We noted earlier that bcb, bbc, bbb, cbb, ccc, ccb, cbc, ccb are all of Hero’s possible lines from the SB when the BB check-calls down. We now have some ideas about the things which are important to consider when trying to differentiate between various postflop situations. Issues of board tex- ture are the one of the primary metrics with which to evaluate situations and group them into categories of spots which are strategically similar. In this section, we will focus on situations on generally static boards. Because hand values will be relatively unlikely to change on later streets, it makes sense to start planning all our actions in the hand on the flop. That is, we can go ahead and think about how we will likely want to play each part of our range on later streets, assuming we do not face a raise or lead and no particularly interesting cards come off. Thus, with issues such as texture in mind, we can start partitioning Hero’s flop range into different lines. That is, we will consider the group of hands with which he will take each line. Hero’s first decision is whether or not to continuation-bet. In fact, Hero can find a reason to c-bet with most of his hands. He can bet for value because he has a good hand (i.e., with the hope of being called by worse), or he can bet because has a bad hand, as a bluff (i.e., with the hope of making a bet- ter hand fold). Indeed many players only check back the flop with those hands in between, so-called weak showdown hands, which are not good enough to bet for value but not bad enough to bet as a bluff. By checking these back on the flop, they hope to control the size of the pot and get closer to showdown. On later streets, there is often the option to continue towards showdown or to put in a value-bet if appropriate.
Let us focus on the more common case where the SB c-bets. How should the turn and river play go after Hero c-bets on a static board, is called, and is checked to on the turn? Now, since Villain called the bet on the flop, he likely has something. This is not necessarily the case for Hero whose range is still very wide. Hero might group his own hands at this point loosely into several categories: strong hands (say, he would like to bet all three streets if Villain keeps check-calling), middling hands (say, he would like to put one
more bet in for value), weak hands (he would like to go to showdown but is probably not good if he bets again and is called), and pure air (some of which will be turned into bluffs). Experience should provide some guide as to how to categorize particular hands and how to choose holdings to turn into bluffs. We will give more attention to these topics in later chapters. So how might Hero want to play each of these groupings on the turn and river? First, his strong hands are probably the easiest to play. He will often want to play bbb with these to try to get the most value for his big hands. Conversely, with the weak hands, which are worth taking to showdown but with which he wants to put no more bets in, will try to do just that: Hero will try to take the bcc line with these.
Now, with our middling hands, we want to make one more bet. Our choice is whether to bet on the turn or on the river. Which is best? The answer is generally the river, for two main reasons. First, by checking back the turn with middling made hands, we control the size of the pot. That is, checking back the turn allows us to be more sure of being able get to showdown without having to put more money than we want to into the pot. In particu- lar, it eliminates Villain’s chance to check-call the turn and then lead the river or to check-raise the turn. If Villain leads the river after we check back the flop, we can simply call the bet and have successfully gotten one bet in with our middling hand. The only remaining danger is that Villain can check-raise our bet on the river, but even in this case, it is easier for us to call the raise on the river and get immediately to showdown than to have faced the raise on the turn with the implicit threat of an additional river bet. A second reason to play bcb rather than bbc with middling made hands is that by checking back the turn and value-betting the river, we can expect to get called by weaker hands more often. If Villain has a weak holding which is considering a call when facing a turn bet, he has to be scared of facing a big river bet also. In particular, by taking a weak-looking turn line, he might be scared giving away the fact that his hand is weak and made, in which case he is very vulnerable both to a wide value-betting range as well as bluffs on the river. There is, however, no such threat of future bets to discourage his paying us off on the river.
ters, some of these hands can be profitably turned into bluffs. With some bluffs, we will want to bet twice just as if we had one of our strong hands. However, what if we just want to bluff once on the turn and river? In this case, it is probably best to bet only the turn for reasons similar to above. Our bluff will be most effective on the turn since Villain must fear the pos- sibility of a river bet. Additionally, betting the turn is how we play our strong value hands. (Keep in mind that we are talking about static boards – how might these considerations change if more draws were possible? ) At this point we have outlined a moderately reasonable approach to bet- ting on static boards versus a check-calling opponent in the BB. Many competent players will play a strategy very similar to this one, at least be- fore they start making reads. They will also tend to think in terms of these sorts of strategies. For example, they will tend to expect you to have many weak showdown value hands after you check back the flop. However, this strategy is certainly not the final word, especially against good opponents. Before we move on to how these ideas must change to accommodate changing hand values on volatile textures, we should at least mention how this approach could be exploited by a smart BB and if and how the SB should adjust his strategy to avoid such exploitation.
First, consider the SB’s tendency to check back weak-showdown hands (and only weak-showdown hands) on the flop. By defining his hand as not strong, he makes himself vulnerable to the BB leading the turn and river aggressively. The BB can do this both with bluffs and with a very wide range of value hands since he can be confident that even many of his me- diocre hands are better than the SB’s holding.
This is a serious threat, but the danger is partially offset by two things. First, by virtue of his position, the SB will have more information available to him at each of his decision points, and he can try to use it to call down when appropriate and fold when appropriate. Second, since he checked back the flop, there are only two rounds of betting left. This limits the amount of pressure the BB can apply, at least with standard-sized bets. Players in the BB will often decline to begin a bluff facing a missed c-bet, since they are unable to fire three streets, and they know that the SB has something that is likely to call at least once.
Still, defining his range so narrowly early in the hand can lead to problems for the SB when facing a good, aggressive opponent. The equilibration ex- ercise can be used to identify the SB’s proper adjustment in this case. If the BB is leading turns and rivers very frequently after a missed c-bet to take advantage of Hero's presumably-weak range, checking back the flop with stronger hands becomes more profitable than it would have otherwise been and may very well become more profitable than c-betting in the first place. So, the SB will definitely want to be capable of checking back some hands strong enough to confidently call down two streets. He may also want to be able to raise the turn and river with some frequency both for value and as bluffs (and especially the river so as to allow the BB to put as much money in as possible with weak holdings).
One interesting adjustment which is likely underutilized at the time of writing is for the BB to incorporate leading turns and rivers for over-bets (that is, betting larger than the size of the pot) when facing a SB who checks back exactly weak-showdown value holdings. The BB can do this with many hands for value since the SB’s range is capped low, and so he can also do this with many bluffs. In the next chapter, we will analyze river spots where a player’s range is defined as weak showdown value, and we will see that his opponent’s most profitable response involves going all-in with many hands, regardless of the current pot size. Intuitively, this move lets him get the most value from his made hands as well as having the most effective bluffs. However, this sort of analysis does rest on assump- tions about the SB’s range – it is easy to imagine that if the BB starts to over-bet leading turns and rivers with too high a frequency, then checking back the flop with strong hands becomes a very attractive option for the SB. Thus, turn and river overbetting in this spot is a great example of one which is highly exploitative in that it takes maximum advantage of the strategy described earlier but can also be very exploitable itself.
Now, take the case that the SB c-bets and the BB calls. The basic outline of the SB strategy above was to bet the turn and river with strong value hands and some bluffs, to bet the turn but give up on the river with other bluffs, and to check the turn and bet the river with middling-strength value hands. The logic leading to this strategy is reasonable, and it is a good strategy against many inexperienced opponents. However, we can also see how a BB
aware of the strategy would be able to take advantage of it.
Consider first the situation after the SB bets the flop and turn. He holds in this case both strong hands and bluffs with little in between since he is checking his middling hands on the turn. Thus, his range is polar. So, to some degree, most of the BB’s middling strength hands have the same value against this polarized range. However, insofar as the SB has a good ratio of value bets to bluffs, it is hard for the BB to take advantage of this knowledge. We will see in future chapters that the BB must just play “check-and-guess” with most of his range in this kind of spot.
But what about the times that the SB checks the turn and bets the river? He only does this with middling strength value-betting hands. Since his range is so well defined, the BB will very often know if he has the best hand and can thus play very well. He can avoid incorrectly calling down with weak hands that only beat a bluff since the SB is not bluffing. If the BB starts folding to too many river bets, however, it is easy for the SB to start including some bluffs in his bcb range.
The more serious problem with the SB’s strategy is not that the BB might call and fold well but rather that he might raise. This is due to the fact that the SB’s range is capped when he bets the river at the end of the bcb line. As when he checked back the flop, having a capped range makes him quite vulnerable to a counterstrategy involving wide value-betting and bluffing ranges. These can come both as river leads and as river check-raises, both of which can be over-bets if the BB wants to apply maximum pressure. Whereas the BB check-folding to river value bets too much led to a simple solution for the SB (bluff more), this issue leads to problems which are a bit harder for the SB to fix. We noted that after the SB bcb, the BB could play well by check-calling and check-folding most of his hands intelligently. What if, on the other hand, the BB still check-calls the river with those same hands with which he can profitably do so, but check-raises with his weakish hands and moderately strong ones? If the SB checks back the turn and bets the river with the above ranges (weak value and maybe some bluffs), he may never have a hand strong enough to happily call the river check-raise. This sets up a very profitable situation for the BB.
checking back the turn with stronger hands or by just calling down light sometimes. Against a particularly aggressive opponent, the SB might find it profitable to do both. Against a more passive player, it might not be worth it to do either even if this means being exploited occasionally. (Re- call the discussion of the appropriate use of the balance concept in Section 2.3.1.) In any case, these adjustments have serious consequences for other parts of the SB’s strategy. These sorts of considerations form the basis of the discussion in the following chapters.
Neglecting variations in bet sizing, there are just eight lines pos- sible to the SB when the BB plays passively. Which are unused in the “standard” strategy described above? Do you think this is problematic? In other words, under what conditions could the SB increase his expectation by taking some of the unused lines?