ANEMIA

We will examine the specific ways God suffers when we discuss Moltmann‟s view of the Father and the Son, at this juncture we will consider Moltmann‟s simple yet complex premise – God suffers.48 According to Moltmann, this is a concept that is evident within the history of the cross, and evident in the encounter with God‟s love. God‟s passion is not a result of some sort of defect in God‟s nature; the suffering of God arises from God‟s willingness to suffer because God is love. “God does not suffer out of deficiency of being, like created beings. To this extent he is „apathetic‟. But he suffers from the love which is the superabundance and overflowing of his being. In so far he is „pathetic‟.”49

The doctrine of impassibility began, Moltmann propounds, with the early Church‟s engagement with philosophy.50 Although this view of God has had, and continues to have, a prominent voice within the Church, it is problematic. The problem, Moltmann asserts, is that this is not how God reveals God‟s self, especially in light of the cross. Through scripture and the encounter with God, the person (and community) finds a God who is „pathetic‟ not „apathetic‟.

The attraction of the doctrine of impassibility, Moltmann thinks, is due to the fact that “in practice down to the present day Christian faith has taken into itself the religious need of

47 _{CG, 62-63.}

48 _{Moltmann‟s idea of passibility is significantly influenced by Abraham Heschel‟s pathos of God.} CG, 270-274. Heschel was one of the first, Moltmann states, to challenge the idea of an apathetic God. TKG, 25. Although he draws from Heschel‟s thought, Moltmann reaches a different conclusion as he is unable to agree with Heschel‟s „dipolar theology‟ and instead argues for a trinitarian solution to the pathos/sympatheia paradox. CG, 275. Heschel may be the primary influence, but in TKG, 21-60, Moltmann engages other individuals as well, and most significantly for this research, Berdiaev. As we noted in chapter 4, Moltmann relies exclusively on Berdiaev‟s concept of movement within the Godhead to examine “the tragedy of God.” See TKG, 42-47.

49 _{TKG, 23. Cf. Berdiaev: “If the capacity for love is ascribed to God, then the capacity for suffering} must also be ascribed to Him.” SF, 51.

50 _{CG, 214. Although Moltmann is arguing for God‟s pathos, he still wants to hold the basic doctrinal} affirmation of Nicaea that, at least in a „relative‟ sense, God is „not changeable‟. CG, 229.

143 finite, threatened and mortal man for security in a higher omnipotence and authority.”51

Following from this, then, any idea of death, suffering, or grief must be excluded from God and God becomes the Unmoved.52

Moltmann holds firmly to God‟s passibility because without it he believes God‟s love cannot be recognized.53 Simply put, he states “A God who cannot suffer cannot love either. A God who cannot love is a dead God.”54

The ability to love carries with it the risk of suffering. Moltmann makes no distinction between how God loves and how the human loves; love is incomprehensible if there is no pathos.

The importance of this point cannot be overstated. If it could be demonstrated that love could occur without pathos, then, Moltmann‟s position would collapse. But, as Moltmann correctly points out, love is incomprehensible without pathos, and, since God is love and cannot do anything that would be contradictory to himself, God‟s suffering is a comprehensible phenomenon. If God wasn‟t love then this point would be moot. As God is love,55 ideas of an impassible God who is not affected by anything external to God‟s self need to be rejected, as they do not conform with God‟s salvation history.

God creating space for creation to exist based on love for the other, a love which includes God‟s willingness to suffer, is the first factor in making freedom possible for the created order. The second factor is drawn from Moltmann‟s understanding of the Trinity.

51 _{CG, 214.}

52

“The „Almighty‟ can do all things but may not display any weakness. God may rule but cannot suffer. God must direct but cannot be directed. God must always speak but cannot listen. A God who is so one-sidedly defined, simply cannot be the living God. . . . The God who alone is active and all-causative condemns all others to passivity and utter dependence.” HG, 95.

53

SL, 137.

54 _{TKG, 38. This position has earned Moltmann considerable criticism. Paul Molnar, who accuses} Moltmann‟s thought of being „theologically inappropriate‟ writes, “This clear projection of human love and suffering into the eternal Godhead manifests the mutual conditioning associated with all human love and suffering; it cannot, however, describe the trinitarian God as free in himself or in revelation in a way which definitively overcomes suffering.” Paul Molnar, Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity: In Dialogue with Karl Barth and Contemporary Theology (Edinburgh: T & T Clark Ltd, 2002), 203. Although Molnar correctly points out certain problems in Moltmann‟s thought, his sharp critique of Moltmann‟s position completely misses the overall objectives of Moltmann‟s thought concerning God‟s passibility and the Trinity. Moltmann is not centered, as is Molnar, on arguing for God‟s sovereignty (although Moltmann is concerned with it). Moltmann‟s thought begins with the cross and in trying to explore the implications of Christ being crucified; thus he does not have as a primary objective to “describe the trinitarian God as free in himself.” Moltmann, in contrast to Molnar, does not regard God‟s freedom as the ability to do whatever is possible. God‟s freedom, and hence God‟s power, is found in God‟s love. “God‟s freedom is not the almighty power for which everything is possible. It is love, which means the self-communication of the good.” ET, 75. This failure to acknowledge Moltmann‟s basic orientation (it is significant that Molnar does not engage The Crucified God), combined with a misreading of Moltmann on several key points (e.g. he claims that Moltmann states that “God needs to suffer in order to love,” Molnar, 200), makes Molnar‟s critique problematic.

144 2. Trinity

Moltmann‟s conception of the Trinity plays an integral role in his formulation of freedom; he is convinced that an understanding of the Trinity is essential if the age-old paradox of freedom existing for both God and human beings is to be resolved. The Trinity is not an abstract philosophical concept, according to Moltmann, but the means by which one can discuss a God whose freedom cannot be externally thwarted and a free human whose existential freedom does not impinge on God. As Richard Bauckham aptly states, “. . . the doctrine of the Trinity, for Moltmann, is not the problem; properly understood, it is the solution.”56

In considering Moltmann‟s Trinitarian thought our attention will focus on his assertion that the intra-trinitarian relationship reveals a God who exists in relation, and that this relationship creates the „space‟ for the created order to be truly free. Thus not only does each Person of the Trinity have a part to play in granting freedom, it is also their existence and their relation to each other that become essential factors for freedom.