Análisis del Valor

After seeking and obtaining President Sukarno's approval for their ideas in February 1963, this group hastily arranged an Assimilation Conference (Musjawarah Asimilasi) for 10-12 March in advance of a Baperki congress that was to begin several days later. At the conference, the formation of an Institute of Promoters of National Unity (Lembaga Pembina Kesatuan Bangsa, LPKB) was announced.34 Soe was one of those elected to the organisation's central leadership which was headed by a Navy legal officer, Sindhunatha.35

This appeared to be a promising beginning, but the following weeks and months proved to be an extremely difficult period for the new organisation.36 Despite his early expression of support for assimilation, President Sukarno continued publicly to praise Baperki and its policies. When serious anti-Chinese riots broke out in several parts of West Java in May, Baperki leaders projected themselves as defenders of the rights of Indonesia's Chinese community. Consequently, the LPKB leaders felt dangerously isolated and began to press for some formal association with the government. On 18 July the LPKB (the organisation's name now changed to Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa, the Institute for the Promotion of National Unity) was placed by presidential decree under the control of the Department of Information and its minister, Roeslan Abdulgani.37

34 In addition to the continued backing of their allies within the army, the assimilationists had actively canvassed support from other quarters. Various prominent political figures including Sunarjo of the PNI, Ipik Gandamana (Minister for the Interior and Regional Autonomy), Roeslan Abdulgani (Minister for Information), Chaerul Saleh (Minister for Basic Industries and Mining, and chairman of the MPRS) and Muljadi Djojomartono (Chairman, Muhammadiyah) either attended the conference or sent messages of support. For details of the conference and its resolutions, see Assimilasi dalam rangka pembinaan kesatuan bangsa 1963.

35 Kristoforus Sindhunatha (formerly Ong Tjong Hai) was born in Jakarta in 1933. He studied law at the University of Indonesia during the late 1950s when he became deputy chairman of PMKRI, the Catholic university student society. After graduating in 1961, he joined the legal affairs bureau of the Indonesian Navy. Interview, 1 March 1985; Apa dan Siapa 1986: 852-3

Onghokham and Tan Hong-gie were also elected to the LPKB leadership along with several pribumi supporters of assimilation. See Assimilasi dalam rangka pembinaan kesatuan bangsa 1963: 58 and 70. 36 Coppel 1976: 56-8

37 On this change in the organisation's status, see Assimilasi dalam rangka pembinaan kesatuan bangsa 1964.

During the following two years Soe played a prominent part within the councils of the LPKB. He was particularly active in the planning and research section of the institute's work, where his knowledge of history and his research skills were called upon and where a number of academics and intellectuals collaborated on specific projects.38 Soe helped produce a number of information booklets and pamphlets setting out the LPK B's views on assim ilation.39 He was especially concerned to locate the issue of Chinese assimilation within the broader context of Indonesia's historical development as an independent nation. Soe argued that national unity had been threatened throughout the course of the nationalist movement and the subsequent struggle for independence by groups attempting to maintain narrow sectional interests. In addition, the policies of the Dutch colonial government had promoted divisions within society along racial, ethnic and regional lines. This had been a deliberate tactic to m aintain colonial pow er by strengthening ethnic identities and fostering racial prejudice to the detriment of national unity. Viewed from this perspective, 'assimilation' was a policy that was inherently patriotic, drawing inspiration from the example set by such early nationalist figures as Douwes Dekker, Dr Tjipto M angunkusumo and Ki Hadjar Dewantoro. On the other hand, the LPKB argued that 'integration' had more in common with those who had tried to elevate minority interests over the interests of the nation at large.

In the latter half of 1963, Soe was appointed to the editorial board of Gelora Minggu, an apparently short-lived weekly published by the private foundation established to support the LPKB's work. In May of the following year, the LPKB established its own journal, Bara Eka. Soe, who was also a member of its editorial board, wrote a

38 This section of the LPKB was initially under the leadership of Drs Jahja Wullur (formerly Oei Tjin San), a social psychologist at Padjadjaran University, Bandung, and the president of the LPKB's West Java branch. For certain details of the LPKB's operations and Soe Hok-gie's role within the organisation in this and the following paragraphs, I am indebted to Charles Coppel who made available information he obtained from LPKB official archives held by the Ministry of Home Affairs in Jakarta.

39 See Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa 1964. Soe was one of the compilers of this anthology which combined excerpts from the speeches and writings of Sukarno, Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, Muhammad Yamin and Roeslan Abdulgani. Soe included an article he had written himself on the Youth Oath of 1928, 'Sumpah Pemuda (28 Oktober 1928) detik kelahiran bangsa Indonesia sebagai satu nasion' (The Youth Oath [28 October 1928] the moment of birth of the Indonesian people as one nation), pp 65-71. See also Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa 1965a. This was a shorter pamphlet written with Drs C.S.T. Kansil. The material was reprinted in an article of the same title in Bara Eka, 3/13, March 1966.

number of articles for this monthly magazine throughout the following eighteen months. These included brief studies of the work of particular individuals whom he believed were among the pioneers of the spirit of assimilation and national unity that the LPKB's work was directed towards promoting.40

Soe was one of the youngest of the LPKB's activists. Despite this, his views were listened to with respect by the older members of the organisation who recognised his intelligence and his seriousness of purpose. However, difficulties arose between Soe and his fellow assimilationists once the LPKB was placed under the authority of the Department of Information in July 1963.41 The LPKB's political rival, the left-aligned Baperki, was a larger and much more powerful organisation. It continued to have the ear of President Sukarno, and also received substantial financial support from the Sino- Indonesian business community. The LPKB, on the defensive politically and with limited financial resources, was struggling to build an effective national organisation with branches throughout the country. Consequently, the institute's leadership was eager to secure whatever recognition and material and financial resources it could through becoming an official organ of government.

But the LPKB's acquisition of official status caused Soe some uneasiness. That uneasiness turned to alarm during 1965 when he discovered that the private foundation that had been established to support the LPKB's work had arranged to accept a 'deferred payment permit' from the governm ent's Central Bank.42 After his appointm ent as M inister for Central Bank A ffairs in Novem ber 1963, Jusuf M uda Dalam had transformed the bank into his personal political fiefdom. His own profligate life-style

40 'Pelopor kesatuan bangsa: Dr Tjipto Mangunkusumo' (Pioneer of national unity - Dr Tjipto Mangunkusumo), Bara Eka, 1/1, May 1964; 'Liem Koen Hian dan perdjuangan pembinaan bangsa' (Liem Koen Hian and the struggle for nation building), Bara Eka, 2/6, July-August 1965. See also his article 'Ichtisar sedjarah tjita— assimilasi' (An outline of the history of assimilation ideals) in the same issue. 41 Interview with K. Sindhunatha, 1 March 1985

42 As the Indonesian economy plummeted into decline in the final years of Guided Democracy and as inflation rocketed out of control, the value of the rupiah was rapidly eroded and foreign exchange became increasingly difficult to obtain. In such circumstances, bureaucrats and government officials with the right connections were able to obtain these permits and sell them on at high profits to businessmen urgently in need of foreign exchange credit facilities.

and corrupt reputation were common knowledge in Jakarta political circles. The bank's resources were used to finance many of the president's favourite grandiose construction projects but it was also a source of patronage and largesse for those with political connections.43 Consequently, Soe regarded any LPKB involvement in such dubious business affairs as totally unacceptable. When he spoke out against the matter within LPKB circles in the latter half of 1965 he was opposed by those who adopted a more pragmatic point of view, and who argued that the organisation urgently needed these funds if it was to operate effectively.44 Soe, however, refused to compromise with what he regarded as a matter of principle. After a bitter confrontation inside the LPKB leadership, in particular with the Catholic Party activist Harry Tjan who was a prominent member of the LPKB's supporting foundation, Soe finally tendered his resignation at an LPKB meeting in January 1966.45

The LPKB involvement was Soe's first practical experience of political activism. Although the LPKB circle included a few individuals who shared many of Soe's views about the Sukarno government, the assimilationists as a group were forced to court the president's support if their movement was to survive. Ironically, it was this political imperative that provided Soe with several unique opportunities to meet face to face with the man whose personal style and policies he had come to despise.

43 On Jusuf Muda Dalam's period in charge of the Central Bank, see Glassburner 1971: 363-83.

44 Interviews with K. Sindhunatha, 1 March 1985; and Harry Tjan Silalahi, 22 February 1985. Some of the funds that the LPKB obtained were used to purchase vehicles for the institute's work. Soe Hok- gie's mother (interview with Nio Hoei An, 5 February 1985) recalled that he had been given an LPKB motor-scooter in 1965 but passed it on to a friend in the organisation. According to Arief Budiman (interview, 12 September 1995) Soe had learned of a plan to purchase houses which were to be made available to some of the LPKB pribumi supporters. Correspondence in the LPKB archives indicates that the organisation was certainly involved in some questionable financial dealings.

43 SHG Diary, 8 January 1966. Soe's diary entry mentions a conflict and his resignation but gives no details.

Meeting the Great Leader of the Revolution

On 22 February 1963, Soe was one of the small group of assimilationists who visited President Sukarno to seek his endorsement for their activities.46 The deputation had been arranged suddenly by an intermediary and there was some initial uncertainty about who should represent their movement. At first Soe’s friend Onghokham was considered, but because of his authorship of the Star Weekly articles that had created so much controversy, it was finally decided that it would be more prudent not to include him. Soe himself had no suitable clothes for such an occasion but at the last moment a jacket several sizes too large was hastily borrowed. The party, consisting of five Sino- Indonesians and four pribumi supporters, assembled at the presidential palace in Jakarta at 6 am before being ushered in to Sukarno's presence for an early morning meeting.47 Also present throughout the discussions were Chaerul Saleh, the Minister for Basic Industries and Mining and Chairman of the Provisional Peoples' Consultative Assembly, and Dasaad, a wealthy businessman. Both men were prominent members of the presidential palace circle during the early 1960s.

The members of the delegation were introduced by Colonel Soetjipto, one of the senior army officers who had supported the assimilationist cause during the previous year.48 Sindhunatha, as spokeman for the group, then outlined the assimilationists' position and explained their proposal for solving the problem of minorities in Indonesia.

46 Soe's detailed account was written two days later (SHG Diary, 24 February 1963). According to a later diary entry (7 January 1966) he visited the presidential palace on at least three separate occasions, although this is the only visit described in his journal. In contrast to the candid comments recorded there, the occasion is also mentioned - in more positive terms - in Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa 1965: 22-3.

47 The delegation consisted of Soe, Sindhunatha, Junus Jahja (the economist, Lauw Chuan Tho, who had only recently changed his name), T.A. Hardjanegara (formerly The Han Liem, a Bandung businessman with interests in the transport sector) and a Dr Arifin. The pribumi members were Soeharto Hasirin (a Department of Foreign Affairs official, recently returned from a posting in the Indonesian embassy in Moscow), Anis Ibrahim (a Minangkabau student who headed the Indonesian Student Press League, IPMI) and Safioedin (an official of the Department of Home Affairs, who was in charge of a bureau with responsibilities for ethnic minorities).

48 Soetjipto was the chief of staff of the Supreme War Command (Peperti) and general secretary of the Consultative Council of the Leadership of the Revolution (MPPR, a Guided Democracy body advising the president).

He concluded by asking for the president's comments and invited his admonishment if he believed that they were in error.

The assimilationists were delighted with Sukarno's response. In general terms the president expressed his agreement with their ideas. He emphasised that he had always been opposed to racism in any form, so any initiative that would strengthen national unity such as intermarriages between ethnic groups had his blessing. During the discussion that followed, the delegation extracted from Sukarno his own novel explanation of Indonesia's national motto Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity). The president, with his usual love of foreign words and phrases, explained that the Bhinneka (Diversity) should be regarded as das Sein (what is), while the Tunggal Ika (Unity) im plied das Sollen (what shall be). Here was a presidential statement that could be used to justify assimilation and undermine the integrationist policies of their Baperki opponents.

Once the delegation's serious business had been dealt with, the conversation became more informal. Sukarno, who apparently had no pressing matters of state that morning, was obviously enjoying himself. Discussion about the problem of the Chinese minority had involved consideration of the issue of marriage. This naturally led the president to reflect on matters in which he claimed special expertise. He began to regale his listeners with his own impressions of how female beauty, as he had observed it at close quarters in various parts of the world, had been enhanced by inter-ethnic marriages.

The president was also eager to hear the latest Jakarta gossip about his Foreign Minister, Dr Subandrio, and his affairs with various prominent local film stars, one of whom was rumoured to be of part-Chinese descent. The conversation turned to homosexuality. Sukarno gave his views on its causes, described how a homosexual foreign state guest had savagely beaten a local transvestite, and declared that he had been reliably informed that Arab countries were full of transvestites. He was now warming to one of his favourite subjects, sex. To the acute discomfort of at least one member of the

assembled company, he went so far as to reflect on

... what it would feel like to fondle the breasts of a woman who had been injected with plastic.

Soe remarked in his diary:

Throughout the course of the conversation whatever seemed inviting was taken up by Bung Karno, Chaerul Saleh and Dasaad (and Hardjo also it appears) with complete freedom. I felt rather strange...

As a human being I think I like Bung Karno, but as leader, no. How can there be any social responsibility with the state led by people like that? Bung Karno, like Ariwijadi, full of jokes with obscene mobs and with such immoral interests. Especially seeing the pot-bellied Dasaad who is still attracted to pretty girls. He declared that he would also have married a Japanese if he had still been young. Bung Karno said that he wanted something (a helicopter?) as a present and Dasaad said, everything will be fine when the papers are clear...

I only have one impression, I cannot believe in him as a leader of state because he is so immoral .49

By the time they left the palace, the audience with the president had lasted nearly three hours. Soe came away feeling angry and disturbed. Sukarno's sexual exploits were common knowledge in Indonesia, especially among Jakarta's political public. Yet, even allowing for Soe's own strong streak of moral prudishness and his relative innocence with the ways of the world, it had been a bizarre experience. He was shocked by the president's behaviour, his open display of braggadocio, his obvious coarseness and his crude immorality. Moreover, this had occurred at a time when publicly Sukarno was forever promoting the cause of Indonesia's cultural identity (kepribadian Indonesia)

and attacking Western culture for its immorality and decadence.50 Soe was also dismayed by the other signs of sordid venality he had observed: the easy familiarity of corrupt figures like Dasaad who were so clearly entrenched within the palace circle; the sycophantic demeanor of the president's aides; and the female assistants he treated as his personal sex objects.51

40 SHG Diary, 24 February 1963. Ariwijadi was a friend of Soe's at Rawamangun; 'he would also have married a Japanese' is a reference to Sukarno's fourth wife, Dewi, whom he had met in Tokyo in 1959. 50 Kepribadian Indonesia was the 'K' in Sukarno’s Manipol-USDEK.

51 Soe's views about the president's personal flaws were further strengthened by a chance meeting in Bandung during the following year with Sukarno's long-forgotten first wife Inggit Garnasih. Soe's account of their meeting, during which Ibu Inggit described her feelings when Sukarno had abandoned her for Fatmawati, are related in his Kartini Day essay: 'Tjita2 Kartini dim pengalaman seorang mahasiswa Indonesia' (Kartini's ideals in the experience of an Indonesian university student), Kompas, 20 April

Soe's diary entry does not indicate what conversations he himself had with Sukarno on this occasion, although his appearance in an ill-fitting jacket guaranteed that his presence did not pass unnoticed. The president, an intensely vain man, punctilious in his own personal appearance and a fastidious dresser, singled out the young student for some humorous banter.52

Little is known about Soe's other meetings with Sukarno, though these may have occurred at the presidential palace in Bogor. On 18 July 1964, the president hosted a reception for LPKB delegates who were attending a conference held to mark the first anniversary of the organisation's formation. Soe was almost certainly present on this occasion.53 According to LPKB official records, on 21 January 1965 Soe travelled to Bogor with Sindhunatha, Anis Ibrahim and members of the Liem family, including Liem Bian Khoen, to present President Sukarno with a bronze deer, a Liem family heirloom.54

Although these visits to the presidential palace did nothing to enhance Soe's opinion of the Great Leader of the Revolution, Sukarno, for his part, apparently found something attractive about the sharp-eyed young student with the borrowed jacket. After one of his meetings with the president, Soe was offered an official position in a history