3. ACCESSORY
This classification is true only under the RPC and is not applied under special laws, because the penalties under the latter are never graduated.
Do not use the term “principal” when the crime committed is a violation of special law (use the term “offender/s, culprit/s, accused)
As to the liability of the participants in the grave, less grave or light felony:
11. When the felony is grave, or less grave, all participants are criminally liable.
12. But when the felony is only light, only the principal and the accomplice are liable. The accessory is not.
Basis: In the commission of light felonies, the social wrong as well as the individual prejudice
89 is so small that penal sanction is deemed not necessary.
G.1. PRINCIPAL
(1) By Direct Participation (2) By Inducement
(3) By Indispensable Cooperation (1) By Direct Participation
Requisites:
(1) That they participated in the criminal resolution; and
(2) That they carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same end.
Those who are liable (participated in the criminal resolution):
materially execute the crime;
appear at the scene of the crime;
perform acts necessary in the commission of the offense.
Why one who does not appear at the scene of the crime is not liable:
his non-appearance is deemed desistance which is favored and encouraged.
conspiracy is generally not a crime unless the law specifically provides a penalty therefore.
there is no basis for criminal liability because there is no criminal participation.
(2) By Inducement Elements:
a. That the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime;
b. That such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the material executor.
Two ways of becoming principal by induction:
a. By directly forcing another to commit a crime by:
a. Using irresistible force - such physical force as would produce an effect upon the individual that despite all his resistance, it reduces him to a mere instrument.
b. Causing uncontrollable fear – such fear that must be grave, actual, serious and of such kind that majority of men would succumb to such moral compulsion. The fear must be both grave and imminent and not speculative, fanciful or remote.
b. By directly inducing another to commit a crime by:
a. Giving of price, or offering of reward or promise.
The one giving the price or offering the reward or promise is a principal by inducement while the one committing the crime in consideration thereof is a principal by direct participation.
b. Using words of command.
The person who used the words of command is a principal by inducement while the person who committed the crime because of the words command is a principal by direct participation.
(1) That the one uttering the words of command must have the intention of procuring the commission of the crime;
(2) That the one who made the command must have an ascendancy or influence over the person who acted;
90 (3) That the words used must be
so direct, so efficacious, so powerful as to amount to physical or moral coercion;
(4) That the words of command must be uttered prior to the commission of the crime; and (5) The material executor of the
crime has no personal reason to commit the crime.
Inducement must be strong enough that the person induced could not resist.
This is tantamount to an irresistible force compelling the person induced to carry out the crime.
Ill-advised language is not enough unless he who made such remark or advice is a co-conspirator in the crime committed.
When does a principal by induction become liable?
The principal by induction becomes liable only when the principal by direct participation committed the act induced.
The inducement must precede the act induced and must be so influential in producing the criminal act that without it, the act would not have been performed.
What are the effects of acquittal of principal by direct participation upon the liability of principal by inducement?
Conspiracy is negated by the acquittal of co-defendant.
Illustration:
While in the course of a quarrel, a person shouted to A, “Kill him! Kill him!” A killed the other person. Is the person who shouted criminally liable? Is that inducement? No. The shouting must be an irresistible force for the
one shouting to be liable. Words uttered in the heat of the moment is not enough to make one a principal to the crime.
People v. Valderrama (1993):
Ernesto shouted to his younger brother Oscar,
“Birahin mo na, birahin mo na!” Oscar stabbed the victim.
It was held that there was no conspiracy.
Joint or simultaneous action per se is not indicia of conspiracy without showing of common design. Oscar has no rancor with the victim for him to kill the latter. Considering that Ernesto had great moral ascendancy and influence over Oscar, being much older (35 years old) than the latter, who was 18 years old, and it was Ernesto who provided his allowance, clothing as well as food and shelter,
Ernesto is principal by inducement.
People v. Agapinay (1990):
The one who uttered “kill him, we will bury him” while the felonious aggression was taking place cannot be held liable as principal by inducement.
Utterance was said in the excitement of the hour, not a command to be obeyed.
People v. Madall (1990): The son was mauled.
The family was not in good terms with their neighbors.
The father challenged everybody and when the neighbors approached, he went home to get a rifle.
The shouts of his wife “here comes another, shoot him” cannot make the wife a principal by inducement.
91 It is not the determining cause of the crime in the absence of proof that the words had great influence over the husband.
Neither is the wife’s act of beaming the victim with a flashlight indispensable to the killing.
She assisted her husband in taking good aim, but such assistance merely facilitated the felonious act of shooting.
Considering that it was not so dark and the husband could have accomplished the deed without his wife’s help, and considering further that doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused, the liability of the wife is only that of an accomplice.
(3) By Indispensable Cooperation Elements:
a. Participation in the criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime charged;
Requires participation in the criminal resolution
There must be conspiracy
Concurrence is sufficient
b. Cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act, without which it would have been accomplished.
Cooperation must be
indispensable
If dispensable, accused is only an accomplice
If cooperation is necessary in the execution of the offense, accused is considered as a principal by direct participation.
Cooperation in the commission of the offense – to desire or wish in common a thing. But that common will or purpose does not necessarily mean a previous understanding, for it can be explained or inferred from the circumstances of each case.
Collective Criminal Responsibility
This is present when the offenders are criminally liable in the same manner and to the same extent. The penalty to be imposed must be the same for all.
Principals by direct participation have collective criminal responsibility. Principals by induction, except those who directly forced another to commit a crime, and principals by direct participation have collective criminal responsibility. Principals by indispensable cooperation have collective criminal responsibilities with the principals by direct participation.
Individual Criminal Responsibility
In the absence of any previous conspiracy, unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime, or community of criminal design, the criminal responsibility arising from different acts directed against one and the same person is individual and not collective, and each of the participants is liable only for the act committed by him.
The basis is the importance of the cooperation to the consummation of the crime.
If the crime could hardly be committed without such cooperation, then such cooperator would be a principal.
If the cooperation merely facilitated or hastened the consummation of the crime, the cooperator is merely an accomplice.
92 The focus is not just on participation but on the importance of participation in committing the crime.
In case of doubt, favor the lesser penalty or liability. Apply the doctrine of pro reo.
G.2. ACCOMPLICE
Accomplices – are persons who, not acting as principals, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous and simultaneous acts, which are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.
They act as mere instruments that perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense.
When is one regarded as an accomplice?
Determine if there is a conspiracy.
If there is, as a general rule, the criminal liability of all will be the same, because the act of one is the act of all.
What are the other traits of an accomplice?
does not have previous agreement or
in the criminal design
They know and agree with the criminal design
Conspirators know the criminal intention
because they reached the decision and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution
Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed
Accomplices merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its
accomplishment
Conspirators are the authors of a crime
Accomplices are
that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
2. That he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in
indispensable to the commission of the act
Cooperation is not indispensable to the commission of the act
G.3. ACCESSORIES
Accessories – are those who (1) having knowledge of the commission of the crime and (2) without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, (3) take part subsequent to its commission in any of the manners provided by the Art. 19, RPC.
When accessories are not criminally liable:
1. When the felony committed is a light felony
2. When the accessory is related to the principal as:
a. spouse
b. ascendant, or descendant, or
93 c. brother or sister whether
legitimate, or natural or adopted or
d. where the accessory is a relative by affinity within the same degree,
unless the accessory himself profited from the effects or proceeds of the crime or assisted the offender to profit therefrom.
Note: Even if only two of the principals guilty of murder are the brothers of the accessory and the others are not related to him, such accessory is exempt from criminal liability.
Instances when one becomes an accessory:
(1) Profiting oneself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime:
Presidential Decree No. 1612 [Anti-Fencing Law]
One who knowingly profits or assists the principal to profit by the effects of robbery or theft (i.e. a fence) is not just an accessory to the crime, but principally liable for fencing
The penalty is higher than that of a mere accessory to the crime of robbery or theft.
Mere possession of any article of value which has been the subject of robbery or theft brings about the presumption of “fencing”.
PD 1612 has, therefore, modified Art. 19 of the RPC
(2) Acquiring the effects of piracy or brigandage:
Presidential Decree 532 [Anti-piracy and Highway Robbery law of 1974)]
If the crime was piracy or brigandage under PD 532, said act constitutes the crime of abetting piracy or abetting brigandage as the case may be,
although the penalty is that of an accomplice, not just an accessory, to the piracy or the brigandage.
Section 4 of PD 532 provides that any person who knowingly and in any manner acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives benefit therefrom, shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal offenders in accordance with the Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any acts provided in this section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
Although Republic Act 7659, in amending Article 122 of the RPC, incorporated therein the crime of piracy in Philippine territorial waters and thus correspondingly superseded PD 532, section 4 of said Decree, which punishes said acts as a crime of abetting piracy or brigandage, still stands as it has not been replaced or modified, and is not inconsistent with any provision of RA 7659.
(3) Concealing or Destroying the Body, Effects or Instruments of the Crime
When the crime is robbery or theft, with respect to the third involvement of the accessory, do not overlook the purpose which must be to prevent discovery of the crime.
The corpus delicti is not the body of the person who is killed.
o Even if the corpse is not recovered, as long as that killing is established beyond reasonable doubt, criminal liability will arise.
o If there is someone who destroys the corpus delicti to prevent discovery, he becomes an accessory.
94 (4) Harboring or Concealing an Offender
In the fourth form or manner of becoming an accessory, take note that the law distinguishes between:
a Public Officer harboring, concealing or assisting the principal to escape
Requisites:
(1) The accessory is a public officer;
(2) He harbors, conceals, or assists in the escape of the principal;
(3) The public officer acts with abuse of his public functions;
(4) The crime committed by the
(1) The accessory is a private person;
(2) He harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the author of the crime;
(3) The crime committed by the principal is either treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
Public Officer Civilian The nature of the of treason, parricide, murder or attempt on the life of the Chief Executive
Revised Penal Code PD 1829 (Also Known
as the Law Penalizing
“Obstruction of Justice”) Specifies the crimes
that should be committed in case a civilian aids in the escape
No specification of the
crime to be
committed by the offender in order that criminal liability be incurred
The offender is the principal or must be convicted of the crime charged
The offender need not even be the principal or need not be convicted of the crime charged
The one who
harbored or
concealed an offender is still an accessory
An offender of any Whether the accomplice and the accessory may be tried and convicted even before the principal is found guilty
There is an earlier Supreme Court ruling that the accessory and accomplice must be charged together with the principal; if the latter is acquitted, the accomplice and the accessory shall not be criminally liable, unless the acquittal is based on a defense which is personal only to the principal.
However, it is not always true that the accomplice and the accessory cannot be criminally liable without the principal being first convicted.
Under Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is required that all those involved in the commission of the crime must be included in the information that may be filed.
The liability of the accused will depend on the quantum of evidence adduced by the prosecution against the particular accused but
95 the prosecution must initiate the proceedings against the principal.
Even if the principal is convicted, if the evidence presented against a supposed accomplice or accessory does not meet the required proof beyond reasonable doubt, then said accused will be acquitted.
So the criminal liability of an accomplice or accessory does not depend on the criminal liability of the principal but depends on the quantum of evidence.
But if the evidence shows that the act done does not constitute a crime and the principal is acquitted, then the supposed accomplice and accessory should also be acquitted.
If there is no crime, then there is no criminal liability, whether principal, accomplice or accessory.