APLICACIONES DEL MODELO DE CALIDAD DEL AGUA

In framing capability approach, Sen remains very tactful, in certain elements making proposition while in others, leaving it upon practitioners to make certain choices. This style and the elements within capability approach have attracted criticism, however there is a consensus on the need to make the entire process more accessible and clearer to the public, it’s this concern that informs the projects’ methodological strategy and it is discussed in greater detail within the methodology chapter. This section however takes a stance concerning the criticisms that challenge the validity of capability approach as a viable evaluation tool.

Sen’s capability approach views the essential object of development (and the entire economic exercise) as ‘the enhancement of living conditions’ (Sen, 1988; Alkire, 2005). This

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founded on the belief that Development is attainment of a ‘better life’ (Anand et al., 2009) therefore the centre of analysis is the life an individual succeeds in living, and Performance Ethnography comes in handy with its ingenious ability to awaken an individual’s life laying it bare for the audience to interpret. It suffices therefore, to assert that evaluation on the quality of life is in essence an evaluation on individual’s freedoms (Sen, 1990). This then constrains the focus to: fuctionings (what person is or does) and; Capabilities (what person is able to be or do).

‘Seen in the form of individual capabilities to do things that a person has reason to value’ Sen 1999a p. 56)

Based on this assertion, several scholars such as Deneulin and Stewart (2009) posit that Sen fails to explicitly account for structures such as physical climate, social norms, cultural and religious beliefs which go beyond individuals control and seen in this light are not individuals’ freedoms hence they argue capability approach is inadequate. However, such freedoms under capability approach are viewed as constraining or enabling structures, as they influence individual freedoms yet are beyond their control (Sen, 1992).

capability approach has also been criticised for being too individualistic, paying insufficient attention to groups and social structures (e.g. Corbridge, 2002; Devereux, 2001; Navarro, 2000). However, the debate on Individualism is not a new one and has prevailed particularly in Economics for a long time. British philosopher and political economist J.S. Mill’s rightly affirmed that, men are not, when brought together, converted into another kind of substance, with different properties (Mill, 1979), attesting to the continuing debate which alludes to methodological individualism a view of the world in terms of individual atoms, that is, individuals first exist as distinct individuals, and then they form relationships and

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engage in co-operative arrangements with one another, for the sake of the greatest individual advantage. In that framework, and as Nussbaum (1995) clarifies, the communal setting is seen as a set of individual atoms that have no links together except a binding common advantage:

‘According to which all social phenomena must be accounted for in terms of what individuals think, choose and do’ (Nussbaum 1995 p. 30).

Debatably, this notion has its roots from the enlightenment project (McLennan et al., 1992) and correlates to the development of the moral autonomy of the subject, which views the human subject as a source of an autonomous will, and alone responsible for his or her actions (L'Etang, 1992). Social atomism was first formulated in the contractualist theory of society, where society was seen as a voluntary association for mutual advantage (Deneulin, 2001). Arguably this was made possible by two advances:

1. Descartes’ disengaged rationality: A rationality which disengaged the mind from the body and from the world (Deneulin, 2001).

2. Galileo’s Resolutive Composite Method: Within which a subject of study could be deconstructed into its constitutive elements which could then be reconstituted in accordance with the law of logic (Apffel-Marglin,1996 and Bhargava, 1992)

Akin to utilitarianism, Sen’s framework contentiously, endorses not only social individualism but also by making individual freedoms the evaluative space of well being, endorses ethical individualism. Critics allege that by failing to explicitly take into account structures of living together, hence go beyond the instrumental approach of individualism, capability approach is inadequate to account for people’s agency and well being (Gasper, 2002; Comim, et al.,

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2008). Other scholars have also dismissed capability approach as endorsing social individualism and as such fails to recognize the interdependence of structures of living together (Gough, 2004; Gigler, 2005).

Although Sen (1985; 1996; 1997; 1999; 2000; 2004) has idiosyncratically edged away from a much closed theory or dogma, and allowed customisation of capability approach, he however accounts for structures of living together as he explicitly sets out conversion factors as an evaluative space (Sen, 1993). In this breadth, varied literature often cite Charles Taylor’s conclusion’s

‘Although in one sense all acts and choices are individual, they however are against a background of practices and understanding ‘indecomposable kernel against which atomism must break its teeth’ (Taylor 1995 p. 135-6).

Such is the view that questions economic policies which hold that structures of living together are merely instrumental in bringing about the individual state of affair. At the centre of Sen’s capability approach is individual agency, which Sen (1992) defines as

‘the realisation of goals and values she has reasons to pursue, whether or not they are connected with her own well-being’ (Sen 1992 p. 56).

In emphasis, Sen illustrates that:

‘The person is not regarded as a spoon-fed patient, in that the capability approach introduces freedom of choice amongst a menu of options (attainable functionings) into well-being assessment. But in separating the well-being aspect of personhood from the agency aspect for evaluative purposes, these doings, human activities, are necessarily seen in a particular light. They are evaluated as effects, which are

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divorced from human intentions and the process of realising them. [...] But the processes of forming objectives, participating in shaping the conditions for action, and making things happen, are all divorced from what well-being is’ (Sen 1999 p. 241).

Evidenced in this discussion, capability approach construes development as to expand the human capability options: the ‘doings’ and ‘beings’ in life. This view point is far removed from that of concentrating goods and services that underprivileged people need rather it focuses on human decisions as a key component that informs development (Giddings et al., 2002; Sen, 1983). This however introduces two key concerns: Firstly, to evaluate a personal decision, is problematic as people would tend to be untruthful on issues so personal as their decisions while others will be uncomfortable to let anyone into this personal space (Lasersohn, 2005; Simon, 2003), in order therefore to query these decisions and subsequent experiences, the research explores performance ethnography, which provokes narration among the participants, bring to light what would otherwise go untold; Secondly querying a decision is in itself controversial, that is, the act of choice, that of progressing from capabilities to achieved functionings, taking into account social structures and constraints. Ordinarily, it is difficult to distinguish between one who refuses to profit from an opportunity as a result of social conditioning and one who has freely declined to exploit the opportunity (Kincheloe, and McLaren, 2011). This position lends itself to a protracted debate between the metaphysical libertarianism and the hard determinism, the former taking incompatibilist position,arguing that determinism is false thus free will (the putative ability of agents to make choices free from certain kinds of constraints) exists or is at least possible. They claim that free will is logically incompatible with a deterministic universe and

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that agents have free will. While the latter is biased to incompatibilism position, and endorses causal determinism and logical determinism and thus rejects free will. An engaging personal narration, will often expose the reasons for particular choice whether or not an opportunity was exploited, performance ethnography thus makes an inquiry on decision possible.

Sen (1999) uses the example of the fasting monk and the starving child to illustrate his point. This example though in as much as it is clear on the deprivation of the capability to have food on the part of the child raises questions on the part of the monk as to whether the monk acts as a free agent. On this background, certain literature suggests that capability approach is silent with regard to the capability to exercise freedom (Zimmermann, 2006; Srinivasan, 2007). However, this is like using the right lens but viewing from the wrong side of the glasses because capability approach doesn’t mechanically dictate what aspects to evaluate, rather it provides an angle of thought in terms of map of events and the motivation for these events. Within the school of ‘human scale development’ developed by Manfred Max-Neef (1998) and others, these ‘maps of events’ are construed to be constant through all human cultures and across historical time periods and that what changes over time and between cultures are the strategies by which these needs are satisfied while Sen (1985) on the other hand views this ‘motivation’ within this map as an independent entity and not necessarily contributing to wellbeing. Both capability approach and fundamental human needs agree that only ends are of intrinsic importance whereas means are instrumental to reach the goal although in some situations this distinction often blurs as ends are simultaneously also means (Robeyns, 2005; Alkire, 2005).

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The lucidity with which capability approach stresses how distinctive identities, and structures for instance influence one’s choices, cannot be over emphasized. In his work about reasoning and social identity for instance Sen (1992) endorses the dependency of individual agency on structures of living together this is partly espoused in Nussbaum’s (1993) reflections that practical reason is a pre-condition for exercising of freedom, never mind the fact that one needs to be free to access practical reason. Nussbaum (2003) like many social scientist, emphatically asserts that human agencies are empowered to understand themselves, hence interpret what they are and what they do and the languages needed for such interpretation are essentially social, and community is a structural precondition of human agency. In closing therefore, as much as Sen’s ideas rightly bring back the focus of development to human beings, there will continue to be elements of incompleteness within the ensuing frameworks largely because capability approach targets a spectrum of issues within an individual, such issues that many research methods will be inadequate to unearth. This research therefore explores performance ethnography to deliver on the resourcefulness of capability approach.