El Problema, Objetivos, Hipótesis y Variables
2.1. Planteamiento del Problema
2.1.2. Antecedentes Teóricos
Future work is suggested as follows.
• In Chapter 3, it would be useful to investigate if the authenticated key exchange protocols can be applied for decentralised marketplaces such as OpenBazaar1. The only guaranteed form of identity for the seller or buyer in these marketplaces is represented in terms of the bitcoin addresses involved in the transaction. Therefore, it is likely that these marketplaces are ideal for relying solely on the blockchain for authenticated and secure end-to-end communication.
• In Chapter 3 and 4, BIP70: Payment Protocol may require further revision before it is suitable for a payment network as there is no guarantee that the bitcoin transaction will be stored in the blockchain. However, the protocol execution transcript of a payment channel should permit any observor to verify that it was executed correctly
7.2 Future work 91
(i.e. dispute-freeness). This might be satisfactory as a basis for linking the bitcoin transaction to messages exchanged during the Payment Protocol.
• In Chapter 5, it appears possible to build an off-chain channel that maintains state (i.e. a state channel). Conceptually, both parties can authorise a third layer on top of Lightning Channels that represents a contract. Both parties can then co-operatively execute this contract off-chain and once the contract reaches its final state both parties can co-operatively reset the channel’s state. This reset will involve updating the lighting channel to effectively invalidate the previous contract while atomically creating a new one.
• In Chapter 6, it is worth attempting to build the Open Vote Network in an Ethereum state channel. All parties can deposit coins into the state channel and perform the self-tallying election off-chain. In the event a single party aborts the off-chain protocol, then the election’s latest state can be broadcast and accepted into the blockchain/voting contract. This triggers a timer that requires the aborted party to continue the protocol before a time-out otherwise their deposit is forfeited. The benefit of this approach is that the blockchain can be used as an arbitrator to enforce that all parties participate in the election while avoiding the expensive gas costs of running the election on-chain.
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