ANEXOS ü ANEXO 1:

The findings have demonstrated that although there is a large number of newspapers and TV stations available in Kazakhstan in Russian, Kazakh and English languages, all forms of media, including the social one, are still heavily monitored, censored and in many cases self-censored. This is despite Nazarbayev clearly stating that “Kazakhstan is firmly set on becoming a Western-style democracy” (Lillis, 2013). In addition, his European colleagues agree with such statement by “continually supporting the implementation of further reforms to strengthen democracy in Kazakhstan” (Kazakhstan, 2015). The Nazarbayev administration insists it is committed to upholding democracy and human rights. Yet, long before the post-Zhanaozen crackdown, detractors noted democratic shortcomings, pointing out that Kazakhstan has never held an election judged free and fair by credible international observers and that is parliament contains no genuine opposition parties (Idrissov, 2012; Lillis, 2011) Although Erlan Idrissov, Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister, claimed (Idrissov, 2012) that during the investigations of the uprising in Zhanaozen, the government and its bodies strived to meet the highest international standards by allowing NGOs, foreign media and observes to visit Zhanaozen, findings of this thesis state otherwise. The alterative trip organized by the representatives of the Kazakhstani blogosphere not loyal to the government was done for this very reason: lack of information and ability to access information about and from Zhanaozen. In fact, the journalists of the opposition-led media and of Novaya Gazeta stated the same. Elena Kostyuchenko of Novaya Gazeta, was one of the first journalists to cover the aftermaths in Zhanaozen, but was then asked to leave the town. This, in turn, has led to all news generators online to cover events from different perspectives and frame them accordingly.

Although the literature review of the previously conducted research demonstrated that a number of scholars believe in new opportunities created by the online public

sphere, the extent of online participation in Kazakhstan during the Zhanaozen uprising was not as great was it was in the countries of the Arab Spring movement or Ukraine and Georgia. However, as the ideas, news and information get to travel the world in seconds, crossing the nation borders in no time, Kazakhstani bloggers did have some impact on political participation. Indeed, it was enough to provoke a response by the Kazakhstani government that sought to organize a group of pro-governmental bloggers to cover the events in Zhanaozen indicating that the state was taking notice of what was happening online and was aware of the need to not simply cut off information flow from the city but negotiate or as others might say manipulate even in a limited way the online space. This was done as an alternative to the rest of the blogosphere who opposed the government and whose reports were at times blocked by state’s “just-in-time” censorship techniques. Such techniques are used by authoritarian states to control the content citizens create as well as get access to. One could say that this was very similar to techniques applied by the Chinese government in which people are hired to comment positively online on behalf of the ruling regime. Furthermore, research findings also indicated that the impact of such political participation could have been greater if it was not for the low Internet penetration rate amongst Kazakhstanis, and in the western part of the country in particular. This raises the issue of the digital divide and political participation.

Although the ‘bloody bloggers’ travelled to Zhanaozen with a pre-defined agenda there appeared to be some strong similarities around the framing of the events in Zhanaozen by Kazakhstani online community, regardless of which side they represented. As stated in the Findings chapter of this thesis, the majority of all messages posted on the two blogging platforms discussed the riots through the prism of socio-economic issues, both in the country and in the region. Not only did Nazarbayev’s daughter, Dariga, a very influential political figure in the country, shared the same opinion about the roots of the conflict, so did Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister, Erlan Idrissov. In a messages, posted on the first anniversary of the bloody events in Zhanaozen, Idrissov stated that as a result of the conflict, new investments have been made in homes, kindergartens and hospitals with hundreds of new permanent jobs created for doctors and teachers. He also stated that the conflict acted as a major

shake-up, too, of local government so that now it is more responsive to the concerns and priorities of the local community (Idrissov, 2012). In addition, Idrissov (2012) stated, the problems exposed were not restricted to Zhanaozen of the Mangistau region but were more widespread and common in those towns dependent on a single industry or company.

The bloggers might have framed the events in Zhanaozen similarly, but one of the most unexpected findings highlighted the problems around national and ethnic identity and ethnic return migration in Kazakhstan. When trying to identify reasons behind the bloody events in Zhanaozen, the bloody bloggers were quick to blame the Oralmans who seemed to have become the ‘scapegoat’ in this case. The notion of “them” and “us” was created, which was noticed and then addressed not only by the government and city officials, but also by the President of Kazakhstan himself. On the contrary, the free bloggers as well as a number of other bloggers referred to the existing social and economic conditions of the regions. Some members of the Kazakhstani government, including the Foreign Minister, have also supported this view. In other words, what occurred in Zhanaozen is a reflection of what is currently happening in the country.