Medios auxiliares
4.1 Andamios en general
Before closing this chapter, it is worth asking whether Jahiz was right. Were Christians the source of every confusion and ambiguity, at least in his own day if not in subsequent centuries when Islam was much more clearly the master over Christianity and Christians could not so boldly point out contradictions in its message? In his refutation of Christians, Jahiz calls them the most heretical, confused, and imbalanced of peoples.92 More than
contradictions in the Qur’an and hadith.93They are a stubborn and obstinate
people.94 For Jahiz, Christians represent a great trial for Muslims, especially
weak-minded ones who do not know how to respond to questions about ambiguous verses in the Qur’an. It is thus up to Jahiz, a leading public intel- lectual, to refute the beliefs of Christians, quelling the theological discord they stir up among Muslims. At the same time, under the influence of state offi- cials seeking to claim religious authority for themselves, Jahiz uses the beliefs of Christians to discredit anthropomorphist views in Islam. He notes that Christians are divided like the stuffed heads of the umma.95Their beliefs, too,
are anthropomorphist,96 the result of a gross failure to understand the lan-
guage of their own scriptures, just like Islam’s anthropomorphists. If you are a Muslim with anthropomorphist beliefs, you are not better than a Christian. If Christians grasped the usages of words, they would find a credible inter- pretation of the apparently anthropomorphist passages in their scriptures.97
The problem is not with scripture but with the minds of Christians—and those of anthropomorphist Muslims, too!
Muslims were certainly concerned about the challenge of Christianity and made great efforts to refute it.98 But do we have evidence that Christians
sought to stir up confusion among Muslims? Jahiz may have just been con- juring up a straw man to knock down, as a way to advance his own theolo- gical vision. It is difficult to know what actually happened between Christians and Muslims in ninth-century Baghdad. However, a text from this period records the proceedings of a debate that took place between a bishop, Theo- dore Abu- Qurra (d. c. 830), and a group of Muslim scholars, in the presence of al-Ma’mun, the caliph who instituted the Inquisition and showed keen interest in theological issues. The caliph, who was making his way across Mesopotamia to wage jihad against the Byzantines, was encamped at that point with his entourage near Harran, where Abu Qurra was bishop, giving occasion for the debate.
It is Abu Qurra who records the debate, so it is naturally construed as a victory for Christianity.99It also depicts al-Ma’mun as the impartial overseer
of the debate, suggesting that Christians would easily best Muslims in dis- putation if allowed to do so without fear of reprisal.100 The many facets of
the debate notwithstanding,101our interest here is limited to the confusion it
attributes to the scholars of Islam, the result of debating a Christian with theological expertise. Abu Qurra would compose a number of theological treatises,102several of which show a close knowledge of Islam, especially the
Qur’an. They also reveal a deep concern to defend Christianity against the claims of Islam. Politically, he had no problem with rule by Islam’s caliphs and even composed a prayer for al-Ma’mun, asking God to protect him. In the debate, he refers to the caliph as“my lord and master, the com- mander of the faithful.” It was not Islam’s rule over Christians that troubled him but rather the hostile attitude of Muslims towards Christians, the result of the Muslim conclusion that the Qur’an depicts Christianity as a degraded religion.
The debate takes up sixteen points of Christian doctrine with a focus on belief in Jesus as the Word of God. This Christian belief is actually affirmed by the Qur’an (Q 4:171) even if Muslims understand it differently from Christians. Abu Qurra notes on a number of occasions that the Qur’an lauds Christians for their beliefs. It is clearly his impression that the Muslims read the Qur’an thinking it indicts Christianity as a form of polytheism. For this reason, throughout the debate, he bases his defense of Christianity on pas- sages from the Qur’an. His goal is to show that Muslims who attack Christianity are actually at odds with their own scripture. It is a contradiction for Muslims to identify Christians with infidelity, polytheism, and idolatry when the Qur’an lauds them. The bishop’s words reflect the anxiety of Christian communities in new circumstances. Even—or especially—when they prosper, they remain theologically deficient in the eyes of Muslims, making them a ready object of disdain. It is thus to strengthen the faith of Christians that Abu Qurra sets the debate down in writing. It is difficult to know to what extent we have a faithful record of the debate, but important for our purposes is the fact that it depicts Abu Qurra causing confusion among his Muslim opponents, reflecting something of the claims of Jahiz.
Abu Qurra, for example, responds to the Muslim position that Jesus is like Adam. God, the Qur’an says, created Jesus as he created Adam, by blowing his spirit into him.103 Thus, Jesus is like Adam, a mere creature. Abu Qurra
retorts that there is a difference. The Qur’an refers to Jesus as the Word of God whereas Adam has no such title. In echo of intra-Muslim discord over the status of the Qur’an, he asks how it could be said that the Word of God is created. Jesus, according to the Qur’an, is the Word of God, and the Word of God cannot be created. There are thus no grounds for calling Christians polytheists for believing in the divinity of Jesus. By claiming Christians are polytheists, Muslims deny their own scripture, making a liar of their prophet. Abu Qurra concludes by asking how Muslims can claim that Christians are polytheists when the Qur’an says on numerous occasions that it was revealed to confirm past scriptures, which Abu Qurra takes to mean the Psalms and Gospels. At this point, one of his Muslim opponents, afigure by the name of Muhammad Ibn‘Abdallah becomes pale, apparently stymied by Abu Qurra’s eloquence.104 When prodded by the caliph, he pleads that Christians have
been around much longer than Muslims, making them better skilled at debate. He says,“My thinking is confused [tah.ayyar]. I have no response to him.” This actually pleases the caliph, who praises Abu Qurra as a sea of knowledge to whom none can compare in theological acumen.
Abu Qurra continues by claiming that Muhammad wanted to make sure that his followers had no doubts about the goodness of Christians.105
He backs this with the statement in the Qur’an (Q 49:14) that the Arabs of the desert, even if they have submitted to Muhammad as Muslims, are not truly believers. The verse thus refers to the Arabs of the desert as“Muslims” in contrast to“believers.” Abu Qurra offers a different reading, claiming that “believers” actually refers to Christians. After all, elsewhere in the Qur’an, the
Arabs of the desert are depicted as infidels and hypocrites. How could they be the“Muslims” mentioned in this verse? The verse, he concludes, really speaks of Muslims in contrast to Christians. The latter are the true believers. Abu Qurra corroborates this by referring to verses in the Qur’an that speak of a well-guided people, whom he takes to be Christians. In such fashion, he undertakes a Christian reading of the Qur’an to show that the scripture of Islam itself offers evidence of the validity and even excellence of Christianity. The debate then moves to the topic of Jesus as the Son of God.106One of
the Muslim scholars in the caliph’s entourage says that this is the reason why Muslims call Christians polytheists. Once again, Abu Qurra responds on their terms:
You deny that your Lord might elect his word and spirit [terms used to describe Jesus in the Qur’an] and then honor and glorify him by naming him as a son to him. You call your prophet messenger of God, Abraham friend of God, and Moses addressee of God. What then prevents God from calling his word and spirit a son to him, since they are from him, just as you would not deny the son who is from you?107
Abu Qurra, aware of the theological conundrums internal to Islam (that Jahiz and Qasim, as seen earlier, tried to resolve), says that God is not in heaven or earth and that one should also not think of Jesus as his son in a physically limited sense. Muslims, he says, believe they have certain knowledge of God but ignorantly conceive of his word and spirit in bodily terms.108Jesus
is the word and spirit of God, as the Qur’an says, but such things, since they are from God, cannot be physically limited. His opponent thereupon surren- ders,“My mind is confused [tah.ayyar ‘aqlı-], and my knowledge has been used to humiliate me [ha-nat ‘alayya ma‘rifatı-]. But I know that Jesus is like Adam even if I do not have the words to respond [‘uyyiytu ‘an al-jawa-b].”
The debate then moves to the topic of the crucifixion of Jesus, a point denied by Muslims. They say that God raised Jesus to himself without allowing him to be killed by his adversaries.109Abu Qurra refers to Q 4:157, which states that
“they did not kill Jesus but it only seemed so to them.” He then notes the verse in the Qur’an that says that God raised Jesus to himself. The conclusion to be drawn, he says, is that Jesus, God’s word and spirit as the Qur’an affirms, cannot be separated from him but is destined to return to him. Here, again, Abu Qurra draws a connection to intra-Muslim controversy, noting that Muslims say the same thing about the Qur’an as the speech of God. It is uncreated. Thus, just as it originated from God, so it will return to him.110Do
Muslims think that God does not have the power to make his word and spirit return to him, that is, rise after being put to death? His opponent then asks him about the suffering of Jesus on the cross. Did the Son of God, God’s word and spirit, not experience pain at the crucifixion? Abu Qurra likens the matter to sunrays on a wall. If the wall were destroyed, would the sun experience pain? One should not think of God’s word and spirit in physical terms. Abu Qurra,
using the words of the Qur’an for his own Christian purposes, cleverly plays upon a fear we saw in the writings of Jahiz, theological partisan of al-Ma’mun, namely, that Muslims stubbornly conceive of God in physical terms. He closes this portion of the debate by affirming the reason for the crucifixion. Christians would not have believed in the resurrection if the Word of God, Christ, had not been crucified prior to being raised. Here, his opponent, this time a Persian, says,“By God, Abu Qurra, you are right. My mind is confused [h.a-r ‘aqlı-] and I do not know what to say in response to you.”
In point after point, Abu Qurra’s opponents concede defeat. Their inability to respond is repeatedly described as a state of confusion.111 This does not
mean that they have denied Islam, only that theyfind Abu Qurra’s arguments compelling. But his arguments are at odds with the beliefs of Islam. As a result, they are trapped in a contradiction, seeing the sense of his position but still committed to their own. The claims of Christians and Muslims about Jesus cannot both be true. This makes them skeptics, unsure where truth lies, per- plexed. Abu Qurra thus describes them as confused. The confusion here is not a suspension of judgment, a stage between acceptance and rejection on the way to certainty. It is more than that. Abu Qurra’s opponents are confused because they do not know whether Christianity or Islam is in the right. They have become skeptics. In contrast, Abu Qurra is shown to be confident, sure of his position, a man of faith, skilled with words, rational in his thinking. He is no skeptic.
The debate silences the scholars of Islam. Abu Qurra has fended off all attacks on Christianity, leaving his opponents nonplussed. The caliph asks,“Is there anyone remaining to debate Abu Qurra?”112 They beseech him,“Would
the commander of the faithful graciously relieve us of the duty of debating Abu Qurra since we are not up to it.” They then go off disgraced and confused (mutah.ayyarı-n), while Abu Qurra is awarded a prize by the caliph. Whatever actually transpired in the debate, the record suggests that the concept of con- fusion was at play in inter-religious relations in the ninth century, and it was used to dismiss the arguments of one’s opponents as a way to reassure oneself of one’s own. Even if only a rhetorical strategy, it seems to have left its mark, making some Muslims wonder whether they had the theological wherewithal to claim certainty for Islam among the divergent beliefs within the umma. Disputation with Christians, combined with intra-Muslim controversy over anthropomorphist beliefs, created the impression of a community in confusion.
Conclusion
There was a good deal of theological wrangling in ninth-century Baghdad and its vicinity, much of it over the question of anthropomorphist beliefs. The controversy is particularly noticeable in the writings of Jahiz, a leading cul- tural figure of the period, not only in his theological treatises but also in his literary works. He was not the only scholar to be concerned about the impli- cations of anthropomorphism for Islam. Others, such as Qasim, may not have
been as troubled by the political implications of anthropomorphist beliefs as Jahiz, servitor of caliphs, but he does connect it, like Jahiz, to challenges coming from Christians. Christians were threatened by Muslim assumptions that the Qur’an indicted Christianity as a kind of polytheism. They responded by pointing to ambiguities within Islam. Faced with anthropomorphist beliefs from within Islam and the theological strategies of Christians from without, Jahiz responded to both with a single strategy. At the heart of this strategy was a theory of language that combined the Qur’an’s concept of clarity with ideas from Aristotle about the sociopolitical significance of speech. He used this theory as a weapon not only against stuff-headed Muslims but also Christians. Failing to grasp the correct usages of words, they ended by believing absurd things about God, posing a threat to social harmony and political stability. It was vital that he refute them both.
We are thus faced with a kind of skeptical confusion that goes beyond the domain of scholarly inquiry. The skepticism of scholarly inquiry is equally well known in other contexts. It denotes a temporary suspension of judgment when one is faced with two equally plausible but mutually contradictory arguments. Here, doubt is a spur to further reflection with the goal of reaching certainty, either for or against the position in question. However, in this chapter, we have seen another kind of skepticism, one that arose out of the specific circum- stances of Islam in the ninth century. This skepticism implies a state of scho- larly stasis, a breakdown in knowledge, where one is simply confused with no prospect of certainty. Christianity served Jahiz as a useful whipping post, but the true culprit was anthropomorphism in Islam. When subjected to rational analysis, anthropomorphist beliefs necessarily begot contradiction. Seeing the phenomenon of confusion as a threat not only to the beliefs of Islam but also to the ethical character of Muslim society, to say nothing of the political order, Jahiz expended much effort to counter and domesticate skeptical confusion in this sense, even when embracing it as a vital part of scholarly inquiry. Alas, his efforts and those of the caliphs he served ended in failure. The Inquisition was lifted during the reign of al-Mutawakkal (r. 847–61), the nephew of al-Ma’mun. This is not to say that the caliphs and their minions embraced anthropomorphist beliefs, but it did suggest that Ibn Hanbal and his followers had succeeded at least in earning for themselves a niche within the scholarly pantheon of Islam. As a result, Islam would take a very different direction from the one al-Ma’mun had tried to establish, one in which skeptical confusion, taking on definable contours in the ninth century, would persist as a source of perplexity overfinal claims to religious truth.
Notes
1 All sorts of questions were raised, many of which might seem absurd to us today, but this is the point of the skeptical dynamic in Islam’s scholarly life. A belief should not be accepted without reservation if, when exposed to absurdity, it could not be convincingly defended. There was, then, some sense to begin a work on a skeptical note, a practice one notes already in the earliest days of theological
reasoning in Islam. One treatise, for example, begins by considering the“absurd” question of whether God (in his absolute sovereignty) could have given his prophetic messengers the capacity not to convey the message that God had designated them to convey. See Josef van Ess, Anfänge Muslimischer Theologie: Zwei Antiqadaritische Traktate aud dem Ersten Jahrhundert der Hig˘ra (Beirut: Franz Steiner 1977). The origins of theological reasoning in Islam remain obscure. For one proposal, see Josef van Ess,“Early Development of Kala-m,” in G.H.A Juynboll, ed., Studies on the First Century of Islamic Society (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press 1982), pp. 109–23.
2 For the development of theological discourse during the eighth and ninth centuries, see Richard M. Frank, Early Islamic Theology: The Mu‘tazilites and al-Ash‘arı-, vol. 2 (2007) in Dimitri Gutas., ed., Texts and Studies on the Development and History of Kala-m, 3 vols. (Ashgate: Variorum 2005–2008).
3 For one analysis of the controversy over the nature of God’s speech, see Josef van Ess,“Ibn Kulla-b und die Mih.na,” Oriens 18/19 (1965/1966), pp. 92–142.
4 al-T.abarı-, The Reunification of the ‘Abba-sid Caliphate, trans. C.E. Bosworth, vol. 32 in The History of al-Tabari (Albany: State University of New York Press 1987), pp. 199–221.
5 For only the latest analysis of the reign of al-Ma’mun, see Hayrettin Yücesoy, Messianic Beliefs and Imperial Politics in Medieval Islam (Columbia, SC: