Análisis funcional de los genes expresados diferencialmente (MapMan)

can be analysed just like those of people in Western arket-based

countries. Thus, for a formalist, the origin of the rna et, with all

its capacity to exchange goods of different kinds, exploi the di\,ision

of labour and provide a hedge against dependence on

⁰

e good, may

P U B L I C G O O D S A N D P R I V A T E G I F T S _IlS

lie in the reciprocal food-sharing arrangements of a hunter-gatherer band.s

The substantivists, however, say that economics cannot apply to primitive societies because the people in those societies are not in a market at all. They are not free agents, deciding their own self­

interest in the passionless world of a shopping mall. They are embed­

ded in a tangle of social obligations, kin networks and power relations. The reason ^a person shares food with another may be because of a calculated reciprocal hedge, but it might also be because he is bound by custom to do so, or intimidated into it by his fear of the recipient's power.

Hawkes, in the substantivist tradition, rebels against the naked economics of reciprocal sharing. As I say, this is surely hair-splitting;

modern economics also tries to broaden its attention beyond the perfect market and take into account the 'irrational' reasons people have for their decisions. And even if Hawkes is right that Hadza men hunt for the prestige rather than the return favour, you can still take a ruthlessly economic view of their motives: they are converting giraffe meat into a durable and valuable commodity - prestige - that will be cashed in for a different currency of advantage at a later stage. For this reason, Richard Alexander calls the trading of concrete for abstract benefits 'indirect reciprocity'.9

Indeed, to take this argument a little funher, I do not believe it is too far-fetched to see in the actions of hunter-gatherers distant echoes of the origins of modern markets in financial derivatives.

When a Hadza man shares meat with the expectation of some future return, he is in effect buying a derivative instrument with which to hedge his risk. According to Hill and Kaplan, he is entering into a contract to swap the variable return rate on his hunting effort for a more nearly fixed return rate achieved by his whole group. He is just like a farmer who contracts to receive a fixed income for his wheat in six months' time by selling a forward contract or buying some futures. Or like a banker who has lent a large loan at a variable rate of interest, and decides to hedge his position by signing a contract for a swap (or perhaps even a swaption - an option to swap) with another bank: he agrees to pay a series of variable payments, linked

u6 T H F. 0 R I G I N S 0 F V I R T U F.

to short-term interest rates, in exchange for receiving a se 'es of fixed payments. In doing so he seeks OUt a counterparty who wants the opposite.

According to Hawkes, the hunter is reducing his expo ure to one currency (meat) by buying another (prestige), in just ththat a company that can raise a loan cheaply in dollars ight swap

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^{same way}

it for one in Deutschmarks to hedge its exposure to exc ange rates.

The analogies are far from exact, but the principles are the same: one person wishes to reduce his risk by trading another, or with others. Those tempted to scoff at hunter-gathere

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s for being far too unsophisticated for this sort of thing would be w

f:

0ng. Their brains are the same as ours, and their instincts for goo deals are as closely honed within their own cultural environments as those of any broker on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. And by seeing it in this light, an important insight emerges. The defence erivatives traders give for their trade is that they are in the business f reducing risk by matching together individuals who have differen exposures.

They argue that a futures market or a swaps market beqefits every­

body. It is not a zero-sum game. If they are nOt able to [swap risks, businesses are exposed to more risk, for which they h

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ve to pay.

Exactly the same argument applies to the origin of and food sharing in human beings. Hunting is risky; sharing that risk.

Everybody benefits.Io

If the Hadza seem too remote, consider a similar pr

�

em clos r to home: windfalls of good luck. There are many exampl s of people who have experienced sudden good fortune and have en deeply resented in their communities for not sharing it with thers. One San woman who was well paid for her part in a film call

ejd ^{The Gods}

Must Be Crazy

spent it all on things for herself, and so provoked a fight."

J

^rOIl

^i£.

Likewise, Marshall Sahlins argu d that the reason hun r-gatherers are sO generally idle - they 'work' far fewer hours t an farming people - and so free of possessions and wealth, is bec use in their egalitarian societies to accumulate too much is to refus to share it, so it makes better sense to want little ' and thereby- ach eve all they want. Hunter-gatherers, said Sahlins, had discovered t e Zen road

P U B L J e G o 0 D S A N D P R J V A T £ G 1 f T S II7 to affluence; they work hard enough to provide for their various ambitions and needs; then, rather than risk jealousy, they stop"�

On

8

August

:£993,

Maura Burke won

£3

million in the Irish national lottery. The 450 people who lived in the tiny village of Lettermore were delighted for their fortunate neighbour and threw a spontaneous party. Mrs Burke's husband died within a month and she had no children. Expectations ran high in the village. Yet she did not share anything with the villagers, and they quickly grew resentful. 'We've not seen a penny of it,' one resident said angrily to a journalist. Mrs Burke began to receive death threats and moved to London. Her good fortune had driven her out of her community because she was unwilling to share."

At first sight, Mrs Burke's punishment was very much in the ,tra­

dition of Hawkes's tolerated theft. The community did not just expect her to be generous with her windfall, it punished her for not being generous. Yet there is another way to look at it: Hill's an4 Kaplan's way. Like a player in a prisoner's dilemma game, Mrs Burke had suddenly defected after cooperating for many years, and her partners felt inclined to punish her. Knowing the neighbours could never offer h,er the same generosity in the future, she had little incentive to share. But a fortunate aboriginal hunter knows it is only a matter of time before he finds himself in the position of recipient rather than donor. The long shadow of the future hangs over his ' decision.

Incidentally, Mrs Burke was lucky. In Eskimo societies, to hoard is taboo. Rich people who are ungenerous are sometimes killed.

In document Respuesta transcriptómica y celular a metales pesados de la simbiosis Medicago truncatula-Ensifer spp. (página 115-125)