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Japan’s foreign policy debates, to some extent in parallel with debates concerning foreign policy analysis theories, involve the question as to whether a state’s foreign policy is primarily determined by international or domestic factors. In the end, most arguments, at least implicitly, admit both international and domestic factors matter to Japan’s foreign policy. It is hence more significant to ask how such international and domestic factors interact with each other in formulating Japan’s foreign policy. This question is particularly important in comprehending Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy because, while Japan arguably experienced significant changes in the international structural environment and domestic policy-making in the post-Cold War era, it has not yet been fully explained how such changes in international and domestic factors link with each other and formulated Japan’s foreign policy direction.

In terms of international structure, Japan’s foreign policy during the Cold War era was more or less influenced by the U.S. as the most significant partner under the Cold War structure. Calder’s ‘reactive state’ model, thus, pays particular attention to the significance of structural factors, emphasizing the extensive impact of U.S. pressure on Japan’s foreign policy-making (Calder, 1988). Miyashita counters the ‘reactive state’ model by emphasizing Japan’s own policy choices based on its preferences, yet without denying the substantial influence of U.S. power and policy on Japan’s foreign policy-making as a whole (Miyashita, 1999). In other words, U.S. power and policy is generally considered as the critical factor in explaining Japan’s foreign policy within the Cold War structure, even if there are different views on the way it influenced the

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The collapse of the Cold War structure made it necessary to examine the resulting changes in the international strategic environment surrounding Japan and its impact on Japan’s foreign policy. Three major issues are often discussed as the crucial transitions that Japan experienced within post-Cold War international structure: the relationship with the U.S.; the rise of the PRC; and, the emergence of regional frameworks centred on ASEAN. Firstly, there was the issue as to how far and in which direction the changing Japan-U.S. relationship shaped Japan’s foreign policy as it became necessary for Japan to review its partnership with the U.S. because of its concern about emerging differences in strategic objectives from the U.S. after the end of the Cold War. In fact, whilst experiencing some friction and adjustments in the bilateral relationship during the 1990s, Japan sought to strengthen its ties with the U.S. and retain U.S. commitment to East Asia, especially after 9/11. According to Kliman, this transition made Japan recognize the further necessity to fulfil demands from the U.S. in such cases as U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (Kliman, 2006). Hughes and Krauss, on the other hand, point out that it was possible for Japan to retain U.S. support for its own policy agenda, particularly the North Korean abduction issue, in return for giving assistance to the U.S. (Hughes and Krauss, 2007).

Secondly, Japan’s response to the rise of the PRC became an issue of intense debate. Facing a newly emerging security and political environment in East Asia, Japan realized the necessity of dealing with the PRC’s growing presence and increasing uncertainty in regard to North Korea, especially from the mid-1990s (Samuels, 2007: 135-157; Green, 2001). However, the arguments on how far and what sort of impact the PRC’s presence made on Japan’s foreign policy have not yet reached a consensus. Green describes Japan’s position as a hesitant realist turn, while admitting it is a relative one, arguing that “Japan’s fundamental thinking on China shifted from a faith in

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economic interdependence to a reluctant realism”, and that Tokyo began to seek “to use multilateral and bilateral security networks to balance, and even contain, Chinese influence” (Green, 2001: 77-79). Mochizuki claims that the Japanese government, while moving away from ‘friendship diplomacy’, perceived both threats and common interests with the PRC, especially in functional issues, leading to its mixed approach of engagement and balancing (Mochizuki, 2007). Whereas scholars point out Japan’s moderate balancing act with the PRC or hedging between Asia and the U.S. (Wan, 2001; Twomey, 2000), the extent to which the shift in power configuration surrounding Japan, including the relationship with the U.S. and the PRC, has transformed Japan’s objectives and indeed shaped the direction of its foreign policy still needs to be further examined.

Thirdly, the impact of emerging regional cooperation and integration centred on ASEAN on Japan’s foreign policy became another discussion issue. In the post-Cold War era, there emerged inter-governmental movements toward the formation of regional cooperation frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit (EAS).10 These movements coincided with deepening economic and social interdependence in East Asia in parallel with rapid region-wide economic growth, which created certain mutual interests among governments in the region. Whilst Japan was more or less committed to these regional movements, there is some difference of opinion among scholars as to the determinants of Japan’s responses. Green insists that Japan committed itself to Southeast Asian affairs in order to engage in competition with the PRC and to establish an independent identity from the U.S. (Green, 2001: 167-192). Berger, on the other hand, proposes the emergence of common pragmatic interests, regional institutions and Japan’s own liberal norms as the primary determinants of Japan’s foreign policy, including East Asian policy (Berger, 2007: 262-268). Given that the development of the East Asia regional order in the post-Cold

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These movements were in many cases coordinated and facilitated by ASEAN as the region-wide political framework whose members included all ten Southeast Asian countries in the 1990s.

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War era can be understood as a complex and multi-dimensional process (Pempel, 2006: 239-240), therefore, it is essential for scholars of Japan’s foreign policy studies to further examine which dimensions and factors of international structure actually influenced Japan’s foreign policy direction in order to deepen the debate on the transitions in international structure connected to Japan and their impact on Japan’s foreign policy.

In the post-Cold War era domestic level factors also became an issue of academic debate due to substantial changes in Japan’s domestic policy-making system and in the actors involved in it. An essential difference in the arguments on Japan’s foreign policy exists in their assumptions about Japan’s policy-making: the ‘reactive state’ model regards Japan’s policy-making system as fragmented and paralyzed while ‘mercantile realism’ and ‘reluctant realism’ models assume a rational and coherent setting of national interests shared by Japanese policy-makers. Calder’s ‘reactive state’ model has a distinctive feature in arguing that Japan’s policy-making system has a fragmented and paralyzed nature and thus reveals pragmatic flexibility to U.S. pressure (Calder, 1988).11 This argument clearly denies Japan’s rational perception of international structure and its strategic pursuit of foreign policy objectives.

Miyashita, in contrast, insists that, even when Japan apparently changes its policy by taking U.S. pressure into account, it is not a result of fragmented policy-making but of its own policy choices based on a coherent set of preferences (Miyashita, 1999: 727-728). Heginbotham and Samuels also assume Japan’s rationality in its external behaviour, applying a ‘mercantile realism’ model to Japan’s unique set of national interests and Tokyo’s strategic pursuit of them (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1998: 190-201). According to Heginbotham and Samuels, Japan strategically pursues its

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According to Calder, Japan carried out economic deregulation in the domestic market and arranged international agreements on trade and financial issues because of strong demands from the U.S., especially in the 1980s (Calder, 1988: 519-526).

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techno-economic interests as a primary foreign policy objective, which can be regarded as a rational set of national interests despite the premise of conventional realism which assumes the primacy of security interests in a state’s foreign policy (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1998: 190-201). Green’s ‘reluctant realism’ model also assumes a shared setting of national interests among Japanese policy-makers, who gradually increased their attention to security issues and balance-of-power considerations in response to international structural transitions in the post-Cold War era, becoming more sensitive to relative power gains as well as eager to behave proactively in Asia (Green, 2001: 1-10).

Having once described Japan as a ‘mercantile realism’ country, Samuels recently focuses on the diversification from the Yoshida doctrine of Japan’s foreign policy discourses since the 1990s. Samuels points out the emergence of four positions as alternatives to the previously dominant Yoshida doctrine: ‘neoautonomists’ insisting on national strength and a more autonomous foreign policy; ‘normal nation-alists’ emphasising national strength, the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance and the necessity to use the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) for settling international disputes; ‘middle power internationalists’ advocating the priority of non-military power and legitimacy given by international institutions; and, ‘pacifists’ championing an unarmed neutrality policy to withhold autonomy (Samuels, 2007: 109-132). In his conclusion, Samuels argues that Japan is still in search of a strategic consensus within the policy-making circle which will constitute the core of Japan’s foreign policy direction. It, however, remains unclear what kind of political dynamics among these domestic discourses, which are advocated by different political camps with unequal political power, has emerged and how such a diversification of discourses has actually shaped the conduct of Japan’s foreign policy within the policy-making system. Given the coexistence of different discourses within Japan’s policy-making circle, it is important to examine how actual foreign policy is formulated among different political camps; through the Prime Minister’s leadership, political bargaining and rent-seeking,

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bureaucratic coordination or through something else.

In parallel with the above-mentioned debate on Japan’s perceptions and objectives, there has been a debate on the effectiveness of Japan’s policy-making system. Japan was under the one party dominant system of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the so-called 1955 system, from 1955 to the early 1990s. While Johnson’s milestone research on Japan’s policy-making system in early periods focused on the power and unique role of Japan’s bureaucracy in initiating and coordinating the policy-making process (Johnson, 1982), scholars began to point out the pluralisation of interests and policy-making power within a one party dominant system (Muramatsu and Krauss, 1987; Pempel, 1987). In this system, the Prime Minister was vulnerable to faction leaders or powerful politicians in the LDP, whereas the bureaucracy was generally in a position to initiate and coordinate policy-making even if it did not always succeed in achieving its objectives.

Further debates on the transitions of Japan’s policy-making system and their influence on Japan’s foreign policy have continued since the 1990s. Shinoda, for instance, demonstrates the emergence of a policy-making process initiated by the Kantei

in the making of security policy since the 1990s, which was not only a result of changing international structure but also of the transformation of domestic actors (Shinoda, 2006). Great attention has been paid to Prime Minister Koizumi’s exercise of

Kantei-led policy-making for symbolic issues, even though it is considered that many other issues remained in the hands of the vertically divided administration (Tanaka, 2007: 310-311). Although the feasibility of Prime Ministers pushing forward their own political agenda still depends on the stability of their domestic power base, a new political dynamic has become an emerging issue of discussion concerning Japan’s foreign policy-making. Nonetheless, it still remains unclear who actually sets the foreign policy agenda, chooses policy-making procedures, provides policy options and

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makes decisions in such a process, and how far this new political dynamic impacts on Japan’s policy-making system as a whole.

In combination with the issue of Japan’s policy-making system, the government’s relationship with domestic actors has recently been a focus of attention. Traditionally, the Japanese government’s close relationship with the LDP and the business sector was seen by academics as an essential factor in Japan’s foreign policy-making under the 1955 system. The Japanese government could enjoy a relatively stable and predictable domestic policy-making process because of close and intensive policy coordination within the so-called ‘iron triangle’ consisting of mainstream politicians, bureaucrats and business leaders. Japan’s foreign policy was thus mostly decided and implemented within this closed circle and the general public was neither much informed about nor interested in foreign policy-making except for symbolic cases such as the anti-nuclear movement and public movements against the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Although the power balance within the ‘iron triangle’ shifted from time to time, the government could in most cases manage its foreign policy capabilities by coordinating relationships with mainstream politicians and business leaders. Yet, as Muramatsu and Krauss noted, Japan’s policy-making system increasingly involved serious conflicts of opinions and interests among a wider range of domestic actors, which has made it more difficult for bureaucrats to effectively coordinate the policy-making process since the 1980s (Muramatsu and Krauss, 1987: 549-550).

In addition to these changes, the collapse of the 1955 system seriously shook the traditional policy-making system, increasingly attracting academic interest in the process in which Japan’s domestic actors and the mode of their interactions have been transformed since the 1990s. The government’s relationship with the Diet, political parties and individual politicians is one of the key issues in this respect. Until the 1990s,

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as the LDP’s internal decision-making process and its members’ formal and informal activities were generally more crucial than formal Diet sessions under the 1955 system, the Diet and non-mainstream politicians could only exert a minor influence on Japan’s policy-making (Iio, 2007). Bureaucrats usually coordinated the overall foreign policy direction while mainstream politicians, individually or collectively, often retained a certain influence on the policy-making process, in some cases by carrying out rent-seeking activities. There were, nonetheless, conscious efforts through a series of political reforms from the late 1980s to strengthen the power of the Prime Minister and the cabinet, to make Diet sessions more meaningful, and to restrict excessive rent-seeking activities of politicians (Iio, 2007), the results of which need to be examined in detail.

Another issue in Japan’s policy-making system debates is the government’s relationship with the business sector. Despite the close government-business coordination under the 1955 system that a ‘mercantile realism’ model implies, the government’s relationship with the business sector also underwent rapid changes from the 1990s. This was for two main reasons. Firstly, from the 1990s, the business sector was a target of political and administrative reform, such as restrictions on private contacts between bureaucrats and business people, and the revision of the Political Funds Control Law which strengthened restrictions on political donations from individual companies to individual politicians. Secondly, the diversification of business interests and the government’s deregulation policies transformed the structure of power and interests between the government and the business sector. In foreign economic policy, scholars point out Japan’s strategic shift from a mercantilist policy to a more cooperative one in line with factors such as structural change of the domestic economy and industries and the development of international economic regimes (Kohno, 2007: 29-32; Kojo, 2007). Still, some signs emerged of the exploration of new government-business cooperation, which could be observed in Japan’s Free Trade

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Agreement (FTA) strategy or government-business missions dispatched to develop relations with emerging market countries. It is therefore necessary to further analyse the government’s domestic resource mobilization in relation to the Diet and politicians as well as the business sector in order to understand Japan’s foreign policy-making in the post-Cold War era.

The government’s relationships with other domestic actors including NGOs and the media and the influence of public opinion also became important issues. Hughes, for example, states that Japan’s sanctions policy toward North Korea was enabled by support and pressure from a domestic coalition including smaller societal actors who successfully mobilized domestic public opinion (Hughes, 2006). Dalpino also suggests that the Japanese government began to utilize humanitarian NGOs as ‘quasi-nongovernmental organizations’ which enabled it to circumvent international criticism in implementing humanitarian assistance toward Myanmar (Dalpino, 2007). These arguments indicate the emergence of new patterns in the way that the Japanese government could use domestic resources. Shinoda points out that Koizumi’s ability to mobilize public opinion was an essential factor in enabling him to carry out top-down policy-making (Shinoda, 2006: 174-176). These arguments indicate that there are some cases of foreign policy-making in which the role of NGOs, the media and public opinion cannot be neglected in comprehending the conduct of Japan’s foreign policy, even if they were still limited on the whole.

This section has reviewed the debates on Japan’s foreign policy from the perspectives of both international structural transitions and domestic political changes. In the end, it is undeniable, as Samuels states and most arguments implicitly admit, that both international and domestic factors matter to Japan’s foreign policy (Samuels, 2007: 4). Then, how can we connect these debates about international and domestic levels with each other so as to understand Japan’s foreign policy as a whole? In order to

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answer this question, the way in which international and domestic factors interact with each other in formulating Japan’s foreign policy need to be examined. The next section will suggest employing neoclassical realism as an analytical framework for this thesis because it proposes a theoretically consistent explanation of a state’s foreign policy by integrating both international and domestic factors.