Now, “[o]nce a theory is formulated in quantificational style its objects of reference can be said simply to be the values of its quantified variables” (Quine 1966d, 100). However, in order to apply the criterion of ontological commitment at all a theorymust be formulated in quantificational style, for otherwise it gains no traction: “the question of the ontological commitment of theories does not properly arise except as that theory is expressed in classical quantificational form or we at least have in mind how to translate it into that form” (Quine 1969c, 106). Natural language is vague and complex. It is not always clear if and what objects we assume in such discourse. For this purpose the criterion was devised as a standard allowing us to judge and measure the ontological import of a particular theory or piece of discourse. In oder to make sure we can always apply it then, and to make sure its application always underlies identical constraints so as to not unfairly skew the result of the criterion we devise a notation,canonical notation, exhibiting quantificational structure into which we regiment the obscure natural language or scientific discourse before we assess its ontological import. Note that the purpose of such a notation is not a language reform, it does not urge us to only talk in the idioms of canonical notation and give up natural language completely, but it helps to clarify and ‘clean up’ the obscure elements of natural language discourse so as to give us a clearer picture to what we are ontologically committed to: “the scientist can enhance objectivity and diminish the interference of language, by his very choice of language” (Quine 1960b, 235). Moreover, it provides a common basis for all theories whose ontological commitment is to be assessed, so as to retain comparability and rule out the possibility of ‘cheating’ by modifying the quantificational language. Our language of choice that diminishes interference of language is what constitutes the so-called canonical notation and we will have to say more about what it is and how it came to be first-order logic in the next chapter. For now we want to focus on the process of translating or regimenting discourse into this notation, as it is a non-trivial process.
It follows from what was said above that determining the ontological commitment of a theory or piece of discourse divides into two tasks: paraphrasing that discourse into a notation allowing us to apply the criterion and then applying that criterion. Canonical notation itself is supposed to provide a notation that is so explicit on matters quantificational and thus ontological that it simply
28
This is not uncontroversial. Geach, for example, takes quantification as primitive and obtains relative clauses from it; cf. (Geach 1962) and (Geach 1968). From the point of view of a genetically motivated theory of language acquisition this way is, however, not open.
29
Note, at this point that the referential role of the variable has nothing to do with the quantificational force of the quantifiers: “The variable comes to appear in its true light as purely a means of identifying and distinguishing the referential places in a sentence, and has nothing to do with ‘all’ or ‘some’, which are the business of ‘∀’ and ‘∃” ’ (Quine 1995a, 32), as well as (Quine 1980, 275): “The point I want to make is that the quantitative force of the quantifier the ‘all’ and ‘some’ is irrelevant to the distinctive work of the bound variable and irrelevant to its referential function.” This will become important when we propose to introduce a new quantifier binding the same sort of variables in Chapter 5.
allows us to read off the the commitments of a theory from its canonical regimentation without having any room for obscurity or doubt as to whether something is quantificational or not:30 “To paraphrase an sentence into the canonical notation of quantification is, first and foremost, to make its ontic content explicit, quantification being a device for talking in general about objects” (Quine 1960b, 242). Paraphrasing a theory into canonical notation constitutes the process ofregimentation. Regimentation into canonical notation is inevitable for understanding what a given piece of discourse is about, after all “[i]t is scarcely cause for wonder that we should be at a loss to say what objects a given discourse presupposes that there are, failing all notion of how to translate that discourse into the sort of language to which ‘there is’ belongs” (Quine 1961, 105).
The problem of how to paraphrase discourse into canonical notation presents itself in multiple dimensions. On the one hand, if the discourse we translate is formulated in a different idiom than ours, we first need to translate it into our language to make sense of it, forreference is parochial and without identifying the referential elements of discourse there is no way to appropriately regiment it into canonical notation. Translation, however, is indeterminate.31 On the one hand, reference is inscrutable (as mentioned in the previous chapter) allowing multiple and equally good ways to fix the reference of the foreign discourse. On the other hand, it might be holophrastically indeterminate in that there might be multiple equally good and mutually incompatible ways to fix the apparatus of reference, given strong enough adjustments in our translations of the remaining expressions of the language.32 In any case, the problems do not stop once we have settled on what we take to be an appropriate translation of the interlocuters discourse, for the paraphrase into canonical notation, the regimentation of a piece of discourse is guided as any paraphrase by considerations of simplicity, systematicity, and avoidance of obscurities and problems. There might then be no unique paraphrase, multiple possible options will be open for us. Thus, while we may ultimately be able answer what exists according to a theory once we have paraphrased in into canonical notation, this questions gives way to the question of how to regiment it:
“The moot or controversial part of the question of the ontic import of a sentence may of course survive in a new guise, as the question how to paraphrase the sentence into canonical notation. But the change of guise conveniently shifts the burden of claims and disavowals. Futile caviling over ontic implications gives way to an invitation to reformulate one’s point in canonical notation. We cannot paraphrase our opponents sentences into canonical notation for him and convict him of the consequences [...]; rather we must ask him what canonical sentences he is prepared to offer, consonantly with his own inadequately expressed purposes. [...] To decline to explain oneself in terms of quantification, or in terms of those special idioms of ordinary language by which quantification is directly explained, is simply to decline to disclose one’s referential intent. [...] We remain free as always to project analytical hypotheses [...] and translate his sentences into canonical notation as seems most reasonable; but he is no more bound by our conclusions than the native by the field linguist’s.” (Quine 1960b, 242/243)
There might be multiple equally good ways, respecting simplicity, familiarity and other theoretical values to regiment a piece of discourse and no way of knowing which one to choose. The reason why there will not be one definite correct paraphrase into canonical notation, no unique correct
30
Cf. (Quine 1960b, 242): “In our canonical notation of quantification, then, we find the restoration of law and order.”
31
Cf. (Quine 1960b) and (Quine 1987a).
32Theindeterminacy of translation is a substantial and controversial thesis. We refer the reader to (Kirk 2006),
(Hylton 2007), (Quine 1960b) and (Quine 1987a) for discussion and will ignore the issues pertaining to translation for a large part in the following.
Chapter 3. Ontological Commitment 41
analysis, is because there is no presupposition of synonymy between the original theory and its canonical paraphrase.33 The goal of the regimentation, the paraphrase into canonical notation, was to clarify the original, more obscure discourse. However, if we “paraphrase a sentence to resolve ambiguity, what we seek is not a synonymous sentence, but one that is more informative by dint of resisting some alternative interpretation” (Quine 1960b, 159); such a paraphrase can and will result in ‘substantial divergences’ such as, e.g., the closing of truth-value gaps or the supplying of explicit reference (Quine 1960b, 159). The relation of a sentence S of the original theory to its regimented paraphrase S0 “is just that the particular business that the speaker was on that occasion trying to get on with, with help of S among other things, can be managed well enough to suit him by using S0 instead of S” (Quine 1960b, 160). However, it is only the speaker who can judge whether a particular paraphrase is appropriate whether it meets the purpose which he used the original sentence for.
Synonymy between original and paraphrase is not required in order to satisfy the function that the original sentence was used to fulfill, in fact requiring absolute synonymy actually obscures and confuses the goal of paraphrase whose aim is to clarify discourse by focusing on its essential functions in that particular situation and ignoring the rest. Thus, the paraphrase of ordered pairs into certain set-theoretic constructions is, for example, good because “[t]he paraphrases were such as to meet most or all the likely purposes for which the originals might be used, except insofar as such needs included brevity or familiarity” (Quine 1960b, 191). A paraphrase into canonical notation is good “insofar as it tends to meet needs for which the original might be wanted” (Quine 1960b, 182), it is not required, however, that the resulting paraphrase is synonymous with the old expression. “It is only required that, to our satisfaction whatever we hoped to achieve by way of our original sentences can be achieved closely enough by way of their paraphrase” (Rayo 2002, 2), we did not simply translate the old discourse by means of paraphrase, we surrendered it in favor of the new (Rayo 2002).
Regimentation, then, is explication. And explication is elimination: for a troublesome expression we find another, much clearer and better one that satisfies all the originals essential functions. We then simply replace the old expression with the new and forget the old problematic one. We have eliminated it and at the same time explicated what we took to be its essential contribution.34 Now,
“[t]his construction is paradigmatic of what we are most typically up to when in a philosophical spirit we offer an “analysis” or “explication” of some hitherto inadequately formulated “idea” or expression. We do not claim synonymy. We do not claim to make clear and explicit what the users of the unclear expression had unconsciously in mind all along. We do not expose hidden meanings, as the words ‘analysis’ and ‘explication’ would suggest; we supply lacks. We fix on the particular functions of the unclear expressions that make it worth troubling about, and then devise a substitute, clear and couched in terms to our liking, that fills those functions. Beyond those conditions of partial agreement, dictated by our interests and purposes, any traits of the explicans come under the head of “don’t cares” [...].” (Quine 1960b, 258/259)
The process of regimentation is thus no trivial matter and should be kept in mind in our further discussion. Neither is, however, the choice of an appropriate canonical notation, the topic of the next two chapters, for while we are able to choose how to regiment a given piece of discourse, “[o]nce we have settled upon a language of regimentation and accepted a theory couched in that language, ontological commitments are forced upon us” (Rayo 2002, 3). Once we have chosen the language
33
Cf. (Quine 1960b, 159): “In neither case is synonymy to be claimed for the paraphrase.”
34
of regimentation and how to paraphrase a particular theory into it, ontological issues are settled determinately and cannot be changed or paraphrased away. We have to live with them. There is thus a lot riding on the choice of a good and sensible canonical notation.