Análisis lista de chequeo 1

Despite its important contributions, the literature on subnational stateness tends to assume that the countryside, peripheries, and frontier regions are homogeneous. Classic studies of the state rarely take into consideration the variable ecological characteristics of the

territory. Brown zones like the Amazon, which accounts for roughly 40% of South America, are barely mentioned in the scholarship on state formation in Latin America (Centeno, 2002; Kurtz, 2013; López-Alves, 2000; Soifer, 2015).

There are some noteworthy exceptions to the general trend of neglecting

ecological characteristics, however. Scholars have recognized that certain territories are difficult to reach, making the “logistics of political control” difficult to implement. In this

sense, there may be territories that, given their ecological characteristics, are naturally resistant to state action. What makes these territories so resistant? Do their ecological or topographical characteristics really explain such difficulties? How much can we infer about the state from the ecosystems in question?

Comparative scholarship identifies certain ecological characteristics thought to make political control difficult. Studies on the causes of violence tend to converge on the idea that a “rough” terrain helps explain both the onset and the continuity of conflict. Rough terrain heightens the risk of violence because it aids “rebels in hiding from superior government forces” (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 76). It is no coincidence that many classic theorists of guerrilla warfare recognize the strategic value of particular territories. For example, Che Guevara (1998, p. 29) argued that guerrillas perform better “in zones difficult to reach, either because of dense forests, steep mountains, impassable deserts or marshes”. Similarly, Mao Tse-tung (2015) observed that a successful guerrilla “travels light and travels fast. He turns the hazards of terrain to his advantage and makes an ally of tropical rains, heavy snow, intense heat and freezing cold” (p. 26).66 _These writers tend to be aware of the existence of geographic obstacles that limit state power (Tollefsen & Buhaug, 2015, p.11). Rough terrain, in other words, helps create brown zones.

66 _{Tse-tung was convinced that guerrilla camps should be located in the mountains, where they could} successfully hide from the regular army.

Additionally, the academic literature tends to agree that mountainous terrain, deserts, and forests are difficult to control (e.g., Giraudy & Luna, 2017, p. 105).67 For example, the proportion of a country that is mountainous has been used as a cross-

national measurement for rough terrain (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p.81).68 Similarly,Herbst (2000)’s States and Power in Africa emphasizes the difficulties of governing the forested or desertic hinterlands of many African countries. Finally, Eartman’s Birth of the

Leviathan explains that, historically, in Poland “vast areas of thick forest and marshland … prevented the construction of large-scale forms of social and political organization” (1997, p. 278). Mountains, deserts, and forests have thus all been represented as environments that tend to resist the effective exercise of state authority.

What do these landscapes have in common that makes them resistant to state authority? Comparative scholarship suggests the answer may have something to do with the way mountains, deserts, and forests restrict population settlement and economic development. Put differently: the effect of different ecosystems on state power is

mediated by population dynamics. For example, in Africa, vast territories remain beyond the reach of the state due to low population density, which makes state building both costly and unrewarding for political elites (Herbst, 2000). James Scott’s conclusions in

The Art of Not Being Governed (2009) do not radically differ from what Herbst argues:

67 _{Tollefsen and Buhaug (2015, p. 17) found that the number of battles increases with distance from the} capital city, the prevalence of mountains and forests, and the size of excluded populations.

68 _{This crude measurement is, surprisingly, not very different from Scott (2009)´s qualitative study on the} highlands of Southeast Asia. Scott studies the Southeast Asian mountain region “on the marches of

mainland Southeast Asia, China, India and Bangladesh” (2009, p. 14), which, according to him, may be one of the largest “non-state spaces” on Earth.

namely, that state authority tends to vanish in certain territories because state power is “man power.” 69

All of the above suggests that the densely forested green zones of the Amazon are, in fact, what O’Donnell (1993) calls brown zones: green is the new brown. Since

O’Donnell did not consider the interaction between the state and nature, the colors of his maps are very different from mine. Many of the brown zones of Peru and Brazil, the Latin American countries that O’Donnell studied, are green, ecologically speaking, since they are mostly covered by natural forests. STR is low in the dense forests of the

Amazon, but high in lands that have been cleared. Amazonia is a continental brown zone spanning several peripheral states (Ungar, 2018)70 _{that face the not-insignificant}

challenge of exerting power over a region that has become crucial for the world economy and environment.

Figure 2.3 provides a simple but powerful image to illustrate this point. It depicts contemporary forest cover in Colombia and its spatial association with the most

important system of indirect rule that the Colombian state implemented until the end of the twentieth century. The Catholic church was in charge of performing most state functions in many parts of the country, and the Amazon was one of them. Therefore, the

69 _{Mountains do not always resist state action, which depends on particular historical configurations. While} state power diminishes with altitude in Southeast Asia (Scott, 2009), power and wealth are concentrated in the Andean mountain range in countries like Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. States were built where manpower was present, thus reinforcing spatial patterns that existed from pre-colonial times (Mahoney 2010). The capital of the Inca Empire was located in Cusco rather than Lima and the suyos (regional territorial power structures) were designed to connect Andean towns. Thus, state strength diminishes in the lowlands of most Andean countries, a fact that the Amazon exemplifies.

70 _{This region is, so to speak, a doubly peripheral region because it comprises the periphery of a group of} peripheral states (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979).

map is useful to highlight that forest areas tend to be brown, which in this case is represented by state delegation to the Catholic Church.

Figure 2.3. Forest cover and indirect rule in Colombia

Data for indirect rule from Bonilla (1968) and for forest cover in 2012 from IGAC- SIGOT (coauthored with Nicolás Herrera).

In conclusion, the existing scholarship provides useful theoretical tools for identifying the places where state strength decreases: peripheries, rural areas, internal frontiers, and areas without commercial agriculture. The literature also concludes that

mountains, deserts, and dense forests tend to be brown zones due to the mismatch between population and territory. The Amazon should be understood as a brown zone because it meets all of these expectations.