Análisis, interpretación y discusión de resultados

In contrast to realism, economic interdependence takes into account the centrality of the economic dimension of power, particularly the issue of resource power. As already mentioned above, it is an appropriate framework for analyzing why and how power relations arise from relations of economic interactions among oil producers and consumers. By utilizing the economic interdependence approach it is possible to gain an understanding of how domestic and international politics are linked. Much of the explanatory power of economic interdependence, however, has been diluted by a misconception of “gain from trade.” As Baldwin has showed, “gain from trade” is another name for the opportunity costs of breaking or altering the relation between two parties. Therefore, “The ‘benefit’ of interdependence should be defined in terms of the values of the parties and the likely effects on those values of breaking the relationship.”154

Yet it is not uncommon in the literature to see the use of the term “economic interdependence” in terms of distribution gains (in the words of Keohane and Nye: “Who gets what?”155). In this sense interdependence is understood as the difference in benefits realized by both parties.156 By knowing just the relative gain, however, there is no telling whether or not an existing relationship is in actuality based on “dependence” (opportunity costs of forgoing the relation for one partner are too high) or just economic linkages. Relative benefit obscures the fact that trading partners could adjust to external economic changes, without enduring a major cost. Without assessing the availability and cost of alternative options, it cannot be determined that “dependence” can serve as a source for power. This oversight is evident in some Middle East scholarship.

As mentioned above, the concept of asymmetries has been adopted by some scholars to explain interactions between Arab oil-producing countries and the international system. But their usages of asymmetric interdependence tend to confuse rather than clarify the reality of the relationship. For instance, Gause writes: “Saudi Arabia’s integration into the world economic and strategic system is better understood in terms of asymmetric

153

See Chatelus and Schemeil, “Toward a New Political Economy of State Industrialization in the Arab Middle East,” 257.

154

David A. Baldwin, “Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis,” 483. 155

Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 7. 156

Gilpin also pointed out the importance of relative gain over mutual gains as one of the primary principles of economic nationalism, which by his account is a potent force in international relations. In his words: “Indeed, economic nationalism is likely to be a significant influence in international relations as long as the state system exists.” See Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), 34.

interdependence.”157 In a similar view, Muqtedar Khan writes that “Now the relationship has turned into asymmetric interdependence – with U.S. dependence on Saudi oil becoming increasingly lesser and Saudi dependence on the United States for security, from external and internal threats increasingly progressive.”158

Although neither author defines the meaning of interdependence, their arguments seem to reflect a notion of interdependence in the sense of relative gain, rather than cost associated with forgoing the relationship. For Khan, the Saudi-American relation is asymmetric interdependence because the United States is less dependent on Saudi Arabia. In the case of Gause, there is no clear argument that explicates the relation of asymmetry. His argument is that Saudi Arabia’s vast oil resources draw American protection and provide the kingdom with influence in international politics. Although his assessment is valid, it tells us nothing about asymmetric interdependence.

Without a clear definition of the concept of asymmetric dependence, Gause places the burden of determining his argument on the reader. Gause seemed to be suggesting the following: in the context of the Saudi-American relations, it is argued that both countries are dependent on each other (oil for military/political support), but Saudi Arabia is more dependent on the United States. Why? Because, according to Gause, “The power asymmetries between Arab states, and Middle Eastern states more generally, and the great powers are too wide for the relationship to be based on equality.”159 His assessment follows from the logic of relative gain, not the opportunity costs of altering the relationship.

Although neither author provides an explicit definition of the concept, their usage resembles Keohane and Nye’s definition of asymmetric dependence, as one partner has more to gain than the other partner. But as we have seen above, neither mutual nor asymmetric benefits are adequate criteria for characterizing a relationship as dependent or interdependent. To claim asymmetric interdependence Khan and Gause should have investigated the cost of forgoing or altering the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States. Had they considered the opportunity costs of altering the relationship, they would have reached a different conclusion. Consider the situation in which Saudi Arabia (in concert with other Arab oil-producing countries) placed an embargo on oil supplies to the United States. The consequence of oil shortage would plunge the American economy into a recession. A recession in the United States would have detrimental effects on the global economy, which in turn depresses world demands for oil. If world demand for oil drops, Saudi Arabia as an oil rentier state (and other oil rentier states) would lose a significant portion of revenues. What this example reveals is that a calculation based on opportunity costs would lead one to characterize the Saudi-

157

Gause III, “The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia,” 195. 158

Muqtadar Khan, Jihad for Jerusalem, 168. Contrary to Muqtadar Khan’s claim that the United States’ dependence is becoming increasingly “lesser,” the data from 1994 to 2004 shows that Saudi oil imports remained fixed at around 8 percent of consumption in the United States. Moreover, the author overlooks the fungibility of the oil market, where the price of oil in the United States is heavily influenced by the international market price, which is partly determined by global supply. Consequently, even if its imports of Saudi oil has declined the United States is still linked to Saudi Arabia by the effect of the oil price. 159

American relations in terms of symmetric dependence or interdependence, not asymmetric interdependence.

Asymmetric interdependence is most obvious in the case of embargoes. The American oil embargo to Japan in 1940-41, for instance, clearly demonstrates the vulnerability of Japanese dependence on oil imports. In order to pressure Japan to abandon its expansion in the Pacific, the United States resorted to an oil embargo. In effect, the embargo left Japan without access to 80 percent of its oil requirements. Another example is the Arab oil embargo of 1973. At that time Western Europe and Japan were highly dependent on oil imports from Arab oil-producing states. By enacting a combination of full embargo and gradual cutbacks, the Arab countries aimed to change the position of Western countries and Japan on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Having no cost-effective alternative to oil imports, Western Europe and Japan were vulnerable to the oil disruptions.