APÉNDICES Apéndice 2 A 9

After summarizing some literature concerning the relationship between Turkey and EUrope, in this part I want to reconstruct the way in which the political elites in EUrope view this relationship. I want to give a first impression of the EUropean debates on a possible Turkish EU-accession. These debates, or rather their contentiousness, are often named as central reasons for Turkey’s limping accession process. The Turkey question was one of the most controversial EU-issues in the last decade. It certainly is the most polarized enlargement debate. The debate is very emotional and there is a strong polarization between supporters and opponents of a Turkish EU-accession. This polarization is obvious at the political and governmental level, which goes hand in hand with strong concerns in wide segments of the EU’s population, as surveys show. Turkey is in this respect, compared to every other potential future EU member state, facing the strongest opposition.

Hence,Eurobarometer 69 comes to following result, after asking about attitudes towards potential EU enlargements (Figure 1: European Commission 2008):

The reasons for these strong public concerns regarding Turkey are often explained by the size and relatively high poverty of the country. Other aspects are – highly dependent on the specific member state – discourses on a history of conflict between Europe and Turkey or the Ottoman Empire, or by those on the Turkish Diaspora in

Europe. In the last few years – at least since 9/11 – the dominant explanatory factor for public anxiety is often seen in Turkey’s predominantly Muslim population. (De Vraese et. al. 2008; McLaren 2007)

The political debate stands in a relationship of mutual dependency with public opinions. It became strongly heated over the course of the ongoing accession process.

Schimmelfennig (2009) summarized some of the governmental positions, at European Councils concerning Turkey’s accession process, in the following table (+

stands for pro-, – for anti-Turkey positions):

(Figure 2: Schimmelfennig 2009: 417, Table 1) According to Schimmelfennig these respective positions proved relatively stable.

Changes in this table were mostly due to governmental changes, and not to processes of policy learning. The table presents positions of actors which were very present and engaged in the debate. It shows a significant decline of support for the Turkish accession process in the latter period. This was mostly due to power changes in Germany and France, where Turkey-skeptic governments came into place. The Turkey debate played a visible role in the election campaigns which preceded those governmental changes, whereby the parties which echoed public doubts on Turkey won.

The Turkey question hence developed into a major issue on EUropean agendas. The debates partly were very intense and brought forward a wide variety of perspectives and arguments. In order to summarize the content of those debates it makes sense to start with one major difference between them. This differentiation is presented by Wimmel (2006), and is about sub-questions of the overall context of discussing the

question of a Turkish EU-accession. Wimmel thereby sees two major questions, which are discussed in debates on Turkey:

• debating the time frame, form and criteria of the accession process, different perspectives on Turkish achievements and shortcomings in fulfilling different criteria

• debating the general possibility of a Turkish full membership, and whether there are relatively unchangeable characteristics of Turkey which speak against it

The second question was formally on the political agenda (informally it is still in place today) in 1997, when Turkey asked for the approval of its official candidacy status.

This bid was rejected, whereby religion and the strength of Conservatives amongst EUropean governments played a significant role. In 1999, only two years later, Turkey, successfully, tried again to reach candidate status. This went hand in hand with a more inclusionist attitude of EU-actors towards enlargement in general. That was, amongst other things, due to the strong position of social democrats in EUropean governments. Also criticism about the EU’s passive foreign policy attitude during the Kosovo-War played a role. On the other hand Turkey, as described earlier, went through a range of political developments and reforms, which found recognition at the EUropean political elites. Turkey boosted this by carrying out an intense lobbying strategy, and the rise of sympathies was further enhanced after an earthquake catastrophe in Turkey. In 1999, all these factors added up to a very positive constellation for Turkey’s ambition to gain official candidacy status. The decision was also influenced by the perception that a Turkish membership would be possible only in the very long-term anyway. Hence, it was seen more as a symbolic act, than a decision with concrete political consequences. (Font 2006;

Schimmelfennig 2009)

Due to the successful and fast reform process in Turkey after 1999, actors in the EU countries started to realize, that a possible Turkish EU-membership was becoming more realistic. Hence, the debate became strongly heated. A stronger polarization of the Turkey debate took place, mostly through the introduction of culturalist arguments into the debate, but also through the concern over more materialistic interests. The process of accession continued despite this, and soon the question of the opening of accession negotiations was on the table. In 2002 Turkey’s candidacy status was re-confirmed by the European Council, and December 2004 was, following

a mediating initiative by Germany and France, named a possible start date for accession talks. The European Commission, in their annual progress reports on enlargement candidates, expressed a qualified support for the start of accession talks.

Thereby they formulated concerns about the continuously deficient implementation of the conducted political reforms in Turkey. They supported maintaining further postponements and the abandonment of accession talks as explicit options. The European Council widely followed this position, although it was a difficult negotiation, with veto threats by Cyprus and Austria. Anti-Turkey actors thereby managed to include further conditions, like options on extended transition periods in the case of a Turkish EU-membership. Their attempts to explicitly formulate alternatives to full membership within the negotiation agreement failed.

(Schimmelfennig 2009; Tassinari 2008)

The surprisingly straight forward accession process until 2005 is often explained by the norms which came into force through the granting of candidacy status. Also Schimmelfennig (2009) describes this aspect: “to the extent that Turkey complied with liberal-democratic norms, member states opposed to Turkish membership for economic or cultural reasons could not legitimately block the path to accession but were rhetorically entrapped” (ibid.: 415). In relation to this point, Font (2006) describes institutional arrangements and polity norms within the EU as important aspects in understanding the progress made so far and the decision to engage in accession talks with Turkey. Following the 1999 decision to accept Turkey as an official enlargement candidate, “the agenda and the possible range of outcomes were strongly conditioned by both European fundamental norms and institutional dynamics” (Font 2006: 211). Through those socialized norms, and the legitimately perceived demand of compliance with them, the pro-Turkey coalition was able to keep the accession process on track. Thereby the Commission, and its progress reports on Turkey, gained a relatively powerful role in the enlargement process. In consequence, the European Council did not override the Commission’s recommendations. (Font 2006; Schimmelfennig 2009)

Nonetheless, it was only the start of a very difficult negotiation process, with many obstacles for Turkey’s possible accession. Through governmental changes in Germany and France, the anti-Turkey coalition was significantly strengthened. The Austrian and French threats, to carry out decisive referendums in case of the successful conclusion of accession talks, had cast one more cloud over the process. In general,

much skepticism existed towards future EU-enlargements, after the fast pace of enlargement in the last few years, with the accession of twelve countries in the last decade. Also the negative votes on the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands in 2005, were to a large part interpreted as votes against an overhasty enlargement process. The strengthened anti-Turkey coalition was however bound to the rules of the enlargement process, and dependent on the opinion of the Commission. After 2004 this opinion, represented by the progress reports, became, in the light of the stagnant reform(-implementation) process in Turkey, more critical.

The main obstacle for the accession talks was seen in Turkey’s deficient realization of the Customs Union, which is not yet fully extended to Cyprus. This led the Commission to recommend that eight of the 35 negotiation chapters should not be opened and none should be provisionally closed until Turkey fixes this problem. The Council, again, acted in accordance with these recommendations, which

“demonstrates that rhetorical entrapment cuts both ways. As long as Turkey complied with EU norms, it backed the supporters of Turkish accession and constrained the skeptics. However, when Turkey failed to comply, it gave legitimacy to the claims of the skeptics to slow down the accession process and forced the supporters of Turkey’s membership bid to join in.” (Schimmelfennig 2009: 428-429). Although the accession process experiences a worrying stagnation, the anti-Turkey actors did not succeed in ending the accession process. (Schimmelfennig 2009)

The entrapment approach, in reference to EU-norms, might explain the relatively successful argumentation of the pro-Turkey coalition, but it cannot explain why different actors joined the respective coalitions. To explain opposition or advocacy of the Turkish accession, it is necessary to take different interests and arguments into account. Subsequently I want to describe some of the, according to respective literature, central issues. A major argument lies in the size and poverty of Turkey, and the economic and financial impacts of a Turkish EU-membership. Since Turkey’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is far under the EU-average, the concern over high financial short- and medium term costs was frequently formulated. In this context the thesis around the EU’s lack of absorption capacity for new member-states, after the past enlargement, was brought forward. On the other hand pro-Turkey sentiments brought arguments about potential long-term profits due to the dynamic and fast growing economy and the young demographic conditions of Turkey into the debate. Turkey’s opponents translate those demographic conditions into a

threatening migration flow from Turkey towards EUrope. This argument is especially present in countries with big and visible Turkish or Muslim diasporas. The high relevance of this question is for example shown by de Vraese et al. (2008) for the Netherlands. Thereby they bring their empirical research to the conclusion that negative attitudes toward immigrants are the most influential factor in the formation of public opposition towards a Turkish accession. (De Vraese et al. 2008; Font 2006;

McLaren)

The size of Turkey is also central in debating institutional interests. These relate to the serviceability and power distribution within the EU institutions. The concern for the potentially high impact of a Turkish inclusion was often brought to the fore.

Actors skeptical to the enlargement argued, that Turkey would, according to the current conditions, gain one of the most, or the single most, influential position(s) in terms of voting numbers within EU decision-making processes. On the other hand a Turkish accession also could lead to a potential, yet not certain, strengthening of the EU-impact within the NATO-institutions, and international organizations in general.

Also when debating the geopolitical impacts of Turkey’s EU-membership – originally the major source of a Turkish inclusion in EUrope –, opposed prognoses and interpretations can be observed between pro- and anti-Turkey speakers. The predominantly Islamic confession of Turks, and EUrope’s relationship with the

‘Islamic World’, are shaping the debate. 9/11 and other Islamist terror attacks are referred to, as well as to the generally perceived threat of clashing civilizations.

Turkey is often framed as a bridge between those civilizations, and its EU-membership could heighten the possibility of the EU playing a mediating and peace advocating role. The Turkish accession is hence seen as a possibility for EUrope to heighten its power in international politics, and to potentially relativize the unilateral world order and the USA’s monopoly on the status of superpower. Opposed to this argument are culturalist concerns about Turkey’s Muslim population. This would make Turkey just too different to join EUrope, and a potential threat to peace within EUrope. Also worries about possible external-borders of the EU with countries like Iraq or Iran, and about increased difficulties to control migration movements are often brought up in the debate. (Baban/Keyman 2008; Font 2006)

These arguments explain parts of the formation of different attitudes towards Turkey.

They also go hand in hand with different imaginations of EUrope. They are related to different perspectives on the state, as well as on the future ideal of the EU and

EUrope. Different actors want EUrope to take over different tasks, and thereby a Turkish EU-accession has different consequences on those different imaginations of EUrope. In the following section, I will focus on the role these imaginations of EUrope play in the EU-Turkey debate.