olongapo City and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void but shall be considered valid as acts of a de facto officer. This is because an elective official, other than a senator, that is appointed to other governmental post, does not automatically forfeit his elective office.

SECTION 8

No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.

Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.

© PER AL T A V. M AT H AY

 Peralta was the trustee of the GSIS. He was granted an optional retirement gratuity of P40T. However, he did not receive sums pertaining to 1) COLA, 2) Incentive Bonus, 3) Christmas Bonus.

 Such items were not passed in audit, in view of the Auditor General’s finding that they should be deducted from his gratuity because they partake the nature of additional compensation. The Auditor General argues that the trustee’s remuneration is fixed by law o P25 per diem for every board meeting.

 As to the COLA, Peralta argues that it is in the nature of reimbursement rather than additional compensation. He argues that the cola is an allowance to take care of expenses incurred by an official to enable him to fulfill his duties.

ISSUE: Is Peralta entitled to the other sums? Are they prohibited compensation?

SC: The constitution provides that no officer or employee of the government shall receive additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law. This is because public office is a public trust. He is there to

render service. He is of course entitled to be rewarded for the performance of his functions entrusted to him, but that should not be the overriding consideration. Thus, an officer or employee of the government may receive only such compensation as may be fixed by law. He is not expected to avail himself of devious or circuitous means to increase the remuneration attached to his position.

It is an entirely different matter if the legislative body would itself determine for reasons satisfactory to it that he should receive something more. If it were so, there must be a law to that effect. As a trustee, he is an officer of the government, as such officer, he cannot receive additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law.

As to the COLA, he was unable to show that the COLA received by him was in the nature of reimbursement. It thus amounts to additional compensation.

As to the Bonuses, by its very nature, a bonus partakes of an additional compensation. The very characterization of what was received by petitioner as bonus being intended by way of incentive to spur him to more diligent efforts and to add to the feeling of well-being during Christmas season would remove any doubt that the Auditor General had no choice but to deduct such items from the gratuity.

No additional compensation unless authorized by law.

C. COMELEC

SECTION 1

(1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective positions in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

CAYETANO V. MONSOD

Christian Monsod was nominated by Pres. Cory Aquino to be the COMELEC Chairman in a letter received by the Commission on Appointments. Petitioner Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination on the ground that Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.

In June 1991, CA confirmed Monsod’s nomination as Chairman of the COMELEC. Weeks later,

he took his oath of office and on the same day assumed office.

Cayetano, as citizen and taxpayer, filed this petition challenging the validity of CA’s confirmation of Monsod’s nomination. He wants Monsod’s appointment be declared null and void.

Monsod graduated from UP law, passed the 1960 Bar with a grade of 86.55%. After passing, he worked in his father’s law office. In 1963-1970, he worked for the World Bank Group as operations officer in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved mainly negotiating loans and coordinating World Bank projects with member countries. When he returned to the Phils, he worked as CEO of an investment bank with the Meralco Group, rendered services as legal consultant and CEO for various companies. He was former Sec. Gen and Nat’l Chairman for NAMFREL and he appeared many times before the COMELEC. Also worked with underprivileged sectors, lobbied for gov’t action in agrarian reform and urban land reform. Became a member of the Davide Commission, the Constitutional Commission, even chair of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers. Actively paying member dues of the IBP since its inception in 1973. Actively paying his professional license fees for more than 10 years.

Issue: Did Monsod meet the required qualification of having practiced law for 10 years? –YES!

Ruling: Practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It requires the rendition of services that needs knowledge and application of legal principle and technique. It embraces all actions taken in matters connected to law. When he advises people or firms and all other clientele as to their rights in law, it’s lawyering. It is considered ‘practice of law’ when the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Preparation and execution of legal documents require a high degree of legal skill – it’s still practice of law. It means any activity, whether in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Generally, it means rendering service of any kind which requires the use if legal knowledge or skill.

The records of the 1987 Consti Commission show that it intended to adopt a liberal interpretation of the practice of law. Mr. Foz raised the issue for COA. He said that practice of law requirement does not necessarily refer to actual practice of law outside COA. The requirement is interpreted to mean that as long as lawyers use their legal knowledge or talent in their respective work in COA, then they are qualified to be considered as commissioners or even chairman of COA. Mr. Foz’s statement was previously discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies. Mr. Ople asked for clarification. Mr Foz explained, that he meant that even

though COA’s main work is auditing (not per se legal) it still involves legal work. Service in COA by a lawyer is considered legal work and is equivalent to the practice of law. This only shows that it was not intended by the framers of the Consti that only private lawyering is required.

Private practice is that done by an individual or a law firm engaged in the business of delivering legal services. “Practice of law” under the constitution is not limited to this.

Monsod’s past work experience as a economist, manager, entrepreneur, lawyer-negotiator of contracts, lawyer-legislator more than satisfy the constitutional requriment.

Finally, appointment is discretionary. It is subject only to the limitation that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. The judgment rendered by the CA is beyond judicial interference except only upon a showing of GADALEJ. None here.

Disssenting, J. Padilla: practice of law requires habituality.

When a lawyer is a corporate manager or business executive, that is not practicing law. Parang CPA na nag-clerk. Doctor na nag-nurse.

Dissenting, J. Gutierrez: Practice of law must be active and regular, not seasonal or intermittent.

Separate Opinion, J. Cruz: Pilosopo. Since the law covers almost all situations, e di lahat ng gumamit ng law, parang nagppractice na rin ng law.

MATIBAG V BENIPAYO

(Art. IX-C, Sec 1(1)) – An ad interim appointment renewed because it was by-passed by the Commission on Appointments is not reappointment as contemplated by Section 1(2), Art. IX-C. Thus the renewal is constitutional

FACTS:

 Maria Angelina Matibag is the Director IV of the Education and Information Department (EID) of the

 Maria Angelina Matibag is the Director IV of the Education and Information Department (EID) of the