5 IDENTIFICACIÓN Y ANÁLISIS
5.2. Análisis de los envases existentes
5.2.1. Análisis estructural
state firms. The party has tried to protect the economic well-being of the factory political
24 Guan Xiaofeng, "Dui qiye dangjian gongzuo de sikao" (Pondering on building the enterprise party organization), Xinchangzheng (Journal of Liaoning Party Committee), no. 11, 1992, p. 28.
25 This is a summary of many Chinese reports. For a good source, see a book edited by Xu Songtao & others, Zhongguo gongzi zhidu gaige (The reform o f the Chinese wage system).
26 Xiao Wei, "Huange jiaodu xinbuxin" (Whether we can look at things from another angle), Zhibu shenghuo (Beijing), no. 8, 1992, p. 17.
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cadres, and in 1991 a four-level speciality titles system was created for them: containing the titles of the senior political work specialist, middle level political work specialist, political work specialist and political work staff. The purpose of the system was to equate the titles and salaries of political cadres to those accorded to engineers and technicians and to make political work a profession so that, the morale of such personnel could be stabilized. How ever, the technical professionals strongly resented this equation. At the same time, political cadres took little comfort from the ranking. The last two years have seen increased numbers of party cadres tender applications for transfer. The political cadres are among the least liked personnel in factories and these cadres know this well. One of my interviewees noted:
I'm aware that people like us are not welcome by workers and technical staff. But is it our fault? When I had just joined the workforce, I dreamed of becoming a technician. Yet Secretary Liu told me that because I had a "red" family background and a high school certificate, the organization (the party) had decided that I should work in the party propaganda department. All these years I have been play ing with empty words, many of which sound odd today. Now I have a senior title as a political wor ker. However, besides talking about stuff which nobody listens to, I am good at nothing. All I can do now is to prevent any of my children from following my path but instead to learn a real skill.
According to the official statistics, political cadres who have not received any special training in management or in other technical fields still make up more than 80% o f the total.27 And many of these cadres are likely to share the feelings of my interviewee. Given this demoralized state of mind, can people believe that the party's industrial cells really have a future?
5.2.2. The Drying up of Party Reserves
The paralysed or semi-paralysed state of party industrial cells has also been due to the drying up of the party's reserves at the grassroots. Even in those factories where the party organizations play a key role at the top level of management, at the shop level, a large
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number of work sections and small work groups have no party members at all. Despite the party's enormous efforts in attracting young people to join the reserves, the attempt has not been fruitful. Take Beijing as an exam ple. According to the m unicipality's party organization chief Cheng Guangwen, party members under age 25 today constitute only 3% of all party members in the city. This is in sharp contrast to 12% plus of party members who have retired. The number of work sections in Beijing's state enterprises that did not have a single party member had once reached about half of the total in the 1980s. Even after a long battle of "filling blanks" since June 4 1989, 35% of these sections still did not have any party members as o f the end of 1992.28 In Shandong Province, among 2.2 million workers, only 11.4% were party members in 1990. As a result, members in production line posts had declined steadily as old party member workers retired, and "blank work sect ions" -- work sections where there was no party member - were on the rise.29 This has, ironically however, eased the tension that ordinary workers had developed towards the party presence around them.
At the local levels the problem is most serious. Qiang W ei, party secretary of Beijing’s Shijingshan District, revealed that the ratio of young party recruits in the overall intake had dropped from 10.1% to 1.9% between 1976 and 1990.30 In W eifang city, Shandong Province, in the 15 state firms under direct municipal control 51.8% of the 1,906 work sections did not have a single party m em ber.31 Such reports have been pervasive in China's party journals, illustrating that the problem is clearly perceived. Yet it is only the tip of the ice berg.
28 Zhibu shenghuo (Beijing), no. 10, 1992, pp. 6-7.
29 Shandong Party Organization Department, "Zai changye gongren zhong fazhan dangyuan de diaocha" (Survey on the recruitment of party members among the industrial workers), Zhibu shenghuo (Shan dong), no. 1, 1990, p. 12.
30 Zhibu shenghuo (Beijing), no. 7, 1991, p. 7.
31 Yu Hongji, "Qiye shengchan yixian dangyuan shao de yuanyin ji duice" (The reason why there are fewer party members in the first line work posts and counter measures), Zhibu shenghuo (Shandong), no. 5, 1991, p. 28.
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From the 1950s to the 1970s high political ambition could be seen by strong desires among the populace to join the party. W hen the youth in the 1980s discarded this enthusiasm, they clearly demonstrated their value judgement of the party's role in real life. In a survey carried out by CASS in 1988 in all major cities, among people polled only 0.33% of the total still regarded joining the party and the Youth League as a priority in life. In the overall ranking of choices for a happy life, party membership ostensibly came last. Other personal goals, such as a harmonious family, successful career, to become rich, etc, have been far more highly valued than the wish to obtain a party ticket.32
Behind this fundamental change in people's socio-political values is a fundamental disillusionm ent toward the party.33 A party member with a special political status is expected to work harder altruistically. In reality, however, what is so familiar to people is the stories of cadre corruption. As a result, a hostile attitude towards party applicants has gradually gathered strength. One applicant in Beijing wrote a letter to a party journal entitled "What should I do" to express his sorrows about having lost most of his friends since handing in an application to the party. All that he was told was that his experience was not uncommon so he should stick to his own choice.34 When workers believe that they have alternatives to obtain more money and a good job, applications for party membership sharp drop. Beijing, with a population of more than 10 million, registered about 70,000 applications in 1986, the next year, with the market making big strides, the number nosedived to around 20,000 and remained there for the following two years. It was not until 1990 that the number revived to the level of 1986.35 This was due largely to the
32 Lu Jianhua, "Dangdai qingnian de zhengzhi jiazhiguan" (The value system o f the contemporary youth), Qingnian yanjiu, no. 2, 1990, pp. 1-6.
33 For an analysis o f this disillusionment, see Hsi-Sheng Chi, Political Disillusionment: The Chinese Communist Under Deng Xiaoping, 1978-1989, Armonk: Sharpe, 1991.
34 Zhibu shenghuo (Shandong), no. 2, 1992, p. 36. 35 Zhibu shenghuo (Beijing), no. 7, 1991, p. 35.
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special organizational efforts by the party to "mobilize" applications, following the June 4 events. 1992 saw the number decline again.36
In addition to general indifference toward joining the party, the party's recruitment arrangements have also contributed to the gradual exhaustion of applicants. Since 1978 the party has adopted an elitist approach to recruitment, that is, it wants the level of education for the new intakes to be as high as possible. A central document stipulated that new candidates should generally have a high-school certificate.37 According to a survey in Jinan city, the new recruits increased the percentage of party members in management and technological fields to nearly 10% of the total. In contrast, fewer recruits have been in production-line posts, the percentage being just over 2%.38
This has, however, posed a dilemma to the party: to admit more intellectuals into the party at the expense of workers may improve the party's general educational level but it has also increased the number of "blank work sections" and thus helped dry up its reserves at the points where the majority of workforce concentrate. The Beijing Public Transportation Company recruited 31,000 workers between 1978-84. The number of party members increased in the meanwhile by only 75, resulting in a drop of the worker/party member ratio to 0.9%. Some party branches had not recruited a single party member for nearly a decade.39 So a cycle emerged: the fewer workers a party cell admitted, the fewer party reserves it would find among workers. This is one of the factors leading to the paralysis of grassroots party cells in large numbers.
36. This is from a cadre in the Industrial Department o f the Beijing Party Committee whom I interviewed in late 1992.
37 Zhongguo gongchandang fazhan dangyuan gongzuo xize (The CCP's regulations on recruiting new
party members). The same document also required the party cells to recruit more youths so as to lower the average age o f the membership.
3 8 The Shandong Party Organization Department, "Zaichangye gongren zhong fazhan dangyuan de diao- cha", p. 12.
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