Análisis estadístico

Most fighting in World War II was done by a remarkably small proportion of troops whose casualties were very high.

John Ellis.1

The Italian campaign… consumed infantry at a rate comparable to the worst fighting on the Western Front during 1916 and 1917.

Ian Wood.2

Since the beginning of their time in the Mediterranean in 1940 through until their arrival in Taranto in October 1943, 2nd _{New Zealand Division suffered over 20,000 casualties (see} Table 1). Of these just under 4000 occurred during the hard fighting across North Africa between October 1942 and May 1943, as the division took part in the offensive at El Alamein, the pursuit across Libya, and the Tunisian battles. This was just prior to the division’s move to Italy.

The losses incurred by the New Zealand Division during their service in the Middle East can be broken down into three distinct periods, each with its own pattern of loss and impact.3 During 1941 the division fought three short sharp campaigns in Greece, Crete, and Libya, lasting 35, 12, and 92 days respectively. Each of these actions was costly in terms of casualties, and seriously affected the fighting efficiency of the division. In Greece, during April 1941, the division suffered over 2400 casualties: 272 killed, 391 wounded, 33 missing, 1793 taken prisoner. The next month, in Crete, in a more intense battle, total casualties approached 4000. In two months the division had lost almost 6500 men. As well as this, much of its heavy weaponry and vehicles had been abandoned in Greece, and those men that were evacuated to Egypt were exhausted. At the end of 1941, during Operation Crusader, the division shouldered much of Eighth Army’s infantry work and suffered accordingly. Although the New Zealanders

1 _{Ellis, The Sharp End, p.162.}

2 _{Ian S. Wood, ‘’Twas England Bade Our Wild Geese Go’: Soldiers of Ireland in the Second World War, in, Time}

to Kill: The Soldier’s Experience of War in the West, 1939-1945, Paul Addison & Angus Calder, (eds.), London:

Pimlico, 1997, p.86.

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remained in the Libyan desert until the end of January 1942, the bulk of the fighting during

Crusader occurred between 25 November and 1 December 1941, and losses within the division during these seven days were very heavy. During this period a further 4600 men were lost. At the beginning of 1942 the division was withdrawn from Egypt for rest, refitting, and reinforcement in Syria.

Four months later, in June, the division was rushed to Egypt as the German and Italian

Panzerarmee attacked and advanced towards Cairo. In a series of engagements lasting two months, in which the German offensive to capture Egypt was halted, the New Zealand Division narrowly avoided being destroyed – most notably at Minqar Qaim. Casualties reached 4990 men before the division was relieved from the line in August, and allowed two months to rest and refurbish, and prepare for the Eighth Army’s offensive at El Alamein.

From Alamein through to the conclusion of the campaign in Tunisia, fighting changed from typically defensive orientated, short, intense, with a concentration of casualties, to an offensive campaign in which there were less men lost as prisoners, a higher proportion of wounded, and casualties were less concentrated, occurring over longer periods.

There are a number of examples where elements of 2nd New Zealand Division suffered heavily at company or battalion level during its campaigning in the Mediterranean. During Operation Crusader for example, 20 Battalion was all but destroyed, losing 548 men, roughly 73% of its establishment strength. The following year, between the beginning of July and the end of the year, a period that included fighting at Minqar Qaim, Ruweisat Ridge, Alam Halfa and El Alamein, 28 (Maori) Battalion lost 502 men - 67% of its establishment strength - all but 25 of which were killed or wounded. In Tunisia, during a period of combat operations that lasted 119 days, the division lost 1774 men, over 350 of whom were killed. Not only did these have to be replaced or rehabilitated, but the return to New Zealand of the 6087 men of the first furlough draft also put pressure on an already straining manpower situation.

In addition, the division was restructuring at the time, with the 4th _{Brigade – 18, 19, and} 20 Infantry Battalions – becoming 18, 19, and 20 Armoured Regiments. Thus the division changed from one based around three mobile infantry brigades, to one lighter in infantry – now only 2 brigades – but containing its own armour. This mechanised configuration ideally reflected the conditions and operational role that the division had been employed in during its time in North Africa – to exploit breakthroughs, but would prove to be problematic in Italy, where the mobile armoured warfare that the division was now designed for was, to a large extent, negated by terrain and weather, and where infantry and artillery played a prime role. A

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decrease in its infantry capability to two brigades from three meant that the remaining infantry battalions shouldered a disproportionate burden operationally, and therefore suffered a heavier toll with regard to casualties. This point was not lost on Freyberg, whose thoughts on the matter were recorded during the fighting at Cassino: ‘we have to face the fact that the morale of the division is dropping because we are hammering our front-line troops with only 2 infantry bdes. If we are to carry out the role of infantry attack and exploitation it will be necessary to have another brigade.’4

In fact, the issue had already become apparent in Tunisia, where the two infantry brigades – 5th and 6th – employed during this time, bore the brunt of the division’s losses, losing 1290 men – 66% of divisional casualties.5 When the losses from other divisional combat units – artillery, divisional cavalry, and engineers – are added, combat unit losses approach 90% of the division’s casualties, while fatalities from these units exceed 97% of the divisional total. In the last year in Africa, following the division’s return from Syria, almost 9500 men were either killed, wounded or captured. Most of these, almost 6000, were infantry, with additional heavy losses – 1013 men – in the divisional artillery. It is little wonder that the division’s ability to maintain its fighting efficiency was being questioned prior to being sent to Italy.6

What also needs to be recognised is the impact that these campaigns and the resulting losses had on the division, and especially on the infantry companies: the loss of experienced soldiers, particularly NCOs and junior officers, the breakup of numerous primary groups, and the cumulative psychological impact of the hard fighting on the surviving men.7

Once in Italy, losses continued to mount steadily. In just over a month, from mid- November 1943, with the New Zealanders fighting in appalling winter conditions near the Sangro River, the division lost a further 1634 men. Between February and May 1944, 1596 more casualties were added to the tally over the 69 days of the battles at Cassino.

Meanwhile, Freyberg was engaged with the New Zealand Prime Minister, attempting between them to steer a course through New Zealand’s deepening manpower issues that were

4 _{General Officer Commanding's Diary - Part IV, September 1943 - October 1944, WAII8/6/46 (ANZ), 18 April}

1944.

5 _{The 4th Brigade – 18, 19 and 20 Battalions - remained in Egypt where it converted to an Armoured Regiment.} 6 _{The various official histories give a casualty breakdown by battalion or function; see, for example, J.F. Cody,}

21 Battalion, Wellington: War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1953, p.462; Murphy, W.E., 2nd

New Zealand Divisional Artillery, Wellington: War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1966, p.767.

7 _{Most of the men who took part in the battle of El Alamein and the campaign in Tunisia were veterans of the}

Battle for Egypt (1942), and Operation Crusader (1941). There would also have been a significant number that had fought as early as Greece and Crete. See pages 96 - 97 for narration regarding the relationship between the length of combat exposure and its psychological impact.

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