Análisis de Resultados de Encuesta

In eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and East Asia, the United States may find itself increasingly at odds with Russia in the coming half- decade. Across Russia’s entire periphery, U.S.-Russian disagreement has recently become more the norm than the exception, and this negative

trend is likely to continue. Such rivalry serves few American interests and should be avoided where possible, since it strengthens the influence and outlook of those within the Russian elite who dislike cooperation with the United States in the first place.

Yet American preferences may not matter much. Russian policy has shown such a high degree of competitiveness in these regions that increased friction between Moscow and Washington may prove inevitable. In this context, the real challenge for U.S. policy will be to advance American interests even in the face of friction, not to eliminate the friction altogether.

The United States should not cede a veto or undue deference to Russia over American relations with the states of the Russian periphery. Russia’s legitimate interests deserve respect, but there is nothing legiti- mate about limiting the opportunity of its neighbors to deepen their integration into the international economy, to choose security allies and partners, or to pursue democratic political transformation.

• The United States should seek to accelerate the integration of coun- tries into transatlantic and all-European institutions, if their foreign policies and domestic achievements demonstrate their readiness to contribute to these institutions.

• The contributions of states such as Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Moldova—to Balkan peacekeeping, to military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq—have already demonstrated that they can be valuable partners of the United States.

Increased frictions on Russia’s periphery should also have implica- tions for the future of cooperation between NATO and Russia. Joint participation in exercises and other operational and technical contacts between military personnel continue to have value, but the standing granted to Russia in a political forum such as the NATO-Russia Council needs to be more carefully scrutinized.

• The council’s agenda should certainly not include issues that affect the interests of other post-Soviet states—least of all those aspiring to become members of the alliance—without their participation.

Recommendations 1: Security 49 • Because 2007 will mark the fifth full year since the creation of the NATO-Russia Council, it is an appropriate moment for members of the alliance to review the council’s record and to evaluate its achievements. This review needs to hold the council to a high standard. If its performance has been poor because Russia’s approach is too different from those of other members—lacking in commit- ment to democratic principles or to the goal of collective responses to meet common challenges—NATO should seek other ways of consulting and cooperating with Russia.

The single most important country on Russia’s periphery is, of course, China. The future policies and direction of these two countries will determine whether the group of the world’s leading powers is divided into two sub-blocs based on their political systems—the demo- cratic states and the authoritarian ones—or even into two military groupings. This prospect is still remote, but there are elements of the relationship between Russia and China that, if extended indefinitely, would begin to harden such distinctions.

• For instance, while the United States and Europe consult closely to coordinate their policies on the transfer of military equipment to China, Russia has found China to be an irresistible market for high- tech weapons exports.

• While the United States and Europe have sought, with considerable success, to speak with one voice to Central Asian states on issues of human rights, religious freedom, and the rule of law—especially within the framework of the Organization for Security and Coopera- tion in Europe (OSCE), to which all these states belong—Russian and Chinese policies treat these efforts as examples of ‘‘destabilizing’’ outside interference.

Preventing the division of the major powers into two camps is an authentic American interest, and efforts to advance it will succeed only if they reflect the interests of Russia and China as well. American strategy toward each country must therefore be based on the goal of making each one’s relations with the United States at least as vital and productive as their relations with each other.

Pursuing stronger relations on the basis of common interests need not, however, prevent the United States from making clear when its interests diverge or from recognizing when theirs do. It is hard to imagine that it will indefinitely be American policy to reduce obstacles to high-tech cooperation with Russia (for example, on NATO-theater missile defense) if its military cooperation with China deepens. And while China probably shares Russian perspectives on Central Asian politics, it may not have quite as intense a geopolitical obsession with curtailing NATO access to military bases in the region.

Over the long term, the biggest single deterrent to the emergence of two camps among the major powers is most likely Russian awareness that such an outcome would make Russia more vulnerable and less able to protect its economic and security interests. It should be American policy to make clear to Russian leaders the advantages of being part of a single ‘‘club’’ of major powers—and the risks of dividing it.

Recommendations 2: Energy,

Trade, and Environmental