i
t seems fitting that discussion of the contain- ment option would come last in this survey of U.s. policy options toward iran, because con- tainment is always america’s last policy choice. When a state proves too hostile for engagement or a diplomatic compromise, when it is too strong to be invaded or otherwise attacked, and when it is too repressive to be overthrown, only then does the United states opt to contain it as best it can. to a great extent, containment has been the de- fault U.s. policy toward iran since the islamic rev- olution because Washington failed with the other options—at least to the extent it tried them. carter, reagan, Bush 41, and clinton all attempted to en- gage iran and failed. carter, Bush 41, clinton, and Bush 43 held out the prospect of a diplomatic com- promise of one sort or another without any luck either. clinton and Bush 43 also tried to aid ira- nian oppositionists in the hope of bringing reform to tehran. No american administration has ever employed military force against iran as a deliber- ate policy, although the reagan administration de- ployed the U.s. Navy to the Persian Gulf in 1987- 1988, at the height of the iran-iraq War, to escort Kuwaiti oil tankers. This resulted in several skir- mishes between U.s. and iranian forces, but in the final analysis, these were all provoked by tehran. amid all of these different efforts to engage, nego- tiate with, and even redirect the iranian regime,the constant in U.s. policy toward iran over the past 30 years has been containment. Through- out this period, none of the other policy options gained any purchase with the iranian regime, although, in truth, they were often applied in a ham-fisted or half-hearted manner. as such, the United states and its allies did as much as they could to limit iran’s ability to support violent ex- tremist groups, subvert friendly governments, de- velop weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and otherwise undermine the Middle eastern status quo. The long list of unilateral sanctions applied by the United states against iran from 1979 on- wards was a critical element of that policy (al- though it was also meant to try to change tehran’s behavior). so, too, were U.s. efforts to discourage arms sales, trade, and investment with iran by other countries. except for those moments when Washington was attempting to engage the iranian regime, the United states typically was trying to isolate it—diplomatically, economically, militar- ily, and in every other way conceivable.
The success of containment during this period was uneven. iran today seems a more powerful and disruptive force in the international rela- tions of the Middle east than it has been since the early days of the revolution. Given that contain- ment sought to achieve the opposite, these results alone suggest that containment failed. But as al- ways with iran, there is more to it than that. First,
but its eventual demise seems increasingly likely, and in the near term, political fractiousness con- tributes to its difficulty in taking decisive action abroad.
although iran’s own failings and mistakes have been the most important reason for its internal decline, containment also played a role. it is dif- ficult to ascertain exactly how much the sanctions were responsible for iran’s economic decay, but they played a part, and many iranians believe that they continue to play a major role.77 The sanc-
tions limited iran’s ability to build up its military strength, to become a major economic player, or employ its vast oil and natural gas reserves in the diplomatic realm, and to garner allies willing and able to help it achieve its goals. in short, contain- ment may not have achieved its maximal objec- tives, but it seems to have achieved more than its minimal goals.
For all of these reasons, a policy of containment toward iran is present in the debate like the pro- verbial elephant in the living room. some analysts and experts have suggested that the United states should simply adopt a strengthened form of con- tainment as its policy toward iran. Many others leave it as the unspoken but well understood fall- back option—that if their preferred policy fails or is not adopted, the United states would be left with no choice but to fall back on containment. although we do see containment as a viable fall- back position for the United states, this section examines it by asking the question, “if the United states were to decide to eschew all of the alterna- tives and pursue a deliberate policy of contain- ment toward iran, what would that entail?” iran’s apparent strength across the region is more
a product of american mistakes than its own ac- tual puissance or cleverness. The United states eliminated iran’s two most threatening neigh- bors—saddam husayn in iraq and the taliban in afghanistan—and left power vacuums that allowed the iranians to assert considerable influ- ence where they previously had little. similarly, american missteps in Lebanon, syria, and else- where, as well as in dealing with the Palestinians, have diminished the power and freedom of action of the United states (and its allies) and handed iran apparent victories at little cost.
second, iran’s “strength” is mostly a façade. iran’s armed forces remain relatively weak, with little ability to project power beyond iran’s borders or thwart an israeli or american military opera- tion. Because of this, iran is fortunate that it sim- ply does not face any real conventional military threats other than those from the United states and israel.
But its luck does not extend much further. Politi- cally, the islamic regime seems less and less pop- ular, and increasing numbers of internal fissures appear each year. additionally, its economy is a disaster. With inflation and unemployment soaring, non-oil imports and currency reserves evaporating, worker productivity and oil ex- ports declining, and a government unwilling to take the drastic steps necessary to get out of its current predicament, iran’s future seems dark. since economics underpins all other aspects of national power over the long term, this does not bode well for iran’s role in the region either. The iranian regime could survive for decades more,