Antecedentes Históricos

A local social science researcher commented to me that under the socialist planned economy until the late 1970s "food, accommodation, household registration, child bearing, school attended, employment, work done and salary were all decided by the state - there was no other way (meiyou qita chulu). What each person could do or obtain was more or less the same." Other informants described pre-reform Shanghai as ninggu - congealed or coagulated - and its economy as si - dead. Similarly, Parish and Whyte depict early to mid-1970s urban China as characterized by residential stability and "extreme bureaucratization and equality" (1984: 6). Writing on Cultural Revolution Shanghai, Lynn White concluded that [t]he daily lives o f many Shanghai citizens are largely determined by political decisions" (1978: 11). Gaige kaifang is designed to unblock restrictions, open up new channels and enliven (bianhuo) the economy. By 1994, it had begun to make changes in each o f the sectors mentioned.

An opened door suggests the possibility for both ingress and egress, and to be able to both gaze out and be gazed upon. The sluice gate metaphor seems especially appropriate since it suggests a build up o f pressure, with a powerful inflow, followed, perhaps, by some backwash. In this section I follow through and investigate indigenous notions o f such movement. A particular concern is to highlight those areas o f "slippage"

where new channels have formed or seepage has permeated established courses.

1.3.1 Information

Elisabeth Croll describes the former "revolutionary enclosure" in the Chinese countryside with a "scarcity o f information" and a singular, vertical channel o f information and a single line o f authority (1994: 118-20). Although it was harder to enforce such controls in a city like Shanghai, information flow was still highly restricted and access to it "highly stratified" (Parish & Whyte 1984: 299). During the 1950s media were centralized (see Nathan 1986: 153). Broadcasting was regarded primarily as a political tool - the PLA were stationed outside media centres and broadcasters read from censored statements. The arts generally were officially intended to serve politics and the Communist Party. A high level o f surveillance and fear o f repercussions prevented the voicing o f many complaints. Parish and Whyte found that "[m]ost residents simply remained in the dark about what was really going on in their country" (1984: 295).

An early "flow" was the grumbling, complaining and muttering o f the populace,

a simmering discontent which bubbled to the surface towards the end o f the Cultural Revolution. Such weapons o f the weak (cf. Scott 1990) like "water constantly dripping wears holes in stone" (di shui c h u a n shi). At this time many people began to "abandon their former trust in the paternalistic benevolence o f the system" (Whyte 1992: 86). My findings support those o f Martin Whyte who argues that "the reemergence o f a civil society was set in motion by developments in the late Mao era" (85). These murmurings became magnified after the death o f Mao and, in particular, once criticism o f the Gang o f Four was allowed and it was admitted that Mao had shortcomings much suppressed anger came out. One intellectual recalled that "the cursing o f the whole nation burst forth like a tidal wave." It appears that the sea-wall o f Communist Party power could not resist the "tide" o f popular grumbling and complaining at the end o f the Cultural Revolution.

In losing its moral authority the Communist Party seems to have lost some o f its ability to control the populace - it had no other choice but to permit this freedom to speak.

By the late 1970s there was a "much greater degree o f openness among the Chinese people today than a decade ago" (Parish & Whyte 1984: 298). As with the changes in economic policy noted above, it seems that this new freedom did not flow from any liberal sentiments on the regime’s part but, rather, was indicative and constitutive o f a loss o f state control over popular practices. People were able to voice grievances (fa laosao) and this reduced the degree o f "mental pressure" (sixiang yali) felt by many in the Maoist era. I frequently heard complaints being made by people in semi­

public contexts such as crowded buses or restaurants which formerly could only have been voiced, if at all, to the most trusted o f intimates. As one man expressed it "before one could not complain, one dare not speak. Now I have liberation (jiefang). The wall (qiang) o f the past has gone." It is notable that here the term jiefang is used not to describe a social release but an individual emancipation.

During the reform period there has been a significant depoliticization o f everyday life. This includes a reduction o f controls over the media which has allowed a proliferation o f magazines, music, television and radio programmes with a much greater range o f styles and them es.25 During 1992-3, for example, live television and radio phone-in programmes became extremely popular (liuxing - "flow" and "prevail/be current"). Topics I heard discussed included consumer rights, sexual fulfilment and

2SOn the proliferation o f popular m edia in C hina see B ish o p 1989, C hang 1989, C row thall 1988-9, Evans 1989, Fitzgerald 1984, H ow k in s 1982, Kraus 1989, 1995, Landsberger 1 9 8 5 -6 , P ic k o w ic z 1995, W om ack 1986.

redundancy. A local theatre director remarked to me that such changes were a significant departure from the past when there was "only the voice o f the government". An interesting aspect o f the popularity o f live programmes was that the local dialect was heard more frequently on local media - another type o f "voice". For a few days in May 1989 "the dike o f censorship itself seemed to have been washed away" (Faison 1990:

147). In particular, from May 13-19 the "media’s detailed and sympathetic reporting rivetted attention on the drama o f the hunger strikers" (Walder 1989: 38).26 Following through the watery, irrigation metaphor and bearing in mind that the Chinese term for broadcasting "bo" also means "sow, seed" one may see gaige kaifang as bringing life to many new shoots.

The proliferation o f media is bound up with the commercialization o f the economy and the "emergence o f a cultural market" (Kraus 1995: 177). John Fitzgerald (1984) observes the commercialisation o f a "significant portion o f the cultural network in China"

(105), with "the market place now calling the tune" (114). Rather than promote Party messages the popular media, which is increasingly dependent upon advertising revenues, must produce items which appeal to consumer tastes. Within the freer media environment it is harder for the state to prevent the appearance o f critical items. Censorship controls prevent blatant criticisms o f the regime, but newspaper articles and television programmes may tang tsa bi dziu/da ca bian qiu an expression derived from ping-pong which describes when a ball glances off the edge o f the table. One informant likened the increasing frequency with which such items now appear as like a bowl with a leak (loudong).

The flow o f information in China in the form o f talk and a liberalization o f the media has been greatly fostered by the opening o f China’s national door.27 A retired man told me that in the Maoist era there "was a news blockade (xinwen fengsuo) and foreign broadcasts were jammed, so we did not know what the outside world was like.

Only the higher levels (shangci) had access to foreign media." Another informant told me "Mao Zedong had a closed door policy. Deng Xiaoping threw open the window and let the wind in. People could see what the West was like." As noted above, the term for

"wind" - feng - has a range o f meanings including "news, information" and "style,

26Four years later on e inform ant recalled th ese few days o f press freedom w ith a d istinct sen se o f nostalgia. P u b lication s at this tim e indicate what a free and "open" C h in ese m edia w o u ld look like.

27The increasing re-in tem ation alization o f Shanghai and the increased p erm eab ility o f th e c ity ’s boundaries are addressed m ore fu lly in the fo llo w in g chapter.

practice, custom". A 38 year old saleswoman made a direct link between changing values and ideas and the "opening" o f China’s "door". She told me that "previously people’s thinking was conservative and closed up. Mao Zedong did not allow us to see the outside world, we were blind (mangmu). When the door opened, we saw the discrepancy [with the West] and could not bear it."

Through the "open door" has flowed information and "strange tales from over the seas" (haiwai qitan). Local people are, for instance, now free to tune-in to the BBC World Service and the Voice o f America and other broadcasts which drift in on foreign air-waves (sic). Television (dianshi - "electronic vision") enables people to gaze upon other people and places from their own living rooms and provides the main channel for images o f other countries. Having been told for years that China was outstripping the capitalist West and hearing only o f the sufferings o f those in capitalist countries, people were often truly surprised by what they saw. A local economics professor commented that "until gaige kaifang Shanghai was regarded as the most modern (xianjin) city in China. After gaige kaifang it was revealed as backward." The makers o f Heshang also remarked upon this noting that "[t]en years ago, when we finally opened our closed bamboo curtain and once again rejoined the world, the Chinese people—who for so long had lived in the hardship o f ‘transitional poverty’ and the isolation o f cultural despotism—

were surprised to discover just how developed the capitalist West and Japan were and how comfortably their people lived" (Su & Wang 1991: 162).

A teacher felt that an important reason students demonstrated in 1989 were changes caused by gaige kaifang. In the past they had not seen or even heard about the outside world. With gaige kaifang they could compare with the rest o f the world and see China’s true state. In addition, the "open door" allowed the outside world to gaze upon China.

This dialectic was evident during the demonstrations when many students carried banners in English obviously designed for consumption abroad (see chapter 2). Since 1989, the state has continued to actively promote the "Open Door" policy. On June 9, 1989, during his congratulatory speech to army commanders who had suppressed demonstrations in Beijing, Deng Xiaoping stated that "[w]hat is important is that we should never change China back into a closed country" (cited in Rai 1991: 123). The official objectives for Shanghai by 2010 are to "achieve an international scale and breadth o f economic development. Create a modern city o f the first order in world terms. Create a society that is open and outward looking with respect to China and the world" (Zhao 1993: 2).

Such slogans may be regarded as unleashing and fostering expectations for the

future. Those who expect Shanghai to develop rapidly and successfully point to factors such as its well trained workforce, favourable geographic location and the state’s support for its development - one view was that the government wants to develop Shanghai at the expense o f Hong Kong. A young businessman told me that he expects Shanghai will reach a similar level to New York and was confident that, at the very minimum, it will surpass Hong Kong within ten years. A retired teacher commented, ’’Napoleon called China a sleeping lion, it is now awakening. Once fully awake, the world will not be able to look down on this race (minzu)." He noted the size o f China’s market adding that

"now America gives China special economic status, in five years time it will be the other way round." His expectation, voiced using terms (ironically) reminiscent o f many Orientalist views o f China, is that the outside world will be able to gaze upon a newly assertive, rich and powerful China.

1.3.2 Flows o f Capital

Many Shanghainese complained about the lack o f infrastructural work carried out in the city in the decades after 1949. Until the 1980s there was no new architecture to compare with the early twentieth century colonial structures on the Bund. One woman described how her uncle had left Shanghai and gone to Hong Kong in 1949. When he next returned in 1979 he found Shanghai "exactly the same, except that everything was older than before." On his most recent visit, in 1993, he noticed distinct changes and his niece commented that this redevelopment "gives people a feeling o f newness." When asked what changes gaige kaifang had brought, local residents often responded by pointing to changes in the city’s outward appearance (waiguan) or "face" (mianmao).

In the mid-1980s the construction o f such buildings as the Hilton Hotel and Union Building and the modern architecture o f the new Hongqiao development zone near the airport were obvious signs o f change. More recently, the development o f Pudong, the construction o f the Nanpu and Yangpu bridges - now attractions on all tourist itineraries - numerous hotels, share dealing centres, commercial entertainment centres, new roads and the underground were all visible markers o f change.

These changes are due in part to a greater retention o f profits made in the city. In 1985 the amount o f tax revenues retained in the city increased from 13.2% to 23.2%

(Jacobs & Hong 1994: 231). There has also been a significant inflow o f domestic and foreign capital. A Wenhui Bao article stated that "[nineties Shanghai, has opened wide (changkai damen) its great door, and welcomes investors from every country to come and

invest in Shanghai... Shanghai is now deepening reform (shenhua gaige), and enlarging the Open Door (kuoda kaifang)... Shanghai is in a period o f development, it is extremely bustling (renao) and flourishing (xingwang)."28 In 1992, for instance, Shanghai introduced US $3.35 billion in foreign investment, equal to the total o f the previous twelve years.29 With the "[d]oor opening wide on the real estate market" land prices in Shanghai have rocketed.30 In 1993, the 460 metre high Shanghai Radio and Television Tower on the east side o f the Huangpu River was completed. It is in keeping with the sustained watery metaphors noted in this chapter that this structure which "is set to become a new symbol o f Shanghai" should be described as "The Oriental Pearl".31

Despite such visible changes in Shanghai’s appearance not all residents were content. A magazine editor commented to me that "with gaige kaifang there appear to have been many changes. For instance, there are many tall buildings. But for salaried laobaixing like me they are too expensive, we cannot afford them. They might as well not be there." A similar view was expressed by a local journalist who asked rhetorically,

"when it comes down to it, where has there been change?" Answering his own question he continued, "the Communist Party likes superficialities (gao biaomian wenzhang).

The laobaixing want larger homes and wider roads. Instead what gets built are big, expensive buildings for foreigners to live in."

1.3.3 Flow o f People International

The tide o f news and information was soon followed by products and people.

Opening China’s door has allowed a flow o f people into and out o f the country. A Confucian saying describes an option when one’s path is blocked: "If the way is not accepted, get on a boat and take to the seas" (dao bu xing, cheng cha fu yu hai). A

"going abroad craze" (chuguore) began in the early 1980s with "large numbers o f talented people turbulently flowing out o f the national door (xiongyongpengpai de liu chu guomen)."32 In addition to citizens sent abroad by the Chinese government for study

:8W H B 2 6 M ay 1993: 1.

:;C D 6 July 1993: 4.

" C D 2 8 April 1993: 1.

3'C D 15 N ovem b er 1993: 5.

3: "‘C h u g u o r e ’ J i a n g W e n Le!" ( ‘G oin g Abroad C raze’ C o o ls!) JFRB 2 9 O ctober 1993.

and training, better educated young Shanghainese seek scholarships in America, Australia and Western Europe, and other emigrants go abroad to work (dagong), often in Japan.33 One commentator described this behaviour to me using a traditional proverb: water runs to low places, people move toward high places (shui wang dichu liu, ren wang gaochu zou). There is considerable evidence o f a "brain drain". Many o f Shanghai’s most able intellectuals, especially university and scientific staff aged between 30-40 have gone abroad. Some seek to marry foreigners to go abroad, a few simply using them as a

"spring board" (tiaoban) to leave China. Sometimes the wish is to obtain a foreign passport since, as one young businesswoman told me, "it is difficult to predict (yuce) what will happen when Deng Xiaoping dies. Having a foreign passport is a kind o f insurance."

A Jiefang Ribao article described Shanghai in 1992-3 as like Taiwan in the 1970s - since 1992 the "going abroad craze" appeared to have been "cooling" with fewer people leaving and "an irresistible tide returning to China" (bu ke zudang de guiguochao).34 This shift was trumpeted as indicative o f the "excellent opportunities" brought by the "continuing deepening o f gaige kaifang" in Shanghai. For instance, young people may have the "wild ambition...unthinkable a few years ago of...oneself being a boss" (ziji zuo laoban).35 This article may overstate the case somewhat but amongst young people I encountered this trend was borne out.

Businessmen, teachers, students and tourists have increasingly flooded into the city.

In the first nine months o f 1993, 908,000 overseas visitors came to Shanghai. O f these 605,969 were foreigners, 165,891 from Taiwan, and 123,153 from Hong Kong and M acao /6 A saleswoman commented that "recently many foreign businessmen (waisheng) come to Shanghai. Shanghai is returning to how it was in the 1940s, a shi li yangchang (a metropolis infested with foreign adventurers - usually referring to pre­

liberation Shanghai CED 1988: 800). There is now an international feel (guoji de ganjue)." Foreign made products were tangible evidence o f China’s new direction, whether it be Japanese cars and electrical equipment, American toothbrushes or British cosmetics. As one man pointed out "at the worst time, in the Cultural Revolution, I dared not have any foreign things visible in my home. Recently there have been many changes,

” S ee H ooper 1985 Chapter 9 "Tem ptations from the West".

’■’S ee fo o tn o te 32.

"Ibid.

3bSS 5 N o v e m b e r 1993: 4.

often o f 180 degrees. For example, in the past American things were described as especially bad, now even the smallest shop likes to stick up a sign saying ‘China-US Joint V enture’."

Intra-National Flow

During the reform era the city boundaries have become much more permeable.

One notable effect is that "a ‘Southern window wind (nanchuang feng)’ has already blown into Shanghai."37 This "wind" takes the form o f cultural influences from Guangdong and Hong Kong including music, food and linguistic expressions. A particularly significant flow is that o f migrant workers from other parts o f China (see White 1994). This has been made possible by the end o f rationing and the reduced effectiveness o f the household registration system. An article in W enhui Bao reported that "[w]ith the increased dynamic development o f Pudong and Shanghai’s current great strides (bumai) towards being an internationalized great metropolis, for the second time in Shanghai’s history there is a rush o f great fervour (rechao - literally a "hot wave") towards ‘Shanghai beach’". By 1993, Shanghai’s floating population (liudong renkou) had already surpassed 2.5 million.38 This article noted that o f this "floating population"

500.000 were construction workers and that Shanghai has plans to implement a "green card" (luka) system for such people. A 1994 report suggested that the figure had already reached 3.3 million.39 According to Shanghai’s Mayor, Huang Ju, by the year 2010, the city will have a population o f 19 to 20 million, including a 5 to 6 million floating population.40

A Xinmin Wanbao article described migrant workers as a "guerilla force...stealthily entering [Shanghai’s] factories."41 This article noted that around

100.000 female textile factory workers had been made redundant (xiagang) in Shanghai and that they were being replaced by a "tide" o f non-Shanghainese migrant workers (waidi mingong chao) which "blindly flows and surges (mangliu yongru) into this city." The willingness o f these workers to do dirty and unpleasant jobs for low wages is described

37X M W B 5 N o v em b er 1993: 14.

18W H B 13 N o v em b er 1993: 6.

'"Cited in W hite 1994: 86.

4U"City o f Future" SS 2 July 1993: 1.

4l"‘Y o u j i d u i ’ Q i a o q i a o d e J in C h a n g " 22 July 1993: 12.

as presenting a "threat" and a "challenge" to redundant Shanghai women workers getting work again.

1.3.ff Flow W ithin Shanghai

In addition to an increasing topographical flow o f people there was also flow within Shanghai in terms o f greater social mobility and the opening up o f new routes and channels. At the end o f 1978 almost all workers were employed by the state either directly or in collective enterprises. Even in the 1980s state employees generally were

"stuck" both residentially and occupationally (Davis 1990: 87). During the early 1990s, in particular, significant changes in the economic base occurred which allowed a greater range o f choice. Many o f the areas o f life mentioned above as having been regulated are now subject to far fewer restrictions. The informant who described Shanghai as having

"stuck" both residentially and occupationally (Davis 1990: 87). During the early 1990s, in particular, significant changes in the economic base occurred which allowed a greater range o f choice. Many o f the areas o f life mentioned above as having been regulated are now subject to far fewer restrictions. The informant who described Shanghai as having