Análisis razonado de los estados financieros

A. INTRODUCTION

What is driving Russia’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)? In order to understand Russian motivations behind their participation in the SCO, one must first consider the broader Russian elite views and policies toward Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This chapter will focus on the internal Russian political debates over the post-Soviet Russian identity. It will also examine Russia’s strategic incentives, economic agenda and security concerns in Central Asia surrounding the initial establishment of the Shanghai-Five during the Yeltsin presidential administration to the SCO in its current form under President Putin. Russia’s interest in the Shanghai-Five was driven by a desire to resolve long standing border disputes with China and the creation of a new strategic partnership. Today, the SCO supports key Russian interests in Central Asia, including cooperation over anti-terrorism activities and the opening of new avenues for economic growth. However, the SCO, which includes China, is only one of many primarily Russian- led multilateral organizations operating within Central Asia.

During the Russian transition from the Soviet era, several regional and global events influenced Russia’s identity and foreign policy outlook. These events include: the Tajik civil war; the 1994 rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan and their support for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Uzbekistan; the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis; the 1999 Kosovo crisis paired with NATO’s eastward expansion; and the events of September 11, 2001, which renewed U.S. strategic engagement and interests in Central Asia. These international and domestic events have shaped the way the Russian political elite view Central Asian regional developments in relation to global politics.

Even though the multilateral cooperation achieved within the SCO has been notable, this chapter argues that Moscow’s choice to operate through bilateral sidebars within and multilaterally outside of the SCO framework, reveals its attachment to great power status and its competitive nature regarding its interests in Central Asia. Russia’s

foreign policy can be seen as an attempt to “keep up with the Jones” in Central Asia, whether economically with China or as a reliable security manger through the CIS CSTO

vis-à-vis the U.S. and NATO. Russia’s near-term competition and cooperation is not a

response against a particular threat, such as from another state or revolutionary transnational actor, but in fact is a response to the threat of continued loss of prestige. The Russian national identity and velikoderhavnost (commitme nt to great power status) does much to explain Russian foreign policy behavior in Central Asia. Although geopolitics and geoeconomics have played a significant role in shaping Russia’s foreign policy orientation toward Central Asia, and more specifically its interests in the SCO, one might consider them constraining variables.

Wanting to move beyond its current regional power status and limited economic sovereignty toward regained great power status, the Russian political elite have recognized that Russia must be a part of the global community and will avoid policies favoring isolation and disengagement from the West. Corollary, if Russia aspires to return to a great power status, it must avoid being “beaten”.102 _{Thus, Russia’s}

motivations toward the SCO can be viewed as only one of the latest vehicles available for offering a means to make the transition back to a great power possible. In order to navigate this agenda, in the face of increasing geopolitical and geoeconomic pressures from both East and West, Russia has sought its own path by relying on the trappings of

102 _{The concept of being “beaten” is familiar outcome to be avoided based on Russia’s historical} experience in how Russia has pursued its Eurasianist orientation. Russia’s current policies should not be necessarily considered “pro” or “anti” any particular country, but in fact represents a “pro-Russian” policy and that Russia’s interest come first. According to Stalin: “To slow down the tempo of industrialization means to fall behind. And those who fall behind are beaten. The history of old Russia consisted, among other things, of constantly being beaten for her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol Khans ... She was beaten by the Swedish feudals. She was beaten by the Polish-Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the Anglo-French capitalists. Everybody beat her--for backwardness ... If you are backward, if you are weak, you are in the wrong, you can be beaten and enslaved. If you are strong, then you are in the right, you must be treated with care ... We have fallen fifty to one hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must cross this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we will be crushed.” Mis ha Tsypkin, “Preparing for World War II.” (Lecture at Navy Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, 19 April 2005) translated from I.V. Stalin, Sochineniya (Moscow: Politizdat, 1951), vol. 13, pp. 38-39.

its unique identity.103 _{The following sections of this chapter outline the nature of events}

shaping the Russian “Eurasianist” foreign policy orientation, as well as the legitimacy of Russia’s search for its regional and geopolitical identity and interests, which is codified in the SCO.

This chapter is organized into four sections. The first section describes the evolution and growing consensus of Russian foreign policy decisions toward Central Asia in the Yeltsin and Putin administrations. Those identified as Eurasianists or pragmatic nationalists appear to have won the current policy debate concerning Central Asia. Thees diverse interests and policy prescriptions that emerged during the internal policy debate of the 1990s exemplifies Russia’s outlook regarding the SCO and its purpose. The second section will lay the foundation of the Russian elites’ strategic incentives and political motivations in Central Asia in an effort to explore if the SCO is a defensive “alliance”. The third section will examine the economic aspects of Russia’s policies toward Central Asia by examining the SCO as an international economic regime. In order to determine if this premise is applicable, it will consider ho w Russia’s use of bilateral and multilateral approaches, within and outside the SCO, contributed or hindered economic interdependence. The fourth section will examine Russian security interests within the SCO framework. Specifically, it will explore if the threat of the “Three Evils” of international terrorism, extremism and separatism, as well as other non- traditional threats such as narcotics trafficking and international crime, are the primary motivation for Russia’s participation in the SCO. In this view, the SCO could be seen as a regional “collective security” arrangement or a modern “concert” of Central Asia used for maintaining the status quo of regional elites.

103 _{“‘Russia is a country which is still groping painfully for a national project and self -identification as} a nation,’ said Masha Lipman, an analsyt [sic] at the Carnegie Endowment in Moscow. ‘If we compare Russia with other postcommunist [sic] countries, they opt for Europe as their future. Not Russia; Russia is very uncertain about what its future is about. Having gone astray on its way to find its own identity, it has naturally turned to the past rather than to the future, because the future is so uncertain and the present is so discouraging.’” Robert Parsons, “Russia: Cossack Revival Gathers Momentum,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (5 May 2005) Available fromhttp://www.rferl.org/ accessed 5 May 2005.