Análisis orbitálico

The aim of this chapter is to show why the basic structure is a morally distinct subject. In

§3.1.1 - §3.1.3, I showed why the considerations relevant for evaluating actions within an

institutions that determine that context. What I have not yet shown is why this justifies

developing distinct principles for the basic structure of society. Cohen and Murphy argue

that, at a fundamental level, the principles that apply to institutions must be the same as

the principles that apply to individuals. In §3.2.1, I will show how the difference between

relevant considerations differentiates the principles that apply within an institutional

context from those that apply to the institutions that establish that context. Then in §3.2.2,

I will show why the principles that apply to the basic structure are distinct from the

principles that apply to other institutions/systems. Finally, in §3.2.3, I will explain why

the principles that apply to the basic structure are distinct from those that apply to the

informal norms in a society.

3.2.1 Deliberative and decisive principles

To make the transition from talking about “considerations” to talking about “principle, I

need to make a distinction between two kinds of moral principles; deliberative principles

and decisive principles. I understand “deliberative principles” as guiding us towards the

recognition of considerations that are relevant for moral and ethical evaluation. I call

them deliberative principle because they guide us in our deliberation about moral and

ethical problems. By contrast, “decisive principles” guide us in reconciling various

considerations and coming to a final evaluation or decision. They are decisive in the

sense that they provide the decisive evaluation of that to which they apply.

Some moral theories, like forms of intuitionism or pluralism, will only recognize

principles that can reconcile relevant considerations. Perhaps autonomy and well-being

are both irreducible moral considerations, but there are no principles that determine how

tradeoffs between the two should be made. Other moral theories will only recognize

decisive principles as valid. According to such views, the only relevant considerations are

those that decisive principles identify as decisive. Since other considerations do not

ultimately determine how we should act, they are not really considerations because they

should not be considered. A third group of theories might recognize both kinds of

principles, supposing that we need to understand what considerations are relevant before

we can make any decisive judgments. If we think that decisive judgments are explained

by a relation between considerations, then we will think both kinds of principles will be

relevant.

In §3.1, I argued that the considerations relevant for evaluating actions within an

institutional context will be distinct from those that are relevant for evaluating the

institutions that determine that context. Why does this mean that the principles that apply

to institutions will be distinct from the principles that apply to individual actions? Well,

that depends on what kind of principles you have in mind.

First, if one is concerned with deliberative principles, then such principle will

need to present the considerations that arise within an institutional context in some way.

If one is deliberating about whether they should accept inegalitarian wages, a deliberative

principle should present the claims that arise within a labor market as a relevant concern.

In this case, the (deliberative) principles that apply to an action within an institutional

that determine that context; the principles that apply to actions should represent the

claims within a labor market whereas the principles that apply to the labor market itself

should not.

My claim is not that all the principles or considerations that apply within an institutional context will be different from those that apply to the institutions. Helping

persons satisfy their basic needs might be a consideration that is relevant for evaluating

both individual and institutions. Though some considerations might be relevant for each,

not all are. The crucial point is that the set of considerations relevant for assessing institutions is distinct from the set of considerations relevant for assessing individual action, so we should distinguish institutional principles from individual principles.

Second, if one is concerned with decisive principles, then we need recognize how

a institutional context ultimately affects what an individual should do. Suppose that two

different property schemes, A and B, would identify two different people, Y and Z, as the

owner of a particular object. If we live under property system A and that system grants

the property right to Y, then we think that Z should not claim that property as her own. A

decisive principle should recognize this, so decisive principles need to be sensitive to the

particularities of the institutional context in which they are applied. Y’s ownership of the

object is only a consideration against Z’s seizing it within a particular institutional

context, and our decisive principle should track the relevance of such considerations.

So, regardless of whether we are concerned with deliberative or decisive

principles, the principles that apply to individual actions within an institution’s context

that moral theories that recognize both the validity of both deliberative and decisive

principles will recognize that principles should be distinct in these two cases. To present

and track the significance of considerations relevant in an institutional context, the

principles for the two should be distinct.

How does all this bear on the arguments of Cohen and Murphy. Well, Cohen’s

overall view is concerned with considerations that are represented by fundamental

principles. Suppose we recognize that equality, autonomy, and well-being are always

significant for any moral problem. Cohen wants to argue that we address moral problems

by seeing how they relate to these fundamental values, regardless of whether we are

evaluating institutions or individual conduct. I can agree with this. I only maintain that

we do not only evaluate individual actions by these fundamental moral values. The considerations that are particular to an institutional context are also relevant. The fact that

our institutions specify obligations, rights, and powers is also relevant to evaluating

action. Our moral principles must also present the particularities within an institutional

context as relevant, and these considerations can oftentimes change our overall evaluation

of an action. It might be permissible for a person to enhance inequality within a justified

labor market if that labor market grants her a claim to such incentives. I do not need to

deny that equality, autonomy, and well-being are fundamental values to recognize that the

set of considerations relevant for evaluating actions within an institution’s context are

distinct from those relevant for evaluating that institution.

A similar point applies to Murphy’s argument. Murphy emphasizes that the same

say on Murphy’s complete argument in §5.1, but let me give a preliminary reply here. So

long as we recognize that our institutions can establish obligations, rights, and powers,

then the considerations relevant for evaluating actions will be distinct in an institutional

context. Fundamental principles will still apply to both individuals and institutions, but

there will be additional (and often decisive) considerations that apply to individual action.

At this stage, I have shown (a) that the considerations relevant for evaluating

individual action within an institutional context are distinct from those relevant for

evaluating the institutions that establish that context, and (b) that the principles that apply

to individual actions in that context are distinct from the principles that apply to the

institutions. This does not yet get me to the claim that the basic structure is a distinct

moral subject. After all, the basic structure is not constituted by all institutions, but only

those that establish our obligations, rights, and powers as members of society. First, I

need to explain why it would be that principles for the basic structure would be morally

distinct from the principles for other institutions or practices. I do so in §3.2.2. Second, I

need to explain why the principles for the basic structure would be morally distinct from

the principles for the network of informal norms that also have a role in shaping ethical

life. I do this in §3.2.3.

3.2.2 Institutions and the Basic Structure

What would justify treating the basic structure differently from other institutions? So far,

I’ve only discussed the difference between principles that apply to actions in an

context. However, it would be wrong to think that individual actions are the only subject

evaluated within an institutional context. Our social practices and institutions shape the

moral context relevant for assessing individual actions, but they also shape the moral

context relevant for assessing other practices. Sometimes an institution will be justified

only because of the role it plays within a particular institutional context. What

differentiates the basic structure from other institutions is that our assessment of the basic

structure should not be sensitive to any institutional context whereas our assessment of

other institutions often should be. In this way, my strategy to distinguish principles for the

basic structure from institutional principles more generally is merely an extension of my

argument for distinguishing principles that apply to institutions from those that apply to

actions within an institutional context.

To see why the assessment of the basic structure should be insensitive to moral

context in a way that other institutions do not need to be, we need to look again towards

what the basic structure is and why it is morally indispensable. The basic structure is that

system of social institutions that establish our obligations, rights, and powers as members

of society. In so doing, it forms a social background against which the various other

practices and institutions in society are formed. Accordingly, these other practices and

institutions will often need to take into consideration the institutional context established

by the basic structure institutions. It is because various practices and institutions are

situated within a basic structure that we should treat the basic structure differently from

these other institutions. The basic structure is not situated within any other institutions

As an example, consider our assessment of a particular educational practice--such

as the admission tests like the SAT and ACT. This practice is not itself part of the basic

structure because there is nothing about the practice that establishes obligations, rights or

powers as members of society. Instead, the practice is a general understanding amongst

students and admission officials about what one needs to do to get into a college. If we

want to assess the practice, we need to look at how it fits within the various practices

around it. We should look at the role that college plays in the job market, at the ways in

which high school prepares students for the test, and so on. Our assessment of the

educational practices as a whole requires that we see how education fits within the larger

society. How does education prepare students for the life they will live? Does it prepare

them for the economy? Does it prepare them to contribute to a democracy? In this way,

we assess our educational practices as within the basic structure institutions of the

political constitution and economic system, and we assess the admission tests within this

education system. Now, if we assess the individual actions of students, teachers, and

administrators that are related to admission tests, we need to see their actions as within

these practices. So, the actions of individuals are within an institutional context, but the

practices are also within such a context. The basic structure, however, sets the

fundamental rules in society around which various other practices are formed. This

distinguishes the basic structure as uniquely removed from the moral context established

by institutions.

Now, the explanation that I give here should not be confused for a mistaken

within were not created first and followed by the creation of other institutions. I

recognize that the institutions that constitute the basic structure were themselves

developed against a moral context composed of particular practices and norms that were

themselves within another basic structure. The point is not to say that the assessment of

other institutions should be sensitive to the moral context established by the basic

structure because the basic structure institutions are temporally prior. Instead, the idea is

that the rules of the basic structure institutions apply to all persons in a society, and so

they apply to persons engaged in other institutions within society. Accordingly, the

background that the basic structure sets is a background for these other institutions. It is

not because the basic institutions came first, but because their rules set a background for

the activities of other practices that we need to assess these other practices within the

moral context set by the basic structure.

For example, we can recognize the activities that religious organizations engage

in will be limited by the basic structure institutions. If our society establishes certain

basic rights, then the activities of religious organizations need to respect these rights.

Whatever property system is recognized designates what property rights these groups

have. What economic system we live within determines how the group can fund itself. In

these cases, it is within the broader systems of the basic structure that religious activities

proceed and religious groups are sustained. Even if we carve out exemptions for religious

groups, for example by allowing gender to be a factor in hiring, it is a feature of our legal

institutions that grants that exception. It might be the case that the basic structure of

that does not change the fact that their activities are now bound by their rules. Even if the

historical story is one in which the religious traditions explain the basic structure, the

normative story is that the religious traditions are now within a moral context set against

the rules of the basic structure.

One might object that the basic structure is situated within another institutional

context, the global structure. It might seem like the particularities of the global structure

should influence our evaluation of the basic structure, thus reducing the centrality of the

basic structure as subject. In response to this objection, I want to return to the response

made in §2.3.2. There, I argued that the global structure is constituted by norms that bind

governments whereas the basic structure is constituted by norms that bind individuals.

Because of this, I think it is wholly appropriate that we evaluate the decisions of

governments as occurring within a global context. However, that does not mean that we

should evaluate the basic structure as within a global context.79

So, the core argument of §3.1 distinguishes institutions generally from the basic

structure in the same way that it distinguishes actions from the institutions those actions

occur within. Principles within a context should be sensitive to the particularities within

that context, but principles that apply to whatever establishes that context (whether an

institution or system of institutions) should not be so sensitive. Our assessment of college

entrance exams, for example, needs to be sensitive to the larger context set by the

education system. The basic structure is distinct as a moral subject because it establishes

79 _{We should also bear in mind that the idea that a state represents the interests of its citizens in}

international relations is itself part of the basic structure of society. In this way, the features of the global structure are, in part, best understood as within a context of basic structures (rather than the other way around).

a context within which our various other institutions and practices are situated. For this

reason, the principles that apply to the basic structure will be distinct from those that

apply to other institutions. Principles for other institutions need to be sensitive to the

moral context established by the basic structure within which they fit, but principles for

the basic structure do not need to be.

3.2.3 The basic structure and the informal structure

Now, it is of course true that institutions are not the sole determinate of the content of

ethical life, and this might seem to warrant an objection to the view. Recall that any

conception of the basic structure will need to distinguish the basic structure from the

various informal norms and generalized expectations within a society. These norms and

expectations might not rise to the level of “institutions,” but they still have profound and

pervasive effects on social life. Call these various features of social life, the “informal

structure” of society.

Now doesn’t the informal structure of society have as much affect on the content

of ethical life as the more formal institutions of the basic structure? Couldn’t we also say

that institutions occur within a context set by the informal norms of a society? It seems

just as important that a good society have the right mores as that it have the right

institutions. Since these norms establish a moral context as well, their assessment seems

formally similar to the assessment of institutions--if we need to distinguish principles for

wouldn’t we distinguish principles for our basic mores on the same basis? If these are so

similar, then why wouldn’t the principles that apply to one also apply to the other?

The appropriate response to this criticism is to focus our attention on the

difference between systems of rules and patterns of behavior. As discussed in Chapter 1,

we should understand social rules as ostensibly binding. There are behaviors that are

identified as right or wrong by appeal to these rules. By contrast, the informal norms of

In document Estudio teórico de las interacciones entre aniones y sistemas pi (página 103-109)