APELACION DE SENTENCIA

The critical juncture that enabled a peaceful outcome to the Affaire Tawès resided in Kérékou’s decision to reach out to the parliament in 1997 to resolve the crisis. As a president, he had the constitutional authority to pardon Captain Tawès and his comrades. However, he decided to involve members of parliament in his strategy to address the issue. Thus, a year into his first term as a democratically elected president, he sent a bill to the parliament that would provide amnesty to all people involved in the August 1992 mutiny and in other national security related incidents.³⁵ The purpose of the bill was to “create better conditions for political détente in order to enable true national reconciliation” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 1).

Although Kérékou’s outreach to parliament was a risky decision, it allowed large discussions about the Affaire Tawès. Through this action, the executive broadened the scope of consensus about its strategy to accommodate Captain Tawès and his comrades. The first round of debates in parliament opened on September 2, 1997 under the auspices of the second vice-president of the parliament, Honorable Théophile Natta (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished

35 The bill related to several incidents. The first concerned the theft of arms and ammunition in the night of May 27-28 1992. The second was the firing of rockets upon the International Conference Center. Third, the bill also covered felonies and crime perpetrated during all elections held between 1990 and 1996 (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a).

1997a). A former member of Soglo’s Cabinet during the mutiny, Honorable Natta was a native of the same region as both President Kérékou and Captain Tawès.

The amnesty bill proposed by President Kérékou faced some opposition in parliament.

One of the opponents was Honarable Emile Kpikpidi, a deputy from Soglo’s party. He called for caution. “If soldiers can join a rebellion today, wander around and come back in three or four years,” he wondered, “are we consolidating the military?” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 3). His position was that the management of the Affaire Tawès should be left to the military. Another argument against the bill came from Honorable Guy Soglo, who was also from the opposition party. He expressed what some members of the Soglo administration back in 1992 might have thought was at the core of the events: “For some of our fellow citizens, tribal patriotism prevails over national patriotism, and I believe that is why they find it impossible to accept an order, however democratically established, as long as it is not incarnated by a citizen from the [ethno-regional] community of their origin” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 4).

A number of parliamentarians were not opposed to the idea of amnesty, but they were reluctant to vote for the bill as proposed. They were concerned about the security implications of granting an amnesty without recovering the weaponry that had been stolen back in 1992. This view was best expressed by Honorable Candide Azannai, a member of Soglo’s opposition party RB, on the second day of the first round of debates. Referring to President Kérékou who proposed the bill, he explained that “I do not understand why a president, who is a military officer by profession, who knows the gravity of national security … [wants to] provide amnesty for these incidents even though the country is still facing threats because the [stolen] arms have not been recovered” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997b, 30).

There were also reservations in other parts of the government. One was the Commission des Lois (Law Committee), which was the parliamentarian committee that had studied the bill before it was presented to the plenary for discussion. According to Honorable Pascal N’Dah-Sekou, a member of the committee who was also from the same region as Captain Tawès, there were diverging views within the committee. Some committee members even tried to block the process entirely. He informed the plenary that it took the personal efforts and the “intellectual honesty” of Honorable Rosine Vieyra-Soglo, the former first lady, to enable the committee to move past these tactics (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a).

The military leadership also had reservations. Their main concern was a provision of the bill that called for a career readjustment for the mutineers. According to the initial bill, the readjustment measure should ensure that the beneficiaries’ new career situation “is neither worse nor better than that of their colleagues who remained in the military” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 32). During a hearing at the parliament, the commanders told the Commission des Lois they only disapproved of this part of the bill. Later, changes were made to reflect the commanders’ concern. Overall, they strongly recommended adoption of the bill “to avoid a ‘Kabila’ effect” (Assemblée Nationale, unpublished 1997a, 30). The reference was about the Democratic Republic of Congo, where Joseph Kabila had led a rebellion to seize power in the previous year.

In response to these reservations, supporters of the amnesty bill drew on a number of precedents, especially in relation with the process that led to the democratic transition in 1989-1990. First, they recalled an executive action “voluntarily” signed by President Kérékou on August 30, 1989 to grant amnesty to all exiled citizens. These individuals were thus allowed to return home without facing charges for criminal acts they might have committed prior to their