ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO

On the night of the attacks, U.S. personnel in Benghazi and Tripoli provided lifesaving medical care to the wounded immediately following the attacks, during the evacuation from Benghazi, and upon arrival in Tripoli.

The Tripoli security team member who had provided medical care on the ground in Benghazi also provided lifesaving first-aid during the evacuation flight from Benghazi to Tripoli to a DS agent who was gravely wounded in the mortar attack. The Tripoli security team member explained that he was not a medical professional, and credited his actions on a mandatory,

specialized, in-depth combat trauma course he had taken as part of his duties. He described how two individuals—a Special Forces-trained medic and a State Department nurse—took over medical care when they landed in Tripoli:

Q: I’m going to step back real quick to the medical assistance you provided and just ask couple questions about that, the medical assistance to [Annex Security Team Member 3] and to [Agent 2]. Were you able to stabilize, in your view, those two individuals or any of those individuals prior to the evacuation of the Annex?

A: Yes.

Q: And did you have to restabilize them on the plane, either of them? A: I gave [Agent 2] another morphine on the plane. I adjusted [Annex

Security Team Member 3’s] bandage. And then when I was moving [Agent 2] off the plane—we were bringing him off without the stretcher because the stretcher was so big and the plane was so small—he stopped

breathing, so I had to give him CPR. Got him back breathing, and that’s when the State Department nurse met me on the plane with one of the Army—there was an Army SF [Special Forces] medic assigned to the State Department. He met me on the plane as well and asked if I was okay and could continue on. I just said they need to go to the hospital now. And then we loaded them on to an ambulance, and at that point, the ambulance took them to Afia Hospital in Tripoli. And I went back in a Suburban with all the other State Department personnel and gear. And that was it. I received a call from the flight medic from Ramstein, the military airlift, and I went over the view of what I did and what I gave them as far as tourniquets, morphine, and IV bags, how much, and the times and stuff. And that was it in reference to my medical service. Q: And you mentioned that a couple of medical personnel, an Embassy

nurse and an SF medic, met you at the ramp in Tripoli? A: Correct.

Q: You said they asked if the patients were capable of going directly to Germany. Was that the request?

A: I believe, yeah. And I said, no, they need to go to the hospital now. This is when I just got [Agent 2] breathing again. But I made the suggestion, you know, I remember they said can they wait for the Ramstein bird. And I was like no, because I really think [Agent 2] was going to die any minute.

Q: And they accepted your recommendation? A: Yes.

Q: And took them to the hospital? A: They did. …

Q: And did the SF medic or the nurse provide any medical assistance there at the plane, or did they just get in the ambulance?

A: As soon as I put them on stretchers, we carried them off the plane, they started on them; they started helping the ambulance drivers. These aren’t ambulances like we’re used to in America. They’re little, tiny, natural gas type of minivans; and they slid them in there, and they jumped into the minivans with them on the way to Afia Hospital. What they did after that, I don’t know. The only thing I remember getting back from a hospital was a bag when they cut off all the gauze and bandages, they sent, they gave [Redacted] the bag of material to give back to us for some reason because there they reutilize a lot of things. So I remember

getting a bloody bag of bandages back. That’s the last I saw of [Agent 2] and [Annex Security Team Member 3] until later on.

Q: We’re coming close to the end of our hour. This is the last question. Setting modesty aside, okay, do you believe that [Agent 2] or [Annex Security Team Member 3] would have survived to make it to Tripoli which without your intervention?

A: No.69

Of special note is that the Special Forces-trained medic who took over medical care when this flight landed in Tripoli was part of a four-man military team assigned to Special Operations Command Africa that had offered to travel to Benghazi after the first Tripoli security team had already departed. Previous investigations determined that keeping this team in Tripoli to provide security at the U.S. Embassy ensured that this medic was able to provide crucial lifesaving care on the airfield in Tripoli.

Admiral Mullen explained to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform in 2013 that this medic provided “heroic” medical assistance that prevented additional fatalities:

Q: Did the ARB, as part of your inquiry, determine that there was a need to keep the four-man team in Tripoli instead of sending them to Benghazi? Were you able to evaluate their need for being there at all?

A: Well, I think—you know, what General Dempsey said was true in terms of this was about 6:30 in the morning. Had … [the Lieutenant Colonel] and the other three gotten on an airplane, they would have flown past the plane bringing those who—out of Benghazi, some of whom were

wounded. And an untold story here is the heroic efforts of the medic actually on that airport coming from Benghazi to Tripoli, which there are those that believe kept a couple of those wounded alive to get them to Tripoli, which would then allow continued triage to put them on a C-17 pretty rapidly and get them up to Landstuhl. So I say that because the focus of the medical aspect on this and the medic who remained in Tripoli was absolutely critical. That’s where the focus was at that time. I would also add that for Lieutenant Colonel [Redacted] and for others who either are currently wearing or have worn the uniform, the desire to get out there to help is who we are. So I certainly wasn’t surprised that that’s what he wanted to do.70

A lieutenant colonel in the Office of Security Cooperation at Embassy Tripoli discussed this in his testimony before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform in 2014:

Q: So I would like to ask you about when you went to receive the aircraft from Benghazi with the wounded on it, okay? … [Y]ou said you took a 19 Delta with you?

A: Correct.

Q: What is a 19 Delta?

A: A 19 Delta is a Special Forces E-medic. Special capabilities to do more enhanced trauma, first aid. So he was able to accompany them and also assist with the Libyan doctors in helping both the wounded men. … The 19 Delta kind of took over. He worked with the Libyan medical

officials. That’s when I got notice that, again, one of the wounded had a rare blood type, so we started scrambling to find out who had a similar blood type, and we did find somebody at the embassy.

Q: So would you characterize the 19 Delta’s role as integral to the care? A: Oh, absolutely.71

ENDNOTES

1 _{Select Committee on Benghazi, Interview of Diplomatic Security Agent 3 (Mar. 19, 2015).}

2 _Id.

3 _{Select Committee on Benghazi, Interview of Annex Security Team Member 2 (May 22, 2015).} 4 _{Select Committee on Benghazi, Interview of Annex Security Team Member 4 (Mar. 1, 2016).} 5 _Id.

6 _{Department of State, Benghazi Accountability Review Board Report (Dec. 2012) (online at}

www.state.gov/documents/organization/202446.pdf).

7 _{Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Review of the Terrorist Attacks on the U.S. Facilities in} Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012, 113th Cong. (Jan. 15, 2014) (online at

www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/113134.pdf).

8 _{House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on Benghazi and the Obama} Administration, 113th Cong. (Apr. 2, 2014).

9 _{House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Investigative Report on the Terrorist Attacks on U.S.} Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012, 113th Cong. (Nov. 21, 2014) (online at

https://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/Benghazi%20Report.pdf).

10 _{Select Committee on Benghazi, Interview of Diplomatic Security Agent 1 (Apr. 1, 2015).} 11 _Id.

12 _Id. 13 _Id. 14 _Id.

15 _{Select Committee on Benghazi, Interview of Diplomatic Security Agent 2 (Mar. 16, 2015).} 16 _Id. 17 _Id. 18 _Id. 19 _Id. 20 _Id. 21 _Id. 22 _Id.

23 _{Select Committee on Benghazi, Interview of Diplomatic Security Agent 3 (Mar. 19, 2015).} 24 _Id.

25 _Id. 26 _Id. 27 _Id.

28 _{Select Committee on Benghazi, Interview of Diplomatic Security Agent 4 (Mar. 6, 2015).} 29 _Id.

30 _Id. 31 _Id. 32 _Id. 33 _Id.

34 _{House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Investigative Report on the Terrorist Attacks on U.S.} Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012, 113th Cong. (Nov. 21, 2014) (online at

https://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/Benghazi%20Report.pdf).

35 _{Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Review of the Terrorist Attacks on the U.S. Facilities in} Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012, 113th Cong. (Jan. 15, 2014) (online at

www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/113134.pdf).

36 _{Select Committee on Benghazi, Interview of CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell (Sept. 28, 2015).} 37 _{“EYES ONLY—TRIPOLI STATION AND BENGHAZI BASE REPORT ON EVENTS OF 11-12}

SEPTEMBER,” Tripoli 27900 (Sept. 19, 2012) (IntBook5-067 - Intbook5-075).

38 _{Deputy Chief of Base, Memorandum for the Record, “Events of 11-12 SEP 2012 at Benghazi Base,}

Libya” (Sept. 19, 2012) (IntBook1-127 – IntBook1-131).

39 _Id.

40 _{Select Committee on Benghazi, Interview of CIA Chief of Base (Nov. 19, 2015).}

41 _Id.

42 _{Select Committee on Benghazi, Interview of CIA Deputy Chief of Base (June 4, 2015).} 43 _Id.

44 _Id.

45 _{Select Committee on Benghazi, Interview of Annex Security Team Member 1 (May 29, 2015).} 46 _Id.

47 _Id.

48 _{Select Committee on Benghazi, Interview of Annex Security Team Member 2 (May 22, 2015).} 49 _Id.

50 _{Select Committee on Benghazi, Interview of Annex Security Team Member 3 (May 27, 2015).} 51 _{Select Committee on Benghazi, Interview of CIA Employee (June 19, 2015).}

52 _{House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Investigative Report on the Terrorist Attacks on U.S.} Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012, 113th Cong. (Nov. 21, 2014) (online at

https://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/Benghazi%20Report.pdf).

53 _{Select Committee on Benghazi, Interview of CIA Chief of Station (July 16, 2015).}

54 _{House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,} Benghazi Briefing No. 4 (Dec. 13, 2013).

55 _Id. 56 _Id.

57 _{Department of Defense, Requested Operational Narrative, US AMB Recovery, 11SEP12 (140-143).} 58 _{Deputy Chief of Base, Memorandum for the Record, “Events of 11-12 SEP 2012 at Benghazi Base,}

Libya” (Sept. 19, 2012) (IntBook1-127 – IntBook1-131).

59 _{Select Committee on Benghazi, Interview of DOD Servicemember (Sept. 22, 2015).} 60 _Id.

61 _Id. 62 _Id.

63 _{Select Committee on Benghazi, Interview of Tripoli Security Team Member (June 23, 2015).} 64 _Id.

65 _{House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,} Benghazi-Related Meeting No. 3 (Dec. 3, 2013).

66 _{Select Committee on Benghazi, Interview of Tripoli Security Team Member (June 23, 2015).} 67 _Id.

68 _Id. 69 _Id.

70 _{House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Admiral Michael Mullen (June}

19, 2013).

71 _{House Committee on Armed Services and House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,}

53