ANÁLISIS INTEGRAL DE LOS RESULTADOS:

A more detailed comparison of all the episodes will take place in chapter 5; however, Table 3.1 summarises the key findings of this chapter.

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Coercive diplomacy in the form of the ideal policy was not applied under the Clinton administration as there was no clear demand given to Gaddafi that he stop his

development of nuclear weapons. The policy objective and clear demands of the Clinton administration were firmly focussed on Gaddafi giving up his support of terrorists, handing over terrorist suspects and paying reparations to the families of the Lockerbie victims. There was no clear demand that Gaddafi was to halt and disarm his nuclear programme, but there was mention of ‘concern’ over his WMD programmes, although this was viewed as a lower priority and related more to his pursuit of chemical and biological weapons.

There was no direct threat to use force, or deadline given with regard to the issue of WMD. However, Gaddafi did comply with the primary demand that Libya hand over terrorist suspects this was met and cease support of terrorism. The approach that was adopted by the Clinton administration was to increase the international political and economic isolation of Gaddafi and his regime. The pressure was delivered through the ILSA and UN sanctions. There was no direct threat communicated that force would be applied in a manner that conforms to the ideal policy. Furthermore, although there was no deadline issued threatening the use of force relating to Gaddafi’s nuclear programme, there was a deadline given for when the measures within UNSC 883 would be applied; therefore, this element conforms partially to the idealpolicy.

Threat to use force Deadline given Assurance given Incentives offered Ideal Policy Predicted outcome of CD Actual outcome of CD Will to threaten and use of force? Impact of org. Libya Ep.1

No Partial Partial Yes No Failure Partial Success Yes Sanctions only Libya Ep.2 Yes No - implied

Partial Yes No Failure Success Yes No impact

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The assurance given to Libya, by the Clinton administration, was that handing over Lockerbie suspects would not be utilised as a way of seeking regime change. However, even after suspects had been handed over the US maintained sanctions based on

outstanding demands that needed to be resolved, which included the issue of WMD. Assurances were given, but not assurances that further demands would not be made; therefore, this element only partially conforms to the ideal policy.

There was a clear incentive offered of having UN and US sanctions lifted that in turn would have improved Libya’s economic situation and bolstered Gaddafi position. Furthermore, the secret talks held between the US and Libya demonstrated that there was a possibility of an improved relationship with the US. Therefore, there was clearly an incentive on offer that conforms to the ideal policy.

Gaddafi’s decision to comply with the US and UN demands, over issues of terrorism which clearly brought him closer to re-integration into the international community, was rational. Furthermore, as the US did not have clear evidence of his nuclear programme and there was no direct threat made, Gaddafi’s pursuit of nuclear weapons program was also rational as it gave him the opportunity to either obtain a deterrent and a mark of prestige, or possible increase any future bargain position with the US.

There was initially coalitional consensus regarding the full implementation of sanctions, this started to wane once individual states saw it against their interests not to enforce them. This was despite US leadership and potential US sanctions for contravention of the ILSA.

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A significant finding within this episode is that although there was no threat to use force over Gaddafi’s WMDs, Jakobsen’s framework predicts that the US should have been willing to threaten force. Dealing with Libya’s WMD programme was of strategic interest to the US, the US was capable of conducting a successful military campaign if required, and it would not have been difficult to make a case to its domestic audience about the danger posed by a Libyan nuclear weapons capability. The combination of these variables conform to an interest driven pattern that Jakobsen asserts would lead to a willingness to threaten force.

The most likely reason that force was not threatened, was even though by 1999 the US was aware of Gaddafi’s nuclear programme, it is clear that policy makers did not view it as an immediate threat and must have assumed that it was one that future

administrations could deal with; the priority of the Clinton administration was achieving reparations for families of the Lockerbie bombing. Raising the nuclear issue with Libya at that time may have complicated and impacted upon the chances of receiving

reparations.

Under the Bush administration the US clearly articulated a policy objective that states that supported terrorism and sought nuclear weapons halt their activities or face the possibility of pre-emptive military action. Libya identified as a state ‘beyond the Axis of evil’, who had a history of supporting terrorists and seeking WMD clearly fell into the category of a potential ‘target’ of a pre-emptive strike. Therefore, Gaddafi must have viewed the demand that states should halt their pursuit of nuclear weapons being implicitly directed at him.

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Although there was not a direct threat of force issued by Bush, the rhetoric from elements of his administration, combined with credible demonstration of force in Iraq clearly were perceived by Gaddafi as a threat. This was particularly amplified when the interdiction of the BBC China provided clear proof that he had a nuclear weapons programme. Therefore, the threat to use force to deny Gaddafi attaining a nuclear capability conformed to the ideal policy.

A key element of this episode was the interception of equipment under the PSI at a crucial moment in the secret negotiations between the UK, US and Libya. The

interception gave that the UK and US the evidence that Gaddafi knew could be used to make a convincing case against him; therefore, it increased the pressure for him to reveal and dismantle fully his programme. This interception in effect made the next meeting of the parties a deadline that Libya needed to make the decision to comply by or face increasing pressure. However, as there was no specific time stated from the outset that Libya had to surrender its nuclear programme or face military strikes, this element does not conform to the ideal policy.

There is a debate as to whether there was a deal done. Bob Joseph, who was the US lead negotiator, argued that there was no bargaining. I agree with most scholars that there must have been an assurance, if only an implicit one, given to Gaddafi that if he complied the US and UK they would not seek regime change and he would be re- integrated back into the international community; the latter being a clear incentive that conforms to the ideal policy. However, there is no evidence that further demands were removed from the table, regarding normal diplomatic issues such as human rights would not be made. Therefore, this element partially conforms to the ideal policy. This element also highlights one of the issues with coercive diplomacy; which is if the strategy works

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it is difficult for regimes not to be tempted to use if over other issues. It should be noted that, with the overthrow of Gaddafi in 2011, whether the assurance of regime change was actually kept is not of significant importance for this episode, but clearly could have an impact on future uses of US coercive diplomacy.

With no immediate obtainment of nuclear weapons, Gaddafi’s surrendering of his nuclear programme was rational. He either continued to develop a nuclear weapon, which in light of US policies enacted after 9/11 was at increased risk of detection, and if detected would have been at a high risk of being destroyed militarily. Negotiating and surrendering this programme seemed to be a path to achieving his goals of re-

integration into the international community and developing a stable economy.

Another significant finding is that like episode 1, although there was no direct threat made to threaten the use force over Gaddafi nuclear weapons programme, Jakobsen’s framework predicts there should have been. As in episode 1 dealing with Libya’s nuclear programme was clearly of strategic interest to the US; the US would almost certainly been able to conduct a successful military campaign if required and it would not have been difficult to make a case to gain domestic support. These factors conform to an interest driven pattern or even with less domestic support it would conform to a government driven pattern, both of which Jakobsen asserts would lead to a willingness to threaten force.

As in episode 1, it is highly likely that the reason force was not threatened was that Gaddafi’s attainment of a nuclear weapons did not appear an immediate threat to US interests. Therefore, the more immediate politically damaging issue of Lockerbie and reparations to the families took priority. Furthermore, after 9/11 the US engaged in

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conflicts in Afghanistan in 2001 and then Iraq in 2003. It is likely that US strategists did not want to engage in further conflicts unless necessary. Therefore, Libya could wait until a more opportune moment.

A significant finding is that in both episodes, although there was no direct threat to use force over Gaddafi nuclear weapons programme, Jakobsen’s framework predicts there should have been. In both episodes Gaddafi nuclear programme was of strategic interest to the US; the US would almost certainly been able to conduct a successful military campaign if required and it would not have been difficult to make a case about the danger that a Libyan bomb posed to gain domestic support. These variables lead to patterns that Jakobsen asserts would lead to a willingness to threaten force.

In both episodes it is asserted that the reason force was not threatened was that Gaddafi’s attainment of a nuclear weapons did not appear an immediate threat to US interests, therefore, the more immediate and politically damaging issue of Lockerbie and reparations to the families took priority. The next chapter will now examine US policy towards North Korea.

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CHAPTER 4 – US COERCIVE DIPLOMACY