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212 95 ANTICIPOS DE FONDOS A INSTITUCIONES PUBLICAS

Incluye los recursos de disponibilidad inmediata, en moneda de curso legal en el país; tales como los recursos financieros provenientes de

212 95 ANTICIPOS DE FONDOS A INSTITUCIONES PUBLICAS

united national front to the policy of a revolutionary bloc of the workers and petty bourgeoisie', and added

5 8 that this bloc could assume the form of a single party. Exactly what the CCP made of this cryptic remark is not known. However, that Stalin did not have in mind a break with the KMT but continuation of the policy of working with it became apparent when he urged this more directly

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some months later. Even after Chiang Kai-shek's coup in 1927 he continued to stress the 'value and

significance' of the CCP's misguided attempts to win over the 'Left KMT'.60

One of the effects of Maring's and Stalin's advice to the CCP had been for the latter to obtain the

impression that the KMT was to be regarded as a Party containing several classes and not as the representative of one. Stalin was later to deny that he had ever said this and maintained - in a remarkable example of hair­ splitting - that his position had been that the KMT was

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merely the party of a bloc of several classes. However, so far as the evolution of the united front doctrine is concerned the Comintern's advice reinforced a tendency on the part of some CCP leaders to view events in China in terms of a national rather than a class struggle and to draw less sharp distinctions between the Communist Party and its allies than had been the case of Lenin's united front writings. Since in Mao's united front doctrine there is also a universalist tendency to

concentrate on the 'contradiction' between a numerically very small enemy and an overwhelming majority and to downgrade conflict between different sections within the majority, this point deserves further elaboration.

JO ibid. 59

J. Stalin, 'The Prospects of the Revolution in China', Collected Works3 Vol.8, p.383.

60

J. Stalin, 'Questions of the Chinese Revolution', Collected Works> Vol.9, p.23.

fi1

J. Stalin, 'Talk with Students of the Sun Yat-sen University', Collected Works, Vol.9, p. 246.

I some of the Chinese Communists were inclined to view events in China in terms of a national, rather than a class struggle, an additional and more important reason may have been the fact that they had been

nationalists before they were Communists. In certain cases, notably that of Li Ta—chao, co—founder of the Chinese Communist Party, this perception of events was reinforced by a populist tendency to regard 'the people' as a single entity possessed of a collective will.62 Interestingly an official CCP history of the united front actually describes an essentially populist article written by Mao in 1919 (before he became a Communist) calling for a 'great union of the popular masses' as one of the forerunners of the united front.63

Li Ta-chao retained an unorthodox approach to the analysis of Chinese society long after his conversion to Marxism. In 1924 he even went so far as to suggest that racial conflict occupied essentially the same position as class struggle in the determination of world events:

The white peoples (see themselves) as the 2 pioneers of culture in the world; they place themselves in a superior position and look down on other races as inferior. Because of this the race question has become a class question and the races on a world scale have come to confront each other as classes... the struggle between the white and coloured races will occur simultaneously with the class struggle.... Thus it can be seen that the class

struggle between the lower class coloured races and the upper class white race is already in embryonic form and its forward movement has not yet stopped.64

On Li Ta-chao's populism, see M. Meisner, Li Ta-ohao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism, Cambridge, 1967, esp. pp. 73-97, 217-223. Also the same author's article

'Leninism and Maoism - Some Populist Perspectives', China Quarterly, No.45, January-March 1971, pp. 2-36.

63

Li Wei-han, 'The United Front Leads the Chinese People to Victory', Red Flag,No. 11, June 1960. Translated J.P.R.S., 8960.

Li also held the related opinion that because of its inferior status vis-a-vis the rich, white

countries, China could be considered a 'proletarian nation'. This was a considerable distortion of the Comintern distinction between 'oppressed' and

oppressor nations, implying, as it did, the absence of class conflict within China, not to speak of the possible superiority of such 'proletarian nations' over other states, including the Soviet Union. Indeed this was a point of view that had been specifically

criticised by the Comintern when, in the 1920s, it was advanced by Sultan Galiev with reference to the Muslim countries. Galiev in fact had gone one step further than Li Ta-chao by arguing that the Western proletariat would retain a colonialist attitude even after it had won victory in the revolution, in which case the only

solution would be to reverse Marxism and impose a

dictatorship of the 'proletarian nations' of the East over the former colonial powers of the West.65

Mao's United Front Doctrine.

Although the second united front between the KMT the Communists was never guite the orderly,

planned and controlled affair that the CCP was later to claim, it was sufficiently successful for it to be the model for what became, after the revolution, a

front doctrine* . When Mao wrote his various articles, he was normally considering some specific problem of the time and often his emphasis would vary according to the problem or sometimes the particular audience to whom his remarks were addressed — an obvious case being articles aimed at winning support amongst the KMT. However there are enough common themes running through his writings on united fronts to justify the use of the word 'doctrine' here. Mao's united

front doctrine may be conveniently divided into three H. C. D'Encausse and S. R. Schram, Marxism and Asia London, 1969, p p . 35-36.

sections: 'theory', 'strategy' and 'tactics', each of which will be considered in turn.

1. Theory.

The practical importance of the CCP-KMT united f^ont for the Chinese revolution — indicated by its position alongside the CCP and the PLA as one of the three 'magic weapons' of the revolution*^ - is

matched by the ideological significance that Mao

attached to the united front as a concept. The united front to Mao is not simply a useful tactic but

something that approaches the status of a historical law. This emerges most clearly from the way in which Mao integrates the concept into the total ideology of Marxism-Leninism in his principal essay on dialectics,

'On Contradiction'.

In general Mao, in 'On Contradiction', follows Engels' formulation of dialectical laws. His starting point is the Marxist theory of history and nature: nothing is static; all things are involved in a continual process of motion and change. True

comprehension of a particular thing, therefore, has to consist of an understanding of it in its dynamic

aspect - as something that is 'becoming', rather than something that 'is'. Thus it is necessary to understand the basic law governing change, which for Marxists is found in the notion of 'contradiction':

The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external, but internal; it

lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development.67

Mao proceeds to examine four specific aspects of contradictions theory, each of which has important

practical implications, especially wTith regard to Mao's approach to united fronts. The first of these Mao

Li Wei-han, op.cit. 6 7

Mao Tse—tung, 'On Contradiction', Selected Works Volume One, p.313.

terras 'The Particularity of Contradiction'. In this section of his article, Mao attempts to combat what he terms 'dogmatism' - dialectical analysis which takes no account of the specific circumstances of each

'concrete' situation. His main concern is to counter critics of the second united front with the KMT by placing this within a dialectical framework. His

arguments are first that it is necessary to distinguish between different kinds of contradictions:

Every form of motion contains within itself its own particular contradiction. This particular contradiction constitutes the particular essence which distinguishes one thing from another.... Every form of society, every form of ideology, has its own particular contradiction and

particular essence.68

'Qualitatively different contradictions', states Mao, 'can only be resolved by qualitatively different

methods'. This seemingly innocent comment marks the intellectual starting point of Mao's 'sinification' of Marxism in its implication, later spelt out by Mao, that revolutionary situations differ from place to place, and that revolution does not need to follow a

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single path. The'dogmatists ,' Mao states: ...do not observe this principle... on the contrary they invariably adopt what they imagine to be an unalterable

formula and arbitrarily apply it

everywhere, which only causes setbacks to the revolution, or makes a sorry mess of what was originally well done.70

Mao moves even further towards flexibility in the application of dialectics by his assertion that although the form of any fundamental contradiction will not

change until it is resolved, the conditions under which it develops will differ at different stages in time. In addition: ^ i bid. , p .320 69 ibid. p. 322 70 ibid.

Among the numerous major and minor contradictions which are determined or influenced by the fundamental

contradiction, some become intensified, some are temporarily or partially

resolved or mitigated, and some new

ones emerge; hence the process is marked by stages. If people do not pay

attention to the stages in the development of a thing, they cannot deal with its

contradictions properly.7l

Mcio then broaches the political point that is the

purpose of the article - that the united front between the KMT and the CCP can be justified by 'Marxist-Leninist dialectics'. He defines the KMT and the CCP as the

two sides or 'aspects' of a contradiction, and argues that the relationship between the two, while remaining one of underlying antagonism, has not been the same at

stages Oi time as a result of each 'aspect' involved in contradictions with other forces at ^ferent periods. Specifically when both have been opposed to imperialism this has given rise to a

situation where, in one contradiction, that between China and imperialism, the KMT and the CCP have been part of the same 'aspect', while in another, that between the KMT and the 'people', they have been

opposing aspects. The above circumstances, Mao states: ...have resulted now in alliance between

the two parties and now in struggle between them, and even during the periods of

alliance there has been a complicated state of simultaneous alliance and struggle.7^

The next section of Mao's article, headed 'The Principal Contradiction and the Principal Aspect of a Contradiction', develops an idea which was to have a continuing importance in Chinese Communist analyses of both domestic and world politics. On the notion of a

'principal contradiction', Mao writes:

There are many contradictions in the process of development of a complex thing, and one of them is necessarily the principal

contradiction whose existence and development ibid., p .325

determine or influence the existence and development of the other contradictions.73

This leads on to a further justification of the united front, and an elaboration of his earlier argument about the existence of many different contradictions. Mao asserts that:

When imperialism launches a war of aggression against (a semi-colonial country) all its

various classes, except for some traitors can temporarily unite in a national war against imperialism. At such a time the contradiction between imperialism and the country concerned becomes the principal contradiction, while all the contradictions among the various classes within the country... are temporarily

relegated to a secondary and subordinate position.7 4

The last two sections of Mao's article, entitled 'The Identity and Struggle of The Aspects of a

Contradiction', and 'The Place Of Antagonism In

Contradiction', are also attempts to place the united front policy in a dialectical context. Mao states that the two aspects of a contradiction exist in a relationship with each other of both identity (or unity) and

struggle. There is identity because:

...first, the existence of each of the two aspects of a contradiction in the process of the development of a thing presupposes the existence of the other aspect, and both

aspects coexist in a single entity; second, in given conditions, each of the two

contradictory aspects transforms itself into its opposite.75

On the other hand struggle is the basic form of

development for two aspects of a contradiction in the process of transforming themselves into each other.

What Mao is trying to imply is that the 'unity' between the CCP and the KMT can be considered, in a dialectical light, as a normal but temporary development. The key passage in this section is in fact a quotation from Lenin:

ibid., p .331 74 ibid.

The unity (coincidence, identity and

equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The

struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.^6

Mao elaborates on this argument by a further use of Engels' theory that there are nodal points at which a

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