The character of the August 1983 revolution was described by Sankara and his governing movement, National Council of the Revolution (NCR), as a democratic and popular revolution, implying that, as far as they were concerned, their seizure of power was agitated and supported by the popular masses of Burkina Faso, especially the labour unions, leftist political parties, peasants and the poor working class Burkinabe. How does Sankara himself define and explain the concept of democratic and popular revolution?
The August Revolution is a democratic one. Its first tasks are the ending of imperialist domination and exploitation; the purging of social, economic and cultural habits which keep our country in its backward state. It will be built on the involvement of all the people. They are mobilising themselves around the democratic and revolutionary structures which will support their interests over those of reactionary allies of imperialism (Sankara, 1985: 52-53).
He goes on to add, in describing the nature and outlook of the August revolution, that “the revolution's object is to give the people power. That is why the very first act of the revolution, after the 4 August Proclamation, was to call on the people to form Revolutionary Defence
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Committees (CDRs)” (ibid). The dual character of the August revolution, according to Sankara, is informed by its conceptualisation as first being democratic and secondly, popular. In giving perspective about this dual character, Sankara begins by clarifying how it is democratic thus: “its primary tasks are to eliminate imperialist domination and exploitation; and to purge the countryside of all the social, economic, and cultural obstacles that keep it in a backward state. Its democratic character flows from this” (Sankara, 2016: 66). The second character of the revolution, which is that it had popular support, is premised on the argument that “it draws its popular character from the full participation of the Voltaic masses in the revolution, and their consistent mobilisation around democratic and revolutionary slogans that concretely express their own interests in opposition to those of the reactionary classes allied with imperialism” (ibid). Dembele (2013) further adds that “
…the Sankarist Revolution was one of the greatest attempts at popular and democratic emancipation in post-Independence Africa. That is why it is considered a novel experience of deep economic, social, cultural and political transformation as evidenced by mass mobilisations to get people to take responsibility for their own needs”.
Coup d’état or Revolution Debate
For a theoretical understanding of what parameters define a revolution vis-à-vis a coup, Tanter and Midlarsky (1967: 265) define the former, using the Marxian school of thought, as “a product of irresistible historical forces, which culminate in a struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat”. Another definition, slightly different, by Arendt (1965: 34), views a revolution as “a kind of a restoration, whereby the insurgents attempt to restore liberties and privileges which were lost as a result of the government’s temporary lapse into despotism”. Coup d’état is best defined in relation to the definition that one uses for a revolution, thus, in that regard,Brinton (1952) describes a coup d’état as a mere replacement of a group of elites (in the case of Africa, neo-colonial elites) by another group of elites.
Tanter and Midlarsky (1967) make a case for the importance of differentiating between different typologies of revolutions. They delineate between four types of revolutions: mass revolution, revolutionary coup, reform coup, and palace revolution. They argue that these forms of revolutions can be differentiated by criteria based on level of mass participation, duration of the revolution, the extent/level of domestic violence during the revolution, and lastly, intentions of insurgents (ibid). Therefore, based on these parameters, mass revolution is the highest level of revolution (ideal form of revolution) and palace revolution is the lowest
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form of revolution. For instance, mass revolution has a high level of mass participation, lasts longer (duration), high domestic violence often characterises it, and intentions of insurgents are fundamentally based on need for an overhaul of the politico-economic, social and cultural structures of society as a whole. It is important to note that definitions and narratives about revolutions are based on the so-called “Great Revolutions” which usually comprise the trio, French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions. This myopic theorisation of revolutions premised on these three has numerous challenges. The case of the August revolution in Burkina Faso essentially fits the “mass revolution” conceptualisation, albeit the fact that it does not meet all the four criteria mentioned above, because its duration was fairly short and it did not have a lot of domestic violence. However, it meets the other two criteria because it had mass participation (popular support from various sectors of society) and its intentions were ideologically grounded because it ultimately and fundamentally changed the political, social, economic and cultural structures of society. Siani-Davies (1996: 454) also adds that, “This tendency to rely on the three ‘Great Revolutions’ as the yardstick against which others are to be measured, in many ways lies at the heart of the definitional problem, since, as the definitions are drawn from the very phenomena they seek to define, they are bound to be unduly restrictive and historically specific”.
During the first FDG with a group of undergraduate students at the Professor Joseph Ki-Zerbo University, when asked what their immediate views and reactions are when they hear the name Thomas Sankara and the August 1983 revolution, this group of students, most of them between the ages 18 and 23, seemed to share almost similar views about Sankara. Student D, responding to this “ice-breaking” question said, “for me Thomas Sankara was the leader of the CNR who proclaimed a coup d’état to be a revolution. So, in my opinion, he misled people as to know what a revolution is and now several youths believe that revolution equates a coup d’état. So, his suppressive actions marked the student movement as well as the working class.”
Another student (Student E), who also shared similar sentiments with Student D, albeit more scathing of Sankara and his relationship with the student movements, passionately replied that,
In my opinion as a student, I will emphasise on his negative side. After his coup d’état re-baptised revolution, he considered himself to be a revolutionary and it is him who effectively suppressed people who were in fact revolutionaries. I can cite a case at the university of Ouagadougou where a law student was suppressed for having affixed his signature on a declaration from the Popular Front to denounce the fact that what
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Thomas Sankara had done was effectively a coup d’état and not a revolution. He suppressed the student, who was expelled from the university and deprived of social services to the extent that he could no longer catch the bus here, he could no longer have a plot of land here to build a house or shelter.
It is important to note that only 11% of the students who participated in the FGD were sympathetic to, and had anything positive to say about Sankara and his revolution, while the majority of the students often described the August 1983 seizure of power as merely “a coup baptised as a revolution”. One pro-Sankara student in this FGD, Student P, had this to say;
In my view, among the Presidents from independence or so-called independence until now, if there was a President to be back in power, I believe it will be Thomas Sankara, because for four years he achieved something great that others have not managed to repeat for several years. Every human [being] is subject to mistakes and if there was a President to be back [in power], I think it will be him. (Words in parenthesis mine).
This was the first student after many who spoke before him, who thought that Sankara did a sterling job as President and achieved more than all Presidents Burkina Faso has seen, combined, and if any President could come back to power, it would have to be him.
Another student (R), from the 11% of students who were sympathetic to Sankara’s cause, spoke at length, cogently and skilfully explaining why he thought Sankara was miles ahead of other Presidents in Burkina Faso (past and present) in transforming the lives of people. Student R argued thus:
…because me personally, he was born before me and died before I knew him [born after his Presidency and death], but if you pick up people from the street and whoever you will be asking about Thomas Sankara, he knows. Why? Because he left his image [legacy] before leaving. If you go around Africa [and] in the world and ask about Thomas Sankara, everyone knows who he was. I did not know him, but today when you read his works you know what he achieved a lot. With regards to the other Presidents, even if one picks ten, some of them are completely unknown and it looks like they have not even existed. When it is about him [Sankara], everyone talks about him and this means he has achieved something really remarkable. In only four years with Thomas Sankara [as President], rails were built and up to date the Burkinabe population is benefiting from that. Among all those Presidents whom he succeeded, I do not see
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anyone, except Sankara, for one has seen Presidents who have been there for twenty- five years, but the population is still crying that they steal, they did so and so. If there was another President like him, it will be great… to work and eat [food security] instead of begging from the Europeans all the time”. (Words in parenthesis mine). This student argues that Sankara left a sterling legacy, that is why he is the most known and admired President in Burkina Faso. The student is of the view that, part of his legacy was building infrastructure that still benefits the Burkinabè to date. (See Annexure A and B for some of the infrastructure that was built during Sankara’s Presidency). Self-sufficiency was a key lesson this student learned from Sankara. He also wished Sankara could come back, or there was another leader like him who could fight imperialism and Burkina Faso’s dependency on the West, especially on its former coloniser, France. Many students in this FGD wanted to extricate their country from the umbilical cord-like parasitic dependency that continued to bind and define the relationship between Burkina Faso and France.
In an attempt to analyse the events of 4 August 1983 and before, and to come to a determination of whether what happened when NCR assumed power could legitimately be described as a revolution, Dialo (2018) argues that,
Thomas Sankara’s Revolution is often dismissed with the argument that it was the result of a military coup rather than the outcome of a popular movement. The argument suggests that because it was born out of the will of just a few radical putschists, it had no real substance and roots in Voltaïque society and history. Such a presentation of the Revolution, which only focuses on the military manoeuvres of August 4, 1983, is superficial and fails to take into account two essential conditions: (1) the international and national context from which the Revolution arose; and (2) the legitimacy that Thomas Sankara acquired in the years before the Revolution.
Factors that explain the first condition which necessitated the revolution are that it took place in a climate of severe institutional instability of a neo-colonial state, where there were coups, one after the other, replacing elites with more elites, resulting in worsening living conditions of ordinary Burkinabe. On the international front, “the international context of the early 1980s imposed on oil-importing countries in Africa such as Upper Volta several external shocks: rising oil prices; rising interest rates of the American Federal Reserve Bank, on which debt was indexed; continuously deteriorating terms of trade; and, the slowing of international trade due to the global recession” (Dialo, 2018). One of the factors that determine the legitimacy of a revolution and any form of government is the trust the people have in the leader and the
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administration in power, which is also augmented by ideological and policy orientation of those in power. In the context of Burkina Faso, Thomas Sankara earned his legitimacy before and after the revolution.
There are at least three incidents prior to the August revolution that earned Sankara political legitimacy and popularity among the working class and peasantry who constituted over 90% of the population. The first was his role in the 1974 Mali-Burkina Faso border war which was diffused with minimal bloodshed, and he played an instrumental role in this conflict’s resolution. Secondly, due to the stripes he had earned from this war, and his rising popularity in the army, he was offered a position in government by Colonel Saye Zerbo which he refused but later accepted due to a lot of pressure from his seniors. He took on the role of Minister of Information in September 1981 where he swiftly began doing things differently (ibid). A few months later, Sankara would resign decrying the repressive and bourgeoisie nature of the government. “Another coup occurred on November 7, 1982, without the participation of Sankara and his left-wing comrades of the army who believed that a movement led only by the army would not allow for the deep political changes to which they aspired” (Dialo, 2018). Thirdly, after this coup which was led by Captain Jean Baptiste Ouedraogo, Sankara was again appointed in government (on 10 January 1983), this time in a much higher position as Prime Minister of Burkina Faso. It was during this time that he gained the most popularity in Burkina Faso and abroad due to his fiery speeches and unapologetic stance on his anti-imperialism rhetoric. Budging to pressure from France, Captain Ouedraogo approved the house arrest of Sankara, because he was a nuisance to the French government and their neo-colonial interest in their former colony, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso).
The following account of events following Sankara’s house arrest, which led to massive demonstrations in Ouagadougou where citizens were calling for the release of Sankara, best explains why events of, and leading up to, 4 August 1983 can be characterised as revolutionary. Dialo (2018) explains that,
For two months, the political situation remained unresolved, each of the camps paranoid and consolidating its positions. Sankara and the left wing of the army strengthened their ties with civilian populations and trade union organizations, and set up a political platform. Captain Blaise Compaoré, a friend and long-time comrade of Thomas Sankara, then took the rumour of an attempt to assassinate the latter as a pretext to move with troops on Ouagadougou in the afternoon of August 4, 1983. Civilian groups supported the operation by cutting electricity in the capital. By 9:30 p.m., Compaoré’s troops controlled the capital. At 10:00 p.m. Thomas
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Sankara announced via radio the fall of the government of Ouedraogo and the beginning of a revolutionary process, the formation of the National Council of the Revolution.
This seems to put to bed the debate about whether August 1983 represents a revolution or if it was, as some students argued, a coup baptised as a revolution. In another Focus Group Discussion with senior postgraduate students at the same university, weighing in on this debate, Student PSG 1 was of the view that “his revolution was a popular revolution. It was important to get closer to the people, to be impregnated with the people’s problem and teach the people how to solve their problems themselves”.
One of the political economy experts on Burkina Faso and the August Revolution, here named Mr Fay (pseudonym), who actually met Thomas Sankara in March 1986 as a student leader from Senegal, strongly argues that the Burkina Faso Revolution cannot be misconstrued as a coup for various reasons. He had this to say;
I don’t know if you know this, but Thomas Sankara did not take power. He was in prison (under house arrest). When the military who took over, power was already taken by the people before Blaise Compaore got to Ouagadougou with the Po` militants, power was already taken by the people. Just like in the Russian revolution, all that the military did was to come and restore order. In my comment to this statement, I queried if this was just like the way things unfolded in 2014 (Revolution 2.0) when the people had already decided that they had had enough of Blaise and took it upon themselves to chase him away, and the military just came in to restore order and help facilitate in the formation of the transitional government. His response was that;
It’s exactly like that, that is the same scenario that also played out in the August 1983 revolution. And they (the people) wanted Sankara. When Blaise came from Po`, the people were unequivocal that they wanted Sankara, they did not want him. My analysis is that one of the things that Blaise has never gotten over with is he wanted to take power but people wanted Sankara. He felt like people owed him something for breaking Sankara out of prison. It was not a coup d’état. Not at all, it was not a coup d’état, it was not initiated by the military. The people had already decided that they wanted Sankara (as their leader) before anything else. The difference between the 2014 revolution is that the people did not know who they wanted.
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These two extracts from Mr Fay are a justification of why the August 1983 takeover of power is called a revolution. Note that Mr Fay repeats twice that "power was already taken by the people". This emphasis is important and may have underlying connotations indicating that he was certain that what unfolded in Burkina Faso was nothing short of a revolution. Mr Fay makes an interesting observation about some parallels between the August 1983 revolution and the October 2014 Revolution 2.0 that ousted Blaise Compaore. Perhaps, as the saying goes, “the chicken had come home to roost”, that is why Blaise was removed from power the same way they took power during the August 1983 revolution. It is clear from these accounts by Mr Fay that the people were adamant that they wanted Sankara as their leader. This may have triggered some envy and jealousy from Blaise as he believed he was the rightful person for the Presidency considering the key role he played in breaking Sankara out of house arrest and mobilising support of other soldiers and other sectors of society. This could, I argue, be one of the root causes of what led to Sankara's assassination on 15 October 1987.
Sankara’s Use of both Soft Power and Coercion to Persuade
In the senior students’ FGD, Student PSG 2, responding to the question about how Sankara was able to change people’s mindsets after so many decades of colonial and neo-colonial rule, said,
It is not easy to rise one day and ask someone to stop the way he had been functioning and adopt something different. So, sometimes, change can be brought by constraining people. This explains why many people were opposed to his policy, labelling him a dictator. How can a dictator succeed in achieving food security in four years? It would not have been possible if he was really a dictator. The recourse to force was one of his