Anexo G. Referencias de los documentos analizados

theme entitles him to be named the theologian and philosopher of (pre-political) democracy and of law, especially international law. His thoughts on democracy include those of the origin of authority, and on how it can be transferred to, or reclaimed from, specific or positive forms of government—which are three: monarchy, or rule by a single individual; aristocracy, or rule by the few; and democracy, or rule by the many or by the people.

Political authority, declares Suárez, derives from God and resides immediately in a community or congregation of men united by a com-mon will and directed to a single goal, the comcom-mon good:

by the very fact that men are gathered together in one city or state, there results in their community, without the intervention of any created will, this kind of [political] authority, and with so great a necessity, that it cannot be obstructed by the human will. It is a sign therefore that the authority is immediately from God, there intervening only that natural consequence or effect, as follows from nature and the dictates of natural reason.³⁵

Authority vested in the people is democracy. Does this mean that democracy is divinely instituted? Suárez responds by distinguishing

fidem, nam cedit in iniuriam et infamiam eius; existimabunt enim infideles nostram fidem dare licentiam violandi iura gentium, imo et ius naturae, occu-pando res alienas, invitis dominis, et inferendo bellum sine titulo iusto. Unde duriores etiam fient, et magis indispositi ad fidem suscipiendam; non est ergo licitus ille modus introducendi praedicationem fidei.

35 Defensio fidei Catholicae et apostolicae adversus Anglicanae sectae errores, lib. 3, cap. 3, n. 13 [24: 216]: eo ipso quod homines in corpus unius civitatis vel reipublicae congregantur, sine interventu alicuius creatae voluntatis resul-tat in illa communiresul-tate talis potestas, cum tanta necessiresul-tate, ut non possit per voluntatem humanam impediri; signum proinde est esse immediate a Deo, interveniente solum illa naturali resultantia seu consecutione ex natura et dic-tamine rationis naturalis...

between democracy as a spontaneous quasi-natural (pre-political) in-stitution, and as a structured and positive one. If the question

is understood of the positive institution, the conclusion [that de-mocracy is divinely instituted] must be denied. If it is understood of the quasi-natural institution, it can and ought to be admitted without any inconvenience... Monarchy and aristocracy could not have been introduced without a positive divine or human institu-tion, because natural reason alone does not determine that any of the types of government referred to are necessary... Therefore since, in human nature considered in itself, apart from faith or divine rev-elation, a positive institution has no place, it must necessarily be concluded of those two types [monarchy and aristocracy], that they are not immediately from God. But democracy can exist without positive institution, and only from natural institution or develop-ment, with the sole negation of a new and positive institution, be-cause natural reason itself declares that the supreme political power naturally flows from an autonomous human community, unless it is transferred to another person through a new institution.³⁶

There indeed exists a positive institution divinely founded, the papa-cy: a clear difference obtains between its supernatural authority and the temporal authority of the state, which in its positive form is not of divine origin, but derives from the people.

However, once the people, exercising its liberty, has used its power to transfer authority to a monarch (or to an aristocratic body), this people

36 Defensio fidei Catholicae et apostolicae adversus Anglicanae sectae errores, lib. 3, cap. 2, n. 8 [24: 209]: si hoc intelligatur de institutione positiva, negan-dam esse consecutionem; si vero intelligatur de institutione quasi naturali, sine ullo inconveniente admitti posse et debere... monarchia et aristocratia introduci non potuerunt sine positiva institutione divina vel humana, quia sola naturalis ratio nude sumpta non determinat aliquam ex dictis speciebus ut necessariam... unde, cum in humana natura, per se spectata absque fide seu revelatione divina, non habeat locum positiva institutio, de illis speciebus necessario concluditur, non esse immediate a Deo. At vero democratia esse posset absque institutione positiva, ex sola naturali institutione seu dima-natione, cum sola negatione novae seu positivae institutionis, quia ipsa ratio naturalis dictat, potestatem politicam supremam naturaliter sequi ex huma-na communitate perfecta, et ex vi eiusdem rationis ad totam communitatem pertinere, nisi per novam institutionem in alium transferatur...

will not with justice, basing itself on that same power, and without the decision of an arbiter, arrogate to itself that liberty as often as it pleases. For if it conceded its power to the king, and which he ac-cepted, by that very fact the king acquired his authority. Therefore although the king received that authority by donation or by con-tract from the people, it will neither be right for the people to take it away from the king, nor to take possession of its liberty again.³⁷ But if the king acts tyrannically, Suárez admits of a right to revolution, that is, the right of the people to wage a just war against their king. As the Doctor states it:

the war of the state against the ruler, even if it be aggressive, is not intrinsically evil, but it must have the conditions of a just war to be honorable. The conclusion is only justified when the ruler is a tyrant... [then] the entire state, and any of its members, has a right against him. Hence any one can liberate the state from tyranny. The reason is, because the tyrant is an aggressor, and unfairly wages war against the state and its individual members; so to all belongs the right of defense... The whole state is above the king, for since it was the one which gave him his authority, it is assumed to have given it on the condition that he would rule in a statesmanlike and not tyrannical manner, else it could depose him.³⁸

37 Defensio fidei Catholicae et apostolicae adversus Anglicanae sectae errores, lib. 3, cap. 3, n. 2 [24: 213]: postquam populus suam potestatem in regem transtulit, non potest iuste, eadem potestate fretus, suo arbitrio, seu quo-ties voluerit, se in libertatem vendicare. Nam si potestatem suam regi con-cessit, quam ille acceptavit, eo ipso rex dominium acquisivit; ergo quamvis rex habuerit a populo illud dominium per donationem vel contractum, non ideo licebit populo dominium illud regis auferre, nec libertatem suam iterum usurpare.

38 De charitate, disp. 13, sect. 8, n. 2 [12: 759]: bellum reipublicae contra principem, etiamsi sit aggressivum, non est intrinsece malum; habere tamen debet conditiones iusti alias belli, ut honestetur. Conclusio solum habet lo-cum, quando princeps est tyrannus... [tunc] tota respublica, et quodlibet eius membrum ius habet contra illum: unde quilibet potest se ac rempublicam a tyrannide vendicare. Ratio est, quia tyrannus ille aggressor est, et inique bellum movet contra rempublicam, et singula membra eius; unde omnibus competit ius defensionis... tota respublica superior est rege; nam cum ipsa dederit illi potestatem, ea conditione dedisse censetur, ut politice, non tyran-nice regeret, alias ab ipsa posse deponi.

We can speculate that words such as these, directly or indirectly, in-spired the five revolutions we mentioned in the Prologue: the Portu-guese (1640), English(1688), American (1776), French (1789) and Mexican (1810).