Análisis de otras entidades del ámbito

Learning from the W hitlam experiences, from 1980 on Labor attem pted to increase its expertise in m anaging the media (Gray 1994). In this, the Hawke government drew some important lessons from the communication methods developed by Neville Wran of New South Wales, who had a proven record of success. It was the Wran government which spelled the end of the traditional ALP. Wran emphasised political pragmatism, sound economic management and party unity and victory (Parker 1990: 42). The Wran governm ent successfully controlled governm ent - media relations, and made extensive use of opinion polling to establish the level of com m unity support for the party and for particular initiatives. The Hawke government’s initiative in applying W ran’s model was symbolised by the appointment of W ran’s chief media adviser, Peter Barron, to Hawke’s office staff in 1983.

Hawke had a special interest in appointing this m edia professional to his ministerial staff. He was aware of the advantages of having staff members with first­ hand knowledge of media processes. To use G rattan’s words, they were needed as "news gatekeepers" (1984: 6). By recruiting former journalists, the government hoped that its staff would have social and informal connections with current official journalists (Gray 1994). As former journalists, they would be expected to know the way the gallery worked as well as individual journalists’ characters. All of this, in turn, would render easier the government’s attempts to create a link to the news room and control the public agenda, or at least, keep the ministry sensitive to likely press concerns and reactions.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the Hawke government appointed numerous journalists, and former media executives, as ministerial advisers, press officers,

speechwritters, agency directors, party officials and public servants (Davis 1990: 359). According to Parker (1990: 31), by the time of the 1990 election, most major bureaux (except the Age) had at least one member who had been professionally associated with the Hawke government or the ALP in Opposition. For example, Alan Ramsay o f the Sydney Morning Herald had worked for Bill Hayden when he was Opposition leader. David Solomon o f Australian had worked for Whitlam. Some journalists were even hired as ministerial staff. Paul Ellercamp {Bulletin) and Anne Summers even went to Hawke’s private office. It was reported that one in five Gallery members had worked on the Hawke government's ministerial staffs (Stewart and Ward 1992: 197). By contrast, during the Hawke era (up to the 1990 election) no press gallery journalists had worked for conservative parties (Parker 1990: 31).

This does not mean that any journalist who has worked on a m inister’s staff will be a simple mouthpiece for one or another party. However, it unlikely that a minister will employ an individual who does not share their basic political philosophy, and unlikely that anyone will work for a government or party whose goals and methods they oppose (Parker 1990: 32). And that those values, reinforced while on a ministers’ staff, are then carried away back into mainstream journalism.

Another strategy to manage the media developed by Hawke government was via personal relationships with journalists. According to Gray (1994), this strategy was central for the Hawke government. A good personal relationship with journalists was perceived by Labor politicians as the best possible way to manage the story written by them. The strategy o f working with journalists was seen as very useful for understanding the way that journalists work and the individual characters of journalists as well as for learning about and creating the possibility for two ways access (from government to journalists and vice versa). Activities included talking to journalists concerning the information they needed and presenting facts, data and information to them. The major target was the parliamentary press gallery. This was because of the potential for influencing public opinion of the Gallery which has a membership of some 160 television, radio and print journalists. Their task was to report federal

politics, and they provided the great bulk of the news, current affairs and commentary which the mass media devote to this subject (Steward and Ward 1992: 196).

While the relationship with the journalists was a useful link to the newsroom, the Hawke government also emphasised the importance of informal relationships with media proprietors. For instance, Hawke had a close personal relationship with both Kerry Packer and Rupert Murdoch. Hawke supported Kerry Packer during the controversy surrounding the Costigan Royal Commission. Hawke also gave an Order of Australia award to Rupert Murdoch (Davis 1990: 359) and had a close relationships with Alan Bond who for a time owned channel 9. The decision of the Hawke government to replace the two-station rule with a 75 per cent audience reach limit and the establishment of cross-ownership controls was viewed by some observers as a deliberate decision to give benefits to the two major media groups of Packer and Murdoch. The decision was made, partly, as a device to fit Labor political objectives: to hasten the break up two hated institutions, the HWT and Fairfax, which were viewed by Labor as its enemies (Chawick 1989: 14-25).

As a result, there were many able and professional journalists in the Gallery, but there were not many Liberal or National supporters (Henderson 1987: 3). Most of the senior and influential Gallery members were predominantly ALP supporters. According to Hywood (1987), at least 80 per cent of the Gallery members voted for the Labor Party. These included the most influential journalists - such as Laurie Oakes, Michelle Grattan, Paul Kelly and Greg Hywood and Max Walsh (cited in Henderson 1987: 6). This may also explain why some journalists were reluctant to make strong criticisms of the government. They were too close to their subjects to provide truly independent political reporting. It was definitely not the case that the Press Gallery supported the Hawke government every day and on every issue, but, as Parker (1990: 33) cynically insisted, on balance and over time, a clear preference existed.