Policy: A Bureaucratic P erspective (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), p.89, Quotation marks in original. 12 Letter from Kissinger to Senator Henry M. Jackson, March 3, 1970, p .l, B ox H - 300, NSC System, NSC Organization [1 o f 3], National Security Council Institutional Files (NSCIF), NPMS, NA.
13 Colonel J.M. Chambers to Bryce N. Harlow (Assistant to the President-Elect), “Suggested Revitalization for the National Security Council,” November 12, 1968, p.3, HAK-ASF, B ox 1, Transition, N ov 1968 - Jan 1969, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
14 Ibid. See Saki Dockrill, E isenhow er’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61 (New York: Macmillan Press LTD, 1996), pp.23-24; and Prados, Keepers o f the Keys, pp.57-95.
The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations maintained the NSC system in “name only,” downgrading its role as a continuing, objective entity and relying only on a few personal advisors.16 The Kennedy NSC was relatively informal, more flexible, and, in many respects, action rather than policy-oriented. The Johnson NSC was a combination o f informal, issue-oriented committee, individual advisers, and the so- called “Tuesday Lunches” at the White House where current concerns were discussed in an unstructured and highly personalized manner. The Kennedy-Johnson national security policies thus relied too much on ad hoc planning which did not sufficiently engage the resources o f the bureaucratic experts on the Council. In consequence, Kennedy-Johnson national security decision-making suffered from the “absence o f systematic policy planning,” the “weakness o f procedures for inter-agency coordination,” and the “lack of continuous assessment o f short and long range objectives.” 17
1.2. Goodpaster’s memoranda
As for actual planning o f a new NSC system, at Nixon’s request, Kissinger consulted General Andrew Goodpaster, Eisenhower’s NSC Staff Secretary, and asked him to produce option papers.18 Goodpaster recommended strengthening the NSC as
16 Chambers to Harlow, “Suggested Revitalization for the National Security Council,” November 12, 1968, p.5, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
17 Sloes to Kissinger, “Organizing the National Security Machinery,” December 21, 1968, p.2, HAK- ASF, B ox 3 General Transition Books, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
18 Halperin, Interview with Komine, June 10, 2004. See also Kissinger, White House Years, pp.41-44; and Idem, Years o f Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), pp.72-76. As Staff Secretary o f the NSC during the Eisenhower administration, Goodpaster was responsible for the flow o f matters on security and international activities between the President and the departments and agencies. The roles o f Staff Secretary and National Security Adviser were combined during the Kennedy-Johnson NSCs. Goodpaster to Kissinger, “Security Affairs Staff Responsibilities Under President Eisenhower,” December 12, 1968, pp. 1-2, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
79
the President’s “highest deliberative, advisory and policy-formulating body.” 19 The system should formulate “broad and far-reaching conceptions o f a long-range character” and provide the “main structure o f the nation’s approach to its international and security problems.”20 Its policy process should provide “coherence and reasoned dynamism, together with a sense of direction, to the whole complex o f policy and action.” Goodpaster recommended that in order to decrease bureaucratic friction, the control o f agenda creation should be managed by the White House, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs should run the key committees.22 It was crucial to impose some degree o f order on the flow of information and action papers to and from the President and to have that supervised by the National Security Adviser who should be fully familiar with the President’s views, priorities, and interests.
The new NSC structure appeared similar to the one Eisenhower used in terms o f its structure for systematic analysis o f policy options. Goodpaster recalls Eisenhower’s statement: “Plans are nothing, but planning is everything” which emphasized the importance o f preparatory work, giving all departments and agencies concerned a chance to present respective positions and bringing together all o f the relevant facts.23 Regarding Nixon’s view, Goodpaster assesses that: “he put a real value on the way
19 Goodpaster to Kissinger, “Organization and Procedures for the Conduct o f National Security Affairs,” December 13, 1968, p .l, HAK-ASF, Box 1, Transition, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.
20 Ibid. 21 Ibid.
22 The idea o f White House control o f the NSC agenda was reinforced when Goodpaster and Kissinger consulted with former President Eisenhower at Walter Reed Army Hospital in December 1968. Eisenhower insisted that the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) structure (which was established in 1967 and chaired by the Under Secretary o f State) should be abolished because the Defense Department would never like taking orders from the State Department. Kissinger, White House Years, p.43; and Idem, Years o f Renewal, p.75.
Andrew J. Goodpaster, “The Nixon Administration National Security Council,” p.3, The National Security Council Project (NSCP), Oral History Roundtables (OHR), Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland and the Brookings Institution, December 8, 1998.
that had been done during the Eisenhower time.” While Eisenhower “intended to maintain control through laying down the policies, main guiding policies, and then allowing that to evolve as the years went on,” Nixon “personally intended to take an active part in major initiatives that could reshape the relationships - major relationships in the world - particularly the relationships among the great powers.”24 Goodpaster thus emphasizes that it was not just a Presidential control o f foreign policy, but that Nixon was going to “direct” it and “engage” himself in it.25
1.3. Halnerin’s memorandum
Kissinger also asked Morton Halperin to produce a memorandum on how the analysis o f bureaucratic politics could be applied to national security and foreign policy decision-making.26
In theory, bureaucratic politics analysts focus on the politics o f a government, where foreign policy decision-making is characterized as a resultant o f a bargaining process among a multitude o f bureaucracies with competing viewpoints and possessing different amounts o f power within the national governmental hierarchy.27 Thus,
24 Ibid., pp.4-5.
25 Ibid., p.4. As for the study o f the presidential leadership in foreign policy decision-making, see, for example, Alexander George, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use o f Information and A dvice (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980); and Richard E. Neustadt, P residential P ow er and the Modern Presidents: The Politics o f Leadership from R oosevelt to Regan, Fifth edition, (N ew York: Free Press, 1990); and K egley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, pp.502-532. 26 Halperin, Interview with Komine, June 10, 2004. Kissinger consulted with Goodpaster and cleared Halperin’s memo with him without saying that Halperin wrote it. Then Lawrence Eagleburger dealt with Goodpaster. Halperin was originally a junior professor and also Kissinger’s former teaching assistant at Harvard. See also Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (N ew York: McGraw-Hill,
1992), pp. 154-155.
27 For bureaucratic politics o f foreign policy decision-making, see, for example, Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter, “A Bureaucratic Perspective: A Preliminary Framework,” in Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter (eds.), Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), pp. 1-42; Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy
81
policy-making is a matter of widening the base o f support within the executive branch through the constant modification of the proposed policy. Concessions are made toward potential allies to satisfy their interests and overcome their objections to establishing a majority intradepartmental coalition. A major characteristic o f policy making is its time-consuming nature.
In practice, there were two fundamental issues to the new NSC system: who would control the agenda and the flow o f policy papers; and who would chair key NSC sub committees. Halperin proposed two major changes. The first proposal, also reflecting General Goodpaster’s view, was to eliminate the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), which was chaired by the Undersecretary o f State and was in charge of reviewing all options and proposals before they reached a formal NSC meeting.28 It would be replaced by a Review Group, chaired by the National Security Adviser, which would give Kissinger: the power to approve any papers submitted to the President by departments and agencies; and the control o f the agenda for NSC meeting. Halperin’s other proposal was to give the National Security Adviser the power to direct National Security Study Memorandum (NSSMs, which were pronounced NIZ-ums) to departments and agencies.29 These directives would become a key tool for Kissinger to decide which policies should be reconsidered, when they would be placed on the agenda, and how they would be discussed. It would also allow him to use the bureaucracy without revealing his real purposes as well as to conduct negotiations secretly. In short, the new NSC system emphasized two principal objectives o f the President: the retention of control over foreign policy decision-
Foreign P olicy Making and the D emocratic Dilemmas, Fifth edition, (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, Inc., 1989), pp.61-71; Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, pp.476-490; and Graham Allison and Philipe Zelikow, Essence o f Decision: Explaining the Cuban M issile Crisis second edition (N ew York: Longman, 1999), pp.4-7.
28 Ibid.
analysis and alternative choices.
1.4. Obiections from the Defense Department and the State Department
Kissinger sent his memorandum on the new NSC system to Nixon, which he privately approved. On December 28, 1968, Nixon summoned Secretary o f State- designate William Rogers and Secretary o f Defense-designate Melvin Laird to Key Biscayne to discuss the Kissinger Plan. After the discussion, Nixon gave the final approval o f the plan. On December 28, 1968, the New York Times reported that President-elect Nixon intended to “enlarge the role o f National Security Council.”30 In his memorandum to departments and agencies on January 16, 1969, Kissinger made clear the flow o f policy papers under the control o f NSC:
All communication directed to the President originating in executive departments and agencies, including those from department and agency heads, should be delivered to the office of the Assistant for National Security Affairs. The NSC office under the direction o f the Assistant to the President will establish secretariat control of all incoming papers prior to forwarding them to the office o f the President. National security papers which the president asked upon or otherwise disposed o f will be preceded out o f the President Secretariat to the NSC office. Any subsequent actions required, such as the relay o f Presidential decisions, return of signed correspondence or follow-up on Presidential comments will be accompanied under the direction o f the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.31