Análisis estructural del entorno competitivo

associations of entire communities existed for themselves, for their own social

production.

They included external, or horizontal inter-village relations, as well as inter­ household networks based on kinship and neighbourhood. They involved various forms of reciprocal and redistributive exchanges (for example, labour for agricultural and domestic production tasks, pooling labour for communal religious, social and irrigation tasks) and collective decision-making and action.

(Turton, 1987, p.80)

At that time people selected village elders as their leaders for their virtue and morals. The villages in the North region used to have two leaders; the one who looked after the affairs of the lay population was called

kae baan,

and another who looked after the affairs of the monks was called

kae wat

(Rabibhadana, 1993).

Until 1897 when the positions of

phuyai baan

(village headman), and

kamnan

(subdistrict leader) were set up by the government, these leaders were elected by villagers. The procedure of the election, however, was carried out rather flexibly, and not formally. The formality lay only in the recognition given to the elected person by the central government (Rabibhadana, 1993). In 1943, there was a major change regarding eligibility, when, to be eligible, the candidate had to be able to read and write. It also stated that persons who served in the army or the police force were to be preferred. This condition was relaxed in 1946 when the clause giving preference to ex-soldiers or policemen was taken out. In 1971, the level of educational qualifications was raised, requiring that the eligible candidate was over 25 years of age, and had completed the compulsory elementary education. Once elected, a headman remained in his position for life, or as later occurred, until 60 years of age (Rabibhadana, 1993).

The requirement for formal education removed the eligibility of all village elders to take up the positions as none of them had had a chance to go to school, or could read or write. 'We must note that with both formal education as well as the training for soldiers and policemen organized by the central government, it was policy to make village headman and subdistrict leader staff of the central bureaucracy" (Rabibhadana, 1993, p.9).

The dismissal of both the village headman and subdistrict leader occurred if more than half of the village inhabitants who were eligible to vote, petitioned for their dismissals. Then the act of dismissal was performed by provincial governor, who used his power

through the district official, when he deemed the headmen unfit for the position because of their behaviour or lack of ability. Rabibhadana provided a critique of this and stated "a little power over the headmen was given to the village, the overwhelming power, very

much discretionary, was given to the governor, and district official . . . who are officials of Ministry of Interior appointed directly from Bangkok" (Rabibhadana, 1 993, p.9).

The role of the village headman was as follows. On one hand, he should be the spokesman of the village, responsible for villagers' welfare, and make requests and demands to the government on their behalf. On the other hand, he takes the role of being the registrar, collects taxes, and keeps the peace within this village. He is the eyes and ears

(pen hu pen taa)

of the government. Such dual roles made the job of a headman more difficult, particularly after 1950 when the threat of communism was first felt and the development policy was closely linked with the state security. Then the First National Development Plan was drawn up in 1 96 1 , in which infrastructure, buildings and road networks were proposed. "Only one year after the outbreak of fighting with insurgents, the Office of Accelerated Development was set up to construct roads to villages, even remote ones" (Rabibhadana, 1993, p. 1 l ).

The penetration of the state was soon accelerated by the highways and road networks, and many more government officials of various departments were posted to work at district and village levels.

(This made) the job of a headman became more difficult since he had to please so many different officials, the officers of different departments with different programmes, at the same time he had to try to please his villagers. The job however became attractive to a certain types of people because with all these development projects, there were gains and benefits which unscrupulous headmen could capture with the corrupt officials.

(Rabibhadana, 1 993, p. 1 1 )

These positions became the most attractive for those ambitious people who wanted to use the positions as instruments to invest or to facilitate their businesses. Usually, they were the well-off in the village, and the village committee were people in the same social status. There are numerous cases of corruption by local leaders and officials in rural development projects. They colluded with contractors and government officials for private benefit. The latest activity in which the local leaders have been engaged is the

role of middlemen in selling land, since in some villages the land has been in great demand for housing estates, tourist resorts, golf courses and factories (Rabibhadana,

1 993; Turton, 1 987).

Eventually, the consequences of the process of change resulted in the weakening of villages, particularly of the local leader institution. Village headmen no longer belonged to, or worked for the benefit of the inhabitants but rather for the government or for their own benefit.

5.

Thai Bureaucracy

Thai society has been described as a bureaucratic polity in which the bureaucrats lay down policy and govern the country and the people (Rabibhadana, 1 993). It is the consequence of a great transformation beginning in 1 880 to escape the intervention of the West. Although Siam (now Thailand) escaped colonial rule, foreign experts were employed to advise and direct in the highest levels of the administration in many departments and ministries. The use of foreign advisors and other means by King Chulalongkorn spanned the most intensive period of transformation in a Western manner. Thus the Thai polity was organised in the pattern of colonial administration, in which the monarch took the place of the colonial governor. "This 'indirect colonization' resulted in the centralizing policy which is largely responsible for the subsequent stunted or distorted political growth of present-day Thailand" (Girling, 198 1 , p.47).

According to the structure and the personnel of the new bureaucracy, functional ministries - salaried, professional bureaucrats in the Western style - have replaced the old semi-hereditary ruling families. These bureaucrats are subjected to periodic transfer throughout the country to avoid local officials establishing a power base, and the transfer is ordered centrally. Centralisation is reinforced by the promotion structure and status accorded by transfer from district to provincial level, and from provincial level to Bangkok. This has also resulted in vertical rather than horizontal communication, since bureaucratic relationships are still largely based on a patronage attitude: local-level officials gain merit points by following orders from the next rank up the administrative ladder rather than by knowledge of, or skill in dealing with local affairs. Therefore, each

department or ministry has an entity, in which accountability and promotion are still largely internal, though inter-sectoral actions are expected.

The effect of this entrenchment of vertical linkages at the expense of horizontal linkages is to inhibit co-ordination between the state's local­ level developers. Each department with each ministry runs its own projects with its own budget, and duplication is rife. Furthermore, it is in each department's interest to expand its role at the expense of others in order to secure larger budget allocations.

(Hirsch, 1 990, p.22)

The system does not encourage either the people to participate in government projects that concern them, or the lower-ranking officials who have to implement the projects, to participate and provide information upwards. Development policy is mostly decided in supra-local level. The administration system contradicts the concept of participation.

Another consequence of the bureaucracy reforms is the rise of "new men" who are educated, recruited and trained to manage the powerful bureaucracy. The education system is also centralised and biased in favour of certain social classes and regions over others. In 1 972-4 more than 74 percent of university students came from families of businessmen or government officials and only 6 percent from agricultural family backgrounds. The Thai attitude toward education is reflected in the phrase,

rian sung

sung cha dai pen chaa khan nai khan

(higher education to be master over others). The words

nai

and

chaa

mean the members of noble class and princes who ruled or governed a number of the ordinary people in the past. Since the patronage attitude has persisted these officials do govern or rule in the true sense of giving orders (Rabibhadana, 1 982;

1 993; Turton, 1 987).

The "state controlled" education system determined that "all children throughout the country would study the same national language (standard Thai), study the same national history (one that accentuated the role of the Siamese Monarch and de-emphasized the roles of local lords and rulers), and learn the same national songs" (Rabibhadana, 1993, p.2 1 ). The effect of the dominant educational system is described as:

(T)o ignore or dismiss as irrelevant, at least to discredit, many pre­ existing traditional and popular forms of knowledge and skills and with them, powers of decision-making and responsibility. Much official 'development' thinking and training starts with a baseline notion of rural

ignorance. Such values can be internalized, thus giving rise to a sense of inherent ignorance or lack of ability.

(Turton, 1 987, p. 1 07)

It is clear therefore that there are socio-cultural factors which work against community participation in PHC in Thailand. The following section examines the experiences of other countries in attempting to implement community participation in PHC progr

_amm

es and identifies the cornrnonalties with those of Thailand.

In document Estrategia de la empresa turística Politours (página 35-41)