ANÁLISIS ESTRUCTURAL

 III. G eneral sexu eneral sexual ethics al ethics

When we apply the “old” natural law theory to sexual morality, the first ste When we apply the “old” natural law theory to sexual morality, the first stepp is to identify the natural end or ends of our sexual faculties. For if what is is to identify the natural end or ends of our sexual faculties. For if what is good for us is determined by what realizes the ends inherent in our nature, good for us is determined by what realizes the ends inherent in our nature, then what is good for us in the

then what is good for us in the sexual context can only be what realizes thesexual context can only be what realizes the ends of our sexual facult

ends of our sexual faculties. Now for Aquinas and other natural law theoristsies. Now for Aquinas and other natural law theorists  In Defense of the P

 In Defense of the Perverted Ferverted Faculty aculty Argument Argument 

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7 NotNotice ice thathat no mt no mentention hion has bas been een madmade hee here eire eithether of dir of divinvine coe commammand and as the s the sousourcerce of obligation or of rewards and punishments in the hereafter as motivation for moral of obligation or of rewards and punishments in the hereafter as motivation for moral  behavior—contrary to

 behavior—contrary to what one what one would expect from would expect from Grisez’Grisez’s description s description of “con-of “con-ventional natu

ventional natural law theory,ral law theory,” which he wrongly accuses of having a “voluntar” which he wrongly accuses of having a “voluntaristic”istic”

conception of obligation (1964, pp. 46–53). Grisez fails to take note of a crucial conception of obligation (1964, pp. 46–53). Grisez fails to take note of a crucial distinction between what Cronin calls the “ultimate ground” and the “proximate distinction between what Cronin calls the “ultimate ground” and the “proximate ground” of moral obligation (Cronin 1939, p. 213). Just as God’s being the first ground” of moral obligation (Cronin 1939, p. 213). Just as God’s being the first cause is perfectly consistent with the reality of secondary

cause is perfectly consistent with the reality of secondary causes (contra the occa-causes (contra the occa-sionalist), so too is God’s being the

sionalist), so too is God’s being the ultimateultimate source of obligation consistent withsource of obligation consistent with there being a

there being a pro proximateximate ground of obligation in the will’s having the good as itsground of obligation in the will’s having the good as its natural end (contra the voluntarist). Hence the “old” natural law theory does not natural end (contra the voluntarist). Hence the “old” natural law theory does not (contra Grisez) have to appeal to natural theology in order to make obligation (contra Grisez) have to appeal to natural theology in order to make obligation in-telligible (even if a

telligible (even if a completecompleteaccount of obligation—as with a complete account of account of obligation—as with a complete account of  causality

causality, or of anything else for that , or of anything else for that matter—will make reference to natural theol-matter—will make reference to natural theol-ogy). See Feser 2009, pp. 188–92 for further

ogy). See Feser 2009, pp. 188–92 for further discussion.discussion.

who build on an Aristotelian metaphysical foundation, to be a

who build on an Aristotelian metaphysical foundation, to be a human beinghuman being is to be a

is to be a rational animal rational animal . That we are. That we are animalsanimalsof a sort entails that of a sort entails that the veg-the veg-etative, sensory

etative, sensory, locomotive, and appetit, locomotive, and appetitive ends that determiive ends that determine what is good ne what is good  for non-human animals are

for non-human animals are also partially constitutive of our also partially constitutive of our good. That wegood. That we are

are rational rational entails that we also have as our own distinctive ends those as-entails that we also have as our own distinctive ends those as-sociated with intellect and volition.

sociated with intellect and volition. Like other animals, in order to flourishLike other animals, in order to flourish we must take in nutrients, go through a process of development from we must take in nutrients, go through a process of development from con-ception through to maturity, reproduce ourselves, and move ourselves about ception through to maturity, reproduce ourselves, and move ourselves about the world in response to inner drives and the information we take in through the world in response to inner drives and the information we take in through sense organs. But on top

sense organs. But on top of that we have to exercise the rational capacitiesof that we have to exercise the rational capacities to form abstract concepts, put them together into judgments, and reason to form abstract concepts, put them together into judgments, and reason from one judgment to another

from one judgment to another in accordance with the laws of logic; and wein accordance with the laws of logic; and we hav

have to choose between alternative courses of action in e to choose between alternative courses of action in light of what the light of what the in- in-tellect knows about them.

tellect knows about them.

 Now

 Now these these latterlatter, highe, higher, r, rational rational activities activities do nodo not meret merely ly constitute constitute dis- dis-tinctive goods; they also alt

tinctive goods; they also alter the nature er the nature of the lowerof the lower, animal , animal goods. For ex-goods. For ex-ample, both a dog and a human being can have a visual perception of a tree.

ample, both a dog and a human being can have a visual perception of a tree.

But there is a

But there is a conceptual conceptual element to normal human visual perception thatelement to normal human visual perception that is not

is not present in the present in the dog’dog’s perception. The dog perceives the tree, but s perception. The dog perceives the tree, but not innot in a way that involves conceptualizing it

a way that involves conceptualizing it asas a tree, forming a judgment likea tree, forming a judgment like that tree is an oak 

that tree is an oak , or inferring from the presence of the tree and the tree’s, or inferring from the presence of the tree and the tree’s status as an oak that

status as an oak thatanan oak ioak is prs presenesent t ..⁸⁸In man, the animal, sensory elementIn man, the animal, sensory element is fused to the disti

is fused to the distinctively human, rational element in such a way as to formnctively human, rational element in such a way as to form a seamless unity

a seamless unity. Hence while perception is . Hence while perception is a good for both non-human a good for both non-human an- an-imals and human beings, that perception in our case participates in our imals and human beings, that perception in our case participates in our ra-tionality makes of it a

tionality makes of it a different and indeed higher sort of good than that different and indeed higher sort of good than that of of  which non-human animals are capable. Other goods we share in common which non-human animals are capable. Other goods we share in common with animals similarly participate

with animals similarly participate in our rationality and in our rationality and are radically trans-are radically trans-formed as a result. Thus,

formed as a result. Thus, mealsmeals have a social and cultural significance thathave a social and cultural significance that raises them above mere feeding;

raises them above mere feeding; games gameshavhave a e a social import social import and conceptualand conceptual content that raises

content that raises them above the play of which other mammals are them above the play of which other mammals are capable;capable;

and so forth.

and so forth.

Our sexual faculties are no different, and this is the key to understanding Our sexual faculties are no different, and this is the key to understanding why they have a

why they have a unitiveunitive as well as aas well as a pr procreatocreativeive end, and why these endsend, and why these ends are inseparable. Take the latter first. That sex considered from a purely are inseparable. Take the latter first. That sex considered from a purely

 N

 NEOEO-S-SCHOLASTICCHOLASTIC EESSAYSSSAYS

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8 FFor disor discuscussiosion of the cn of the crucirucial difal differferencences bees betwtween ieen intentellellectuctual acal actitivitvity in the sy in the strictrictt sense and the exercises in sensation and imagination

sense and the exercises in sensation and imagination of which non-human animalsof which non-human animals are capable, see Feser 2013.

are capable, see Feser 2013.

 biologic

 biological poal point of int of view view exists exists for for the sthe sake ake of pof procreation rocreation is uncis uncontroontroversiaversial.l.

This is true even though people have sexual relations for various reasons This is true even though people have sexual relations for various reasons other than procreation, since we are talking about

other than procreation, since we are talking about nature’snature’s ends here, notends here, not ours. In particular, it is

ours. In particular, it is true even though sex is pleasurable and human beingstrue even though sex is pleasurable and human beings and animals are typically drawn to sex precisely because of this pleasure.

and animals are typically drawn to sex precisely because of this pleasure.

For giving pleasure is not

For giving pleasure is not thethe end of sex, not thatend of sex, not that for the sake of w for the sake of whichhich sexsex exists in animals. Rather, sexual pleasure has as its own natural end the exists in animals. Rather, sexual pleasure has as its own natural end the get-ting of animals to engage in sexual relations, so that they will procreate.

ting of animals to engage in sexual relations, so that they will procreate.

This parallels the situation with eating: Even though eating is pleasurable, This parallels the situation with eating: Even though eating is pleasurable, the biological point of eating is not to give pleasure, but rather to provide the biological point of eating is not to give pleasure, but rather to provide an organism with the nutrients it

an organism with the nutrients it needs to survive. needs to survive. The pleasure of eating isThe pleasure of eating is  just nature’

 just nature’s was way of getting animals to do what is ney of getting animals to do what is needed to fulfileded to fulfill this end.l this end.

When analyzing the biological significance of either eating or sex, to When analyzing the biological significance of either eating or sex, to em- phasize pleasure would be to put the cart before the horse. Pleasure has its  phasize pleasure would be to put the cart before the horse. Pleasure has its  place, but it is secondary

 place, but it is secondary..  Notice also that

 Notice also that nature makes nature makes it very it very difficult to indulge in difficult to indulge in sex withoutsex without  procreation. There is

 procreation. There is no no prophylactic sheathe iprophylactic sheathe issued with ssued with a penis a penis at at birth,birth, and no diaphragm issued wit

and no diaphragm issued with a vagina. It takes some effort to come up withh a vagina. It takes some effort to come up with these devices, and even then, in the form i

these devices, and even then, in the form in which they existed for most of n which they existed for most of  human histor

human history they y they were not terwere not terribly effectiribly effective. Moreovve. Moreover, experience indi-er, experience indi-cates that people simply find sexual relations more pleasurable when such cates that people simply find sexual relations more pleasurable when such devices are not u

devices are not used, esed, even if they will ven if they will often use toften use them anyway out of a desirehem anyway out of a desire to avoid pregnancy. Indeed, this is one reason pregnancy is (even if often to avoid pregnancy. Indeed, this is one reason pregnancy is (even if often cut short by aborti

cut short by abortion) very common even in societies in which contraceptionon) very common even in societies in which contraception is easily available: People know they could take a few minutes to go buy a is easily available: People know they could take a few minutes to go buy a condom, but

condom, but go ahead and go ahead and engage in “unprotected” sex engage in “unprotected” sex anywanywayay. As this in-. As this in-dicates, sexual arousal occurs very frequently and can often be very

dicates, sexual arousal occurs very frequently and can often be very hard tohard to resist even for a short while. And that last resort to those seeking to avoid  resist even for a short while. And that last resort to those seeking to avoid   preg

 pregnancnancy—the y—the “withdr“withdrawawal” al” method—method—is is notorionotoriously usly unreliaunreliable. ble. Even Even withwith the advent of “the pill,” pregnancies (though also abortions) are common;

the advent of “the pill,” pregnancies (though also abortions) are common;

and even effective use of the pill—which has existed only for a very brief  and even effective use of the pill—which has existed only for a very brief   period of huma

 period of human history—requires that n history—requires that a wa woman remember oman remember to take it to take it at theat the appointed times and be willing to put up with its uncomfortable side effects.

appointed times and be willing to put up with its uncomfortable side effects.

So, sex exists in animals for the sake of procreation, and sexual pleasure So, sex exists in animals for the sake of procreation, and sexual pleasure exists for the sake of getting them to indulge in sex, so that they will exists for the sake of getting them to indulge in sex, so that they will pro-create. And we’re built in such a way that sexual arousal is hard to resist create. And we’re built in such a way that sexual arousal is hard to resist and occurs very frequently, and such that it is very difficult to avoid and occurs very frequently, and such that it is very difficult to avoid preg-nancies resulting from indulgence of that arousal. The obvious conclusion nancies resulting from indulgence of that arousal. The obvious conclusion is that the natural end of sex is (in part)

is that the natural end of sex is (in part) not just procreation, but procreationnot just procreation, but procreation  In Defense of the P

 In Defense of the Perverted Ferverted Faculty aculty Argument Argument 

in large numbers. Mother Nature clearly wants us to have babies, and lots in large numbers. Mother Nature clearly wants us to have babies, and lots of them. Nor can this be written off as just so much rationalization of of them. Nor can this be written off as just so much rationalization of prej-udice. Apart from the Aristotelian jargon, everything said so far about the udice. Apart from the Aristotelian jargon, everything said so far about the natural ends of sex and

natural ends of sex and sexual pleasure could be endorsed by the sexual pleasure could be endorsed by the DarwinianDarwinian naturalist as a perfectly accurate description of their biological functions, naturalist as a perfectly accurate description of their biological functions, whether or not such a naturalist would agree with the moral conclusions whether or not such a naturalist would agree with the moral conclusions natural law theorists would dra

natural law theorists would draw from it.w from it.

 Now

 Now in light in light of all of all this, it this, it does sedoes seem that em that Mother Mother Nature has Nature has put a put a fairlyfairly heavy burden on women, who, if “nature takes its

heavy burden on women, who, if “nature takes its course,course,” are bound to ” are bound to be- be-come pregnant somewhat frequently. She has also put a fairly heavy burden come pregnant somewhat frequently. She has also put a fairly heavy burden on children too,

on children too, given that unlike non-human offspring they are utterly de-given that unlike non-human offspring they are utterly de- pendent on

 pendent on others for others for their their needs, and needs, and for a for a very lvery long period. This ong period. This is is truetrue not only of their biological needs, but of the moral and cultural needs they not only of their biological needs, but of the moral and cultural needs they hav

have by virtue of being le by virtue of being little rational animals. They need education in bothittle rational animals. They need education in both what is useful and what is right, and correction of error. In human beings, what is useful and what is right, and correction of error. In human beings,  procreation—generating ne

 procreation—generating new members of the species—is not just a mattw members of the species—is not just a matter er  of producing new orga

of producing new organisms, but also of nisms, but also of forming them into forming them into persons capablepersons capable of fulfilling their nature as distinctively

of fulfilling their nature as distinctively rational rational animals. animals. So, nature’So, nature’s takings taking its course thus seems to leave mothers and offspring pretty helpless, or at its course thus seems to leave mothers and offspring pretty helpless, or at any rate it would do so

any rate it would do so if there weren’if there weren’t someone ordained t someone ordained by nature to pro-by nature to

any rate it would do so if there weren’if there weren’t someone ordained t someone ordained by nature to pro-by nature to