APLICACIÓN DEL MÉTODO DE HUNTER EN SISTEMAS MIXTOS

I believe that we have good normative reasons to accept that locally manipulated agents are free and responsible, even if we do not possess that intuition. If we accept that our practice of praising and blaming others enshrines consequentialist attitudes, then that gives us reason to believe locally manipulated agents are free and responsible because our reactive attitudes are able to influence their future behaviour as much as it can shape an ordinary individual’s future actions. This argument is distinct from the others in this chapter in that it is arguing for a normative claim, that we should adopt non-historical compatibilism, and does not rely on my reader actually finding it intuitive that non-historical compatibilism is true.

When we normally discuss the concepts of praise and blame, we are interested in who deserves praise or blame based on their past behaviour. But the conditions for when a

113 _{Compatibilists freely admit that we can change our character by exercising our agency. But that does not}

mean that our character ultimately comes from our agency. The very first character we have is not something we have control over.

person is praiseworthy or blameworthy can come apart from the conditions for when we should praise or blame that person. Consider Irena Sendler, who smuggled Jewish children out of Warsaw when it was occupied by Nazi Germany. She is praiseworthy for performing such a noble deed with great risk to herself. However, it might be unwise to praise her because this could draw the attention of the Nazis, who would then injure her. Similarly, it is reasonable for me to hesitate blaming you for treading on my foot if I know this will cause you to receive a punishment that is not a suitable response to your action.

Questions of whether someone deserves praise or blame are distinct from, though related to, questions of whether we ought to, all things considered, praise or blame

someone. Whether it is appropriate to offer credit or censure depends partially on whether doing so will lead to more good consequences than bad. Praising and blaming serve

important social functions. When we praise someone, we reward them with the hope that it will encourage them or others witnessing the praising to perform a morally good action in the future. Likewise, when we blame and punish individuals, we are also trying to deter crime from occurring. These are beneficial, future-looking considerations that influence whether we should compliment or condemn someone’s actions that are independent of whether the person deserves our reactions to them.

Our attitudes towards young children, animals and criminal policy reflect the

consequentialist aspects of our praising and blaming practices. Young children and animals do not have the requisite cognitive capacities to be considered morally responsible for the actions they perform. But this does not inhibit us from praising or blaming them for the actions they perform. In these cases, we hope to direct their future behaviour by

incentivising them to perform the good actions again, and making it costly to act harmfully. The fact that they do not deserve the praise or blame does not make it inappropriate to

praise or blame them. Similarly, many philosophers believe that capital punishment’s potential to deter future offenders is a good reason to implement it for those who commit serious crimes.114 Focusing on the possible future goods gained from presently blaming someone demonstrates that there is also a consequentialist consideration to blame, which is independent of whether the person deserves the blame.

The consequentialist aspects of praising and blaming give us a normative reason to endorse non-historical compatibilism. If you accept that we care about the concept of moral responsibility and think it is important because we use the tools of blaming and praising to help correct behaviour, then you should also accept that manipulated agents can be

praiseworthy or blameworthy for what they do. Manipulated agents are ex hypothesi just as able to reflect on what they do as an ordinary agent. They are still influenced by the way society reacts to and treats them, despite the manipulation altering who they once were. The social functioning element of moral responsibility will work successfully and can still be applied to manipulated agents.

One might object to this argument by noting that I am advocating a revision of our praising and blaming practices, using the example of manipulated agents. But as manipulated agents do not exist, the normative reason to endorse non-historical

compatibilism is weak and we thus do not have any cause to change our practices. I believe the normative reason is still powerful as there are potentially a number of real life

individuals that historical compatibilists will not consider morally responsible that

consequentially we should still praise or blame. Consider Robert Harris from Chapter 1. It is plausible that some historical compatibilists will argue that he is not responsible for what he

114

Philosophical defences of the death penalty can be found in Ernest Van Den Haag, "On Deterrence and the Death Penalty," The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 60, no. 2 (1969); David A. Conway, "Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Considerations in Dialogue Form," Philosophy and Public Affairs 3, no. 4 (1974).

did, given his history. However, it is also possible that he is responsive to being blamed by his community. This would then be another example where we have a normative reason to accept non-historical compatibilism and treat an agent as morally responsible because they could be educated by praise/blame and realise the consequentialist benefits of non-

historical compatibilism.

This response to manipulation arguments is unique, as it does not dispute that it is intuitive that locally manipulated agents are morally responsible. Instead, it admits that we may have this intuition, but that we have better reasons to accept non-historical

compatibilism. If we believe this is an important dimension to moral responsibility, then we should hold that manipulated agents are morally responsible for their actions.