3. Análisis e interpretación de los resultados
3.1 Análisis e interpretación de los resultados de la encuesta
Eckel (1981) points out that there are two types of income smoothing: natural
and intentional smoothing. The former results from the accrual basis of accounting
process while the latter is engaged by corporate management for self-interest. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 1, income smoothing is related to both increasing and decreasing
earnings. Using solely discretionary accruals seems to fulfil a managerial require-
ment to smooth income for both goals. For example, management can over-estimate
a provision for warranty to reduce earnings during a good time or under-estimate
an allowance for doubtful accounts receivable to amplify earnings during a difficult
time.
Many studies have reported the use of accounting methods to smooth income,
such as in the banking industry (see for example, Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008; Sood
and Abou, 2012). Apart from the banking industry, Chaney et al. (1998) find that
firms listed on the New York stock exchanges use discretionary accruals to smooth
income. Beattie et al. (1994) report that UK firms unfairly classify extraordinary
items to smooth net income before extraordinary items. Peek (2004) reports that
Dutch companies use accrual estimation to smoothing earnings. Leuz et al. (2003)
also studied the effect of institutional factors on accrual-based income smoothing
in many countries. Literature has paid little attention to the use of real activity
manipulation to smooth income. To the best our knowledge, few have studied real
activity income smoothing. For instance, Nagy and Neal (2001) find that Japanese
their peer US firms do to smooth income. Consistently, Mande et al. (2000) find
that listed Japanese firms adjust R&D to smooth income and do even more in
expansion years. While accruals can be used to both inflate and deflate earnings, real
earnings manipulation seems to be the income-increasing strategy of management
during times of difficulty (Graham et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006). Walker (2013)
points out the findings of Graham et al. (2005) calling for more studies about real
activity earnings management and income smoothing.
Accounting profession and financial statement users seem to perceive income
smoothing differently. On the one hand, intentionally smoothing out fluctuating
earnings is considered undesirable by regulators (Levitt, 1998) because such smooth-
ness may misrepresent firm’s underlying economic performance. On the other hand,
investors seem to prefer smooth income for many reasons. For instance, Graham
et al. (2005) find that management believe that investors perceive firms with smooth
income as less risky in comparison to those with variable income. Francis et al.
(2004) find that investors reward such firms with lower costs of capital. Ball (2006)
points out that smooth income is preferable for earnings prediction. With its big in-
centives, income smoothing is generally considered to be common business practice
worldwide.
3.2.2 International Financial Reporting Standards and earnings man-
agement
As discussed in Chapter 1, a large body of research has investigated the effect of
IFRS on earnings management in many countries. While a number of previous stud-
ies focus on accrual earnings management after the IFRS adoption (Van Tendeloo
and Vanstraelen, 2005; Callao and Jarne, 2010; Zéghal et al., 2011; Houqe et al.,
2012), some test income smoothing. For instance, Barth et al. (2008) by comparing
earnings variation of firms worldwide – between the pre- and post-IAS periods and
between IAS firms and non-IAS firms, report that income smoothing declines after
with those of Barth et al. (2008), report a significant decline in income smoothing
in China. Hung and Subramanyam (2007) report an increase in income variability
of German firms after voluntary IAS adoption. In contrast, adopting IFRS in Eu-
rope shows different consequences. Chen et al. (2010) find an increase in income
smoothing of European firms after compliance with IFRS. Ahmed et al. (2013) re-
port a rise in income smoothing worldwide by comparing firms in IFRS adopting
countries and those in non-IFRS countries. Capkun et al. (2013) find an increase
in income smoothing for both voluntary and mandatory IFRS adopters worldwide.
However, smoothing methods have been little investigated. Note that the majority
of these prior studies estimated a group variance of net income as a proxy for income
smoothing. So they could only employ a univariate test in order to investigate the
effect of IFRS.
Though accounting standards adopted by firms are considered of high quality,
other incentives also play an important role in determining the quality of account-
ing information (Ball et al., 2003). So if the income-smoothing incentives discussed
earlier still remain, management may use real activity manipulation to smooth in-
come instead. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) theoretically propose that restricting
accounting standards may lead to the use of real manipulation. Empirical evidence
has also been documented. For instance, Tan and Jamal (2006), based on results
from their experimental study, report that tightening accounting allowances leads
to a drop in accrual manipulation but a manager who has a clear picture of a firm’s
future earnings is still able to engage in real activity manipulation to smooth earn-
ings. Ipino and Parbonetti (2011) investigating both discretionary accruals and real
activity manipulation, find that adopting IFRS leads to an increase in overall real
manipulation, especially for firms in strong legal enforcement countries.
Given that management can employ both accrual and real activity manipula-
tion and if IFRS may directly affect accounting choices and allowances, a decline
in income smoothing after the adoption found in some prior research may be possi-
while real manipulation remains, or 2) the magnitude of decrease in accrual manipu-
lation is more than the degree of real earnings management increases. Nevertheless,
the relation between income smoothing and the methods used to reduce earnings
volatility around the IFRS adoption period has been less documented.