State administrations, i.e. the set of institutions and rules that organize government, establish the parameters through which rulers exercise the (political) power conferred to them by their ruling position. As discussed earlier, exercise of political power denotes the
downward relationship between state and society, whereas a political regime (i.e., democracy) characterizes the upward movement between society and the state (Mazzuca 1998, 2007).
The management of state resources –that is, the exercise of political power, is administered following Max Weber in a continuum from extreme patrimonial to highly
62 The low and even negative correlation between levels of economic development and democracy at the
subnational level (-0.18 in Mexico, and 0.34 in Argentina), further suggests that general (i.e., national) theories about democracy, which argue that higher levels of economic development are needed to attain democracy, might not be suitable to account for democratic sustainability at the subnational level of government.
bureaucratic administrations. Patrimonial administrations (or patrimonialism) are
characterized by (a) the centralization of power in the hands of the ruler; (b) the erosion of horizontal control across different spheres of government; (c) the reduction of citizens’ autonomy due to the generation of ties of loyalty and dependence –commonly through complex patron-client linkages; (d) rulers’ appropriation of state funds for private consumption; (e) the use of political influence and public resources for the purposes of entrenching the position of the ruling group –such as covert funding of party campaigns and patronage; (f) the discretionary and particularistic provision of public goods –as opposed to distribution based on merit and need (see Weber 1976 [1925]; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Ertman 1997; Hartlyn 1998b; Mazzuca (1998, 2007).63
Bureaucratic administrations (or bureaucratization), by contrast, are characterized, as Weber noted, by the complete separation between the personage of the ruler and the means of administration, warfare, and financial organization. Put differently, bureaucratization entails the lack of rulers’ private appropriation of public resources, and his/her maximum
adherencesto the rules.
Neopatrimonial and bureaucratic administrations are “ideal types,” and as such can rarely be found in practice, and thus may not apply in all particular cases. They simply serve as endpoints in a continuum to indicate that there can be nothing, conceptually at least, which is more ideal. They do, however, draw attention to the fact that state administrations can be different enough to stand at polar opposites.
63 From here on out, following Bratton and van de Walle (1997) and Hartlyn (1998b), I refer to these
administrations as “neopatrimonial,” as Weber’s characterization of patrimonial administrations does not adequately characterize any of the national [and subnational] political systems existing in our time.
2) From concept to measurement: an additive index of state administrations
Unlike the concept structure of democracy, which is organized along necessary and sufficient conditions, neopatrimonialism (and its negative pole, bureaucratization) pertains to the family-resemblance concept structure. The family resemblance concept structure, as Goertz asserts “is as a rule about sufficiency with no necessary condition requirements” (2006:36).64
The presence of any of the constitutive dimensions (“a” through “f”, listed above) places any given subnational unit, say, province A, in the category of neopatrimonial provinces. Yet, province A might be grouped together with other patrimonial province, say, province B, despite the fact that the characteristic that makes province B neopatrimonial, is different from the one that makes province A neopatrimonial. Thus, it is possible that two or more provinces classified as neopatrimonial will not share all of what may be seen as the defining attributes of neopatrimonialism, yet still capture a set of commonalities considered to be constitutive of this type of state administration.65
Of all the secondary-level dimensions of neopatrimonialism listed above, the
contemporary literature has identified some dimensions as analytically important for coding an administration as neopatrimonial. These include: (a) the centralization of power in the hands of the ruler and rulers’ encroachment over other branches of government (i.e., lack of horizontal accountability); (b) the reduction of autonomy of the rulers’ followers by
64 An example of a family resemblance concept structure is the concept of corporatism. As Collier and Mahon
(1993) indicate, “the literature on corporatism generally presents a series of defining attributes, usually without the expectation that the full set of attributes would be found in every instance (Malloy 1977; Schmitter 1974).” Thus, “over many decades during the twentieth century, it was reasonable to characterize labor relations in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico as corporative, despite variation in the features of corporative structuring, subsidy, and control of groups found in the four cases (Collier and Collier 1991)” (Collier and Mahon 1993).
generating ties of loyalty and dependence (i.e., clientelism and patronage); (c) the use of non- universalistic criteria to distribute public goods; and (d) lack of citizens’ autonomy to
effectively control rulers’ activities (i.e., lack of societal accountability (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, Hartlyn 1998b, Mazzuca 1998, 2007; Smulovitz & Peruzzotti 2000, 2002). Accordingly, the basic-level concept of neopatrimonialism used in this dissertation is comprised of four dimensions: (1) horizontal accountability, (2) societal accountability, (3) patronage, and (4) rulers’ fiscal discretion.66 As was done with the measurement of
democracy, to ensure concept-measure consistency, I proceed to measure neopatrimonialism according to the scheme presented in figure 3.3. 67
As previously discussed in section II, a necessary condition can have no
substitute.That is precisely why, to measure democracy –a concept with a necessary and sufficient structure, I have created a multiplicative index (and modeled it with the logical AND). In contrast, the family resemblance concept structure allows for the absence of any given characteristic to be compensated for by the presence of another.68 Thus, I model the concept using the logical OR (which is closely associated with addition) (Goertz 2006: 39-
66 Unlike the necessary and sufficient concept structure, concepts with the family resemblance structure can be
assessed by identifying attributes that are present to varying degrees in particular cases, rather than being simply present or absent. This is why all four secondary-level dimensions do not need to be present (i.e., measured). Such is the case of the secondary-level dimension societal accountability. Due to constraints of data availability, no measure of societal accountability is provided for the Argentine provinces.
67 I have chosen to measure (and thus operationalize) the highest value of the regime continuum (i.e.,
democracy), and the lowest value of the state administration continuum (i.e., neopatrimonialism).
68 To illustrate this point, take the case of two Argentine provinces. Santa Cruz and San Luis both score high on
the neopatrimonial-bureaucratic continuum (i.e., relatively speaking, they are more bureaucratic than other Argentine provinces). Yet, they do so for different reasons. San Luis stands among the provinces with lower quantities of public employees in the country, whereas Santa Cruz ranks among the provinces with intermediate-high levels of public employment. By contrast, Santa Cruz ranks among the provinces that have a medium-high score on the exercise indicator “independence of the judiciary,” whereas San Luis obtains one the of the lowest scores. However, when the two indicators (together with the rest of the exercise indicators) are added up, both provinces score low on neopatrimonialism.
44; Mahoney & Goertz 2006). In other words, the secondary-level dimensions of the neopatrimonialism concept are all substitutable and that is why I add them all up. 69
69 A detailed description of the indicators used to measure neopatrimonialism, as well as how they are
8
0
Figure 3.4: A family resemblance concept structure of neopatrimonialism
+ Indep. of the judiciary (Arg.) Access to public info. (Mex) Agencies of fiscal control (Mex.) Size of public administ. (Arg & Mex)
Rules of fiscal allocat. (Arg.) Appropr. of munic. funds (Mex.) Indicator level + Horizontal accountability Societal accountability
Patronage Rulers’ fiscal discretion Secondary level Neopatrimonialism Basic level Legend: + + + ontological + logical OR substitutability
3) Results and discussion: subnational state-administrations in Argentina and Mexico
The data set used to measure neopatrimonialism covers 23 provinces in Argentina, and 31 states in Mexico.70 The data span the period 1983-2006 in Argentina, and 1997-2006 in Mexico, time periods that begin with the onset of the most recent transition to democracy at the national level.
The graphs and maps presented below show that the exercise of political power in the Argentine provinces and the Mexican states varies across units, although in a less
pronounced way than democracy.71 Graphs 3.3 and 3.4 indicate that the lower levels of neopatrimonialism (i.e., high scores) of the Argentine provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and San Luis contrast sharply with the high levels of neopatrimonialism (i.e., low scores) observed in La Rioja, Formosa, and Tierra del Fuego. Likewise whereas power in the Mexican states of Jalisco, Nuevo León, Morelos, San Luis Potosí, Estado de México, and Guanajuato is exercised along fairly bureaucratic norms and procedures (as indicated by the low score on the neopatrimonial scale), political power in the states of Oaxaca, Hidalgo, Guerrero, and Tabasco is exercised in the opposite fashion.
70 The city of Buenos Aires and Mexico City are not included in this dataset because, unlike the other provinces,
they do not possess lower levels of government (aka municipalities). As a result, the secondary-level dimension “rulers’ fiscal discretion” does not exist.
71 In Argentina, the exercise variable has a mean value of 0.469, a standard deviation of 0.134, a maximum
value of 0.119, and minimum value of 0.750. The variable exercise in Mexico has a mean value of 0.427, a standard deviation of 0.085, a maximum value of 0.153, and a minimum value of 0.686.
Graph 3.3:Subnational state-administrations --exercise of state power (Argentina 1983-2006) .2 .4 .6 .8 .2 .4 .6 .8 .2 .4 .6 .8 .2 .4 .6 .8 .2 .4 .6 .8 1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010
Buenos Aires Capital Federal Catamarca Chaco Chubut
Corrientes Córdoba Entre Ríos Formosa Jujuy
La Pampa La Rioja Mendoza Misiones Neuquén
Río Negro Salta San Juan San Luis Santa Cruz
Santa Fe Santiago del Estero Tierra del Fuego Tucumán
e x e rc is e year Graphs by province
Lower values indicate higher levels of neopatrimonialism
Graph 3.4: Subnational state-administrations --exercise of state power (Mexico 1997-2006) .2 .4 .6 .8 .2 .4 .6 .8 .2 .4 .6 .8 .2 .4 .6 .8 .2 .4 .6 .8 .2 .4 .6 .8 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Aguascalientes Baja California Baja California Sur Campeche Chiapas Chihuahua
Coahuila Colima Distrito Federal Durango Edo Mexico Guanajuato
Guerrero Hidalgo Jalisco Michoacán Morelos Nayarit
Nvo Leon Oaxaca Puebla Queretaro Quintana Roo SLP
Sinaloa Sonora Tabasco Tamaulipas Tlaxcala Veracruz
Yucatan Zacatecas e x e rc is e Year Graphs by State
Lower values indicate higher levels of neopatrimonialism
Unlike the pattern observed in the access graphs (3.1 and 3.2), it is possible to discern a few socioeconomic and geographical trends within the exercise dimension that are worth mentioning. Provinces with high levels of socioeconomic development are, on average, associated with lower levels of neopatrimonialism. In Argentina, for instance, the provinces of Mendoza, Santa Fe, Entre Ríos, Buenos Aires (together with Córdoba), all of which comprise the bulk of the richest and most economically developed Argentine provinces, receive the highest scores on the exercise dimension. In Mexico, a similar pattern is observed, as states with the highest levels of socioeconomic development, such as Jalisco, Nuevo León, and Morelos, receive the lowest scores on the neo-patrimonial scale. In contrast, the provinces and states that, on average, present the highest levels of
neopatrimonialism, are those located in the least economically developed and poorest areas of Argentina and Mexico. Such is the case of the Argentine provinces of La Rioja, Formosa, Corrientes, and Jujuy, and the Mexican states of Oaxaca, Chiapas, Guerrero, and Tabasco72. Between these two poles, provinces and states with intermediate levels of economic
development fall, on average, somewhere in the middle of the neopatrimonialism- bureaucracy continuum.73
The partisanship trends observed in Argentina are mixed at best, with Peronist
governors ranking very high on the exercise dimension (such as the governors from Santa Fe, Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos, Mendoza, and La Pampa), and still others scoring at the bottom of
72 Despite the fact that Tabasco is one of the oil-producing states of Mexico, receiving large amount of revenues
from oil production, it still ranks among the poorest and least economically developed states of Mexico.
73 These findings suggest, following Weber’s classic assertion that, at the subnational level in both Argentina
and Mexico, there is a moderate ‘elective affinity’ between capitalist development and bureaucratic administrations (evidenced by a correlation of 0.32 in Mexico and 0.22 in Argentina).
the scale (such as the governors of La Rioja and Formosa).74 The same can be said about other Argentine national and provincial parties, which no relationship between partisanship and the exercise of political power. The Radical-ruled provinces fall both high (Mendoza and Chubut) and low (Tierra del Fuego and Rio Negro) on the exercise scale, and provinces ruled by provincial parties, such as Neuquén, Tucumán, and San Juan, also rank on divergent positions along the exercise scale. Thus, in Argentina, it is difficult to establish any pattern of association between exercise of political power and partisanship.
IV. Access to state power vs. exercise of state power: a new classification of