Although both countries had rich left wing political traditions and were faced with a difficult socio-economic transition, which was fertile ground for the emergence of left wing parties, the socio-economic left remained scarcely populated. However, it is important to note that almost all parties in these countries expressed some leftist socio-economic stances in their programmatic documents; an economic left-right division was not clear-cut and was rather subsumed by other dominant cleavages (related to identity and statehood
issues). Nevertheless, the Democratic Party and the Socialist Party of Serbia were the only relevant parties that could be categorised as socio-democratic in Serbia, despite the emergence of a number of small, non-parliamentary parties that claimed to be social-democratic, but which rapidly vanished over the years (the Social Democratic Union, Social Democratic Party of Serbia, and Social Democratic Alliance). On the other hand, the Social Democratic Party of Croatia was the uncontested major left-wing political force in that country. All three parties may be seen as close to the left socio-economic as well as the modernism pole, since the 2008 reorientation of the Socialist Party of Serbia.
The Democratic Party was founded in 1990 as a liberal centre-right party whose programme was based on the concept of a liberal market economy and economic freedoms. The party was in favour of full liberalisation of the economy, which included the elimination of all restrictions on private initiatives as well as the unrestrained development of markets for goods, with a minimal role for the state (Vukomanović 2007).
Vukomanović (2007) also noted that it was the only relevant party in Serbia that explicitly mentioned capitalism as a political goal, given that its 1992 programme stated the party as being for real capitalism, with wide participation of citizens. However, after coming to power in 2000, the then-party leader, Zoran Djindjić, decided to strategically shift the party’s ideological basis and adopted social democratic principles. EPP’s MEP, Doris Pack (Interview 2011), a close friend of Djindjić, claimed in an interview that this party changed ideology because Djindjić wanted to join the Party of European Socialists due to the fact that this was the strongest grouping in the European Parliament. Senior party official Zoran Alimpić (Interview 2011) revealed in an interview that Djindjić’ s decision to apply for membership in the Social International and the Party of European Socialists came as a surprise even to senior party officials. Stojiljković (2011), on the other hand, argued that the party’s ideological reorientation was a result of the calculation that the left political spectrum was unoccupied by a strong, relevant social-democratic party (given the nationalist political legacy of the then-unreformed Socialist Party of Serbia, which claimed that position) and that the party could expand its political influence as well as integrate many unconsolidated parties of the centre-left.
This ideological transformation was not reflected in party programmes which did not contain elaborated social democratic principles. The 2001 party programme, interestingly, stated that the Democratic Party was a flexible party of principles rather than of ideology, as well as a party interested in results rather than ideological orthodoxy (DS 2001).
However, in its later documents, this party included more social-democratic content. In its 2007 election manifesto (DS 2007), for example, the party argued that it intended to develop a market economy, but also a socially responsible state, and that it would fight against ‘wild capitalism’ and misuse of the market. It also advocated ‘a new social contract’
in line with modern social-democratic tendencies, although without elaborating its content.
The party’s stances on socio-economic issues thus became more embedded in social democratic principles over the years. On the other hand, this party never emphasised national issues (unlike the majority of Serbian parties) and it had consistently moderate and rather liberal stances on identity and statehood issues.
However, it is questionable whether this ideological transformation was completed. Vujačić (2007) argued that the Democratic Party remained close to the liberal family despite its intentions to be social democratic. Moreover, a majority of the party’s electorate, including party members, did not associate the Democratic Party with the social democratic option, although it strove to have a key position on the moderate left of the political spectrum since 2000 (Stojiljković, 2007). Stojiljković (2011, p.93) pointed out that the Democratic Party was an example of ‘a centre party with highly pragmatic and problematic orientation, which abandoned the principle of explicit and precise positioning on the left-right continuum’. Goati (2009, p.284) also claimed that the Democratic Party, judging by its policy, was safely close to the liberal family, but its intentions were with the social-democratic family. The Democratic Party thus largely abandoned its liberal political legacy and aimed to become a fully-fledged member of the social democratic family. It can be therefore best characterised as a social democratic party with a very significant liberal legacy.
The Socialist Party of Serbia was founded in 1990 as the successor of the Serbian League of Communists. Given its pronounced nationalist rhetoric and policies throughout the 1990s, this communist-successor party might have been categorised in Siaroff’s (2000, p.14) words as ‘the left-centre national populist party’. Siaroff argued that this type of parties had been positioned left of the socio-economic centre, but what was key was their strong populist nationalism. Mudde (2007) specifically noted that the Socialist Party of Serbia had pronounced ‘social populist ideology’, and argued this party seemed better classified as
‘radical opportunist’, rather than ‘radical nationalist’.
Following the death of its long-term authoritarian leader, SlobodanMilošević, the Socialist Party of Serbia embarked on a gradual ideological transformation in the mid-2000s in terms of its position on both the socio-economic left-right and the cosmopolitanism-nationalism dimensions. Specifically, this party expressed an ideological suspicion towards private property and privatisation throughout the 1990s. It perceived the privatisation of public property as general extortion and theft, and it gave up opposing this privatisation only in its 2003 programme. However, even the 2003 programmatic declaration pointed out that the Socialists were against total privatisation and in favour of the strengthening and preservation of the public sector (Vukomanović 2007). At the same time, its 2006 programmatic declaration objected to the results of ‘the October 2000 capitalist counter-revolution’, since ‘the Socialists saved Serbia from the transition, while those who came to power afterwards created dramatic social gaps’ (SPS 2006, p.3). The declaration also praised the achievements of ‘one of the most important statesman of the twentieth century, Slobodan Milošević’ (SPS 2006, p.2).
The Socialists were also anti-globalists and, in the mid-2000s, still expressed Eurosceptic sentiments. They specifically believed that ‘every nation and every man has the right to develop freely in accordance with their traditions and needs, so the Socialists refuse to support those who impose their own beliefs and way of life by using weapons and political violence’ (SPS 2006, p.9), which was an obvious reference to the Western countries and their policies towards Serbia over the last two decades. The party also shared rather traditional and conservative views since it was ‘firmly against the cultural and spiritual degradation as a result of unconditional acceptance of the values that come from abroad.
Cultivation and preservation of the Serbian language and Cyrillic script should be of the utmost consideration of the national institutions’ (SPS 2006, p.9).
One of the most remarkable developments in Serbian party politics was the Socialists’
ideological transformation after 2008, when it helped form a pro-European government with the Democratic Party. The party underwent a substantial, although strategically driven, ideological reorientation in an effort to position itself as a modern, European, social-democratic party, both in relation to socio-economic and identity issues. The 2010 party programme was a reflection of such an intention, and represented a radical break with the previous ideology. It explicitly stated that the Socialists remembered their mistakes, authoritarian rule, economic failures and persecution of political opponents, and that the new generation should know the full truth about the party’s past (SPS 2010). The
reoriented party, however, stood for ‘a democratic political culture and a spirit of tolerance, open and constructive discussion and dialogue’, respect for different ideas, the rights and interests of minorities and a secular state (SPS 2010). The party’s vice president, Dijana Vukomanović (Interview 2011), argued in an interview that the party was in favour of a socially responsible market economy, social justice and equality, an emphasis on individual interests, as well as the strengthening of partnerships with trade unions, NGOs and civil society. It also opposed centralisation and state control of the economy, arguing, ‘private property has historically proved its economic and social sustainability and efficiency’, and therefore supported the process of privatisation (SPS 2010). In summary, the Socialist Party of Serbia can be classified as a party that belonged to a social-democratic family after 2008, since its programme and (somewhat its) policies were based on socio-democratic values. Additionally, its nationalistic populism, as defined by Siaroff (2000) and Mudde (2007), vanished both from party documents and rhetoric, but also from the policies this party has pursued since 2008 (and particularly since 2012 general election).
Finally, the Social Democratic Party of Croatia, founded in 1990, was the legal successor of the Croatian League of Communists. As a post-communist successor party, it underwent rapid ideological transformation in the early 1990s and has since been a consistent advocate of the social-democratic values that permeated the party’s programmatic documents and rhetoric, as expressed by all interviewed senior officials (Vrbat, Interview 2011; Lugarić, Interview 2011; Mondekar, Interview 2011). In the early 2000s, the party started identifying itself with the values of ‘the European third way social democracy’, understood as ‘a path towards the post-modern society based on sustainable growth, new technologies, pluralism of values and interests, underlying social justice and concern for human rights’ (SDP, 2004). The party also stood for ‘a social Croatia’ based on the affirmation of work and creativity, appreciation of the role of capital, but also a high degree of solidarity with the weakest in a society (SDP 2004). Its 2004 political declaration (SDP 2004) stated, ‘social democracy is a historical choice’ of this party, since it was against political authoritarianism, backward conservatism and isolationism, while being in favour of political equality, social justice and a modern, European Croatia (SDP 2004). Its 2007 election manifesto stated that this party strove for the promotion of entrepreneurship, but also
‘responsibility of ownership, public health service, a society that takes care of the weak and unprotected, as well as consideration and respect for the human differences that enrich a society’ (SDP 2007a). This party is therefore characterised as a social democratic party
with the most consistent and elaborated social democratic ideology of any in the two cases examined.