II. VALORACIÓN GENERAL
II.3. ANTECEDENTES PERSONALES:
strongly, the employment rate among immigrants from non-Western nations in Sweden was only 48 per cent (Sanandaji 2009). It should be noted that employment in Swedish statistics also includes some people that do not hold a regular occupation, such as those participating in government-financed labour market programmes. De- pendence on government welfare was nine times as high for non-Western immigrants compared with people born in Sweden the same year (Statistics Sweden 2004).
Sweden has thus gone from being a nation which successfully integrated the foreign born into the labour market, to one where many immigrants are trapped in long-term dependency on benefit payments. This change is linked to immigration policy, but also to the general eco- nomic policy. The expansion of the welfare state since the mid twentieth century has created a situation where the incentive to work has been reduced, while the incentive to live off benefit payments has increased. At the same time, regulations and trade union domination of the labour mar- ket impede entry into the workforce. As a consequence, the ability to integrate foreign-born people has significantly worsened (Sanandaji 2009).
Table 13 shows the unemployment rates of immigrants with low education levels compared with native-born indi- viduals. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, immigrants with low education levels have, in fact, the same or lower rates of unemployment compared with natives with similar
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educational backgrounds. In the US the unemployment level is almost 9 percentage points lower for foreign-born compared with natives among those with low education levels. This compares with a rate over 10 percentage points higher in Sweden. In Scandinavian labour markets, even immigrants with high qualifications can struggle to find suitable employment. Highly educated immigrants in Fin- land and Sweden have an unemployment rate over 8 per- centage points higher than native-born Finns and Swedes of similar educational background. In the Anglo-Saxon
Table 13 Unemployment among immigrants in Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries (percentage of labour force in age range 15–64) Unemployment rate of low- educated foreign-born population Difference between unemployment rate of low- educated foreign born and natives Unemployment rate of highly educated foreign-born population Difference between unemployment rate of highly educated foreign born and natives US 14.7 –8.9 06.4 1.4 New Zealand 14.9 –2.3 05.8 1.9 Australia 10.1 –1.0 05.0 2.5 UK 08.6 –0.8 06.4 2.7 Norway 13.2 06.9 04.3 2.8 Canada 16.7 00.3 08.5 3.8 OECD average 16.9 02.7 08.4 4.0 Denmark 15.9 06.2 09.4 5.5 Sweden 26.8 10.3 11.2 8.1 Finland 23.9 08.5 12.4 8.4 Source: OECD (2012b).
countries, the difference ranges from 1.4 percentage points in the US to 2.7 percentage points in the UK.
It is interesting that Denmark, with more liberal labour market policies, has lower foreign-born unemployment than Sweden and Finland. At the same time, the Danish welfare state is not nearly as effective as the UK model in creating opportunities for immigrants. Denmark has rel- atively high effective minimum wages as well as generous benefits. This makes it difficult, and not always lucrative, for immigrants to get a foothold in the labour market (Brücker et al. 2012). Danish researcher Peter Nannestad (2004: 6) writes:
In addition to broad coverage, transfer payments in the Danish welfare state are also quite generous relative to minimum wages in the labour market. Thus the welfare state weakens economic incentives for labour market participation, especially for low-skilled, low-paid, indi- viduals. […] the welfare state may also weaken immi- grants’ incentives to invest in acquiring the necessary preconditions for labour market participation, like mini- mum levels of language and social skills.
In Norway, much unemployment is hidden in early retirement statistics, among native-born Norwegians in general and among immigrants. one study looks at the individuals aged 30–55 who were granted a disability pension at some point between 1992 and 2003. This group includes 11 per cent of men and 16 per cent of women with a Norwegian background. Among immigrants from the
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Middle East and North Africa, the figures were even high- er: 25 per cent among the men and 24 per cent among the women. The authors calculate that: ‘Age-adjusted relative risk of receiving a disability pension was more than three times higher for Middle Eastern/North African males that for ethnic Norwegians’ (Claussen et al. 2012: 260). The fact that a significant share of Norwegians of working age at some point are granted disability pensions, often tempo- rarily of course, strengthens the case that the system to a large degree is used as hidden unemployment.
There is no doubt that a generous welfare system initial- ly helps many immigrant families, cushioning the transi- tion to a new country. However, as long-term dependency grows, it can easily lead to marginalisation. The result is lasting social poverty, as welfare dependency is passed on from parents to children, in neighbourhoods where many adults do not work.