Daniel FIOTT
The crisis that hit Libya in 2011 first affected Malta on the 21 February when two Libyan Mirage air force jets made an emergency landing at the international airport at Luqa. As the crisis in Libya worsened, Malta eventually provided safe-haven to approximately 8,000 foreigners from over 50 countries that had to be evacuated. As part of the EU, Malta contributed to efforts launched and sustained by the European Commission’s DG ECHO by contributing financial and in-kind services such as plane repatriations, medical supplies, food and naval vessels worth €730,117 – therefore contributing more than Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia.27 Malta was internationally commended for its role in the crisis, not just because it served as a hub for the evacuation efforts but also because it facilitated UN Resolution 1976 by opening its airspace to NATO forces. Former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, termed Malta a key staging area for the relief and evacuation efforts during the Libya crisis.28 Malta’s response was indeed remarkable when one considers that it is one of the EU’s smallest members and that its armed forces and emergency response forces are relatively small by European standards. The Libya crisis was just one recent expression of greater Maltese self-confidence in crisis operations. Libya can be partly explained by geographical proximity, but Malta has also been engaged in a number of CSDP operations beyond its immediate sphere of interest – even though the country has constitutional neutrality. For example, in April 2010 a twelve-man special detachment team (C Special Duties Company) from the Armed Forces of Malta was deployed for four months onboard the MUSTAFA-H, a World Food Programme ship, to protect the vessel during her trip to northern Somalia. Staff officers from the AFM were also sent to the EUNAVFOR Operational Headquarters at Northwood, United Kingdom. Additionally, three trainers were sent to EUTM Somalia as part of the military training mission in 2008, and an AFM officer was seconded to EUTM Somalia’s Mission Headquarters in Kampala in 2011. Two non-commissioned officers were sent to EUBAM Rafah in 2009, and in 2008 – as part of its first ever CSDP operation – Malta sent two personnel to the EUMM Georgia. During the Libya crisis in 2011 the AFM seconded staff to the EUFOR Libya Opera- tional Headquarters in Rome.
27 European Commission (2012) ‘Fact Sheet Libya’. See: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/libya_
factsheet.pdf.
THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY: NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
However, a great dose of reality is required when assessing Malta’s involvement in the CSDP. Let us be frank, given the country’s size and resources, its contributions to operations will be miniscule and it will never be in a position to launch and lead a CSDP mission – in defence terms Malta is but a drop in the ocean. Indeed, Malta does not even have a dedicated Ministry of Defence and in 2012 it had 1,510 military personnel; 97 civilian personnel; 20 troops deployed (a total of 1.3 per cent of its total military personnel); 105 deployable land forces; and 30 sustainable land forces. Even though this means that Malta’s deployability rate29 surpassed Cyprus in 2012 – incredible given that Cyprus’ defence budget is much higher than Malta’s – Malta is a dwarf in military terms. Yet Malta’s involvement in the CSDP should not be completely overlooked for three main reasons.
Firstly, its geographical location puts it at the centre of any Mediterranean crises that may emerge in the future. For historical reasons Malta has declared itself a neutral state, but it increasingly recognises that it has a security role to play in the Mediter- ranean Sea. It will not become a NATO member anytime soon – although it is a member of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) –, and activists regularly denounce NATO naval stop-offs at Valletta as anti-constitutional. Until Malta recognises that its self- declared neutrality is a remnant of Cold War politics, it will feel comfortable playing just a minor role in the CSDP. Yet, due to its size and resources, Malta might always be accused of being a ‘free rider’ in the CSDP. Indeed, its neutrality and geography appear to move in different directions; neutrality would imply that the country did not have to invest in defence, whereas its geography indicates that it needs to play a greater role in managing potential crises that affect its national interests. The migra- tion issue, and the resulting (repeated!) calls by Malta for greater EU resources and political support, highlights how necessary it is for Malta to play a greater role in security and defence policy.
Malta will never be in a position to spend ambitiously on defence, and it certainly will never own a naval fleet on a par with most of its fellow European states. The point, rather, is about using defence spending commitments to make a political statement and to ultimately overcome accusations of ‘free riding’. Consider that in 2012 Malta spent a meager €39.3 million on defence or just 0.58 per cent of GDP – nowhere near the NATO 2 per cent average.30 This amount can be broken down to reflect that the
bulk of Malta’s defence budget goes on personnel (€32 million) with €6.2 million being spent on operational and maintenance-related expenditure. Just €1.1 million was spent on infrastructure, investment and operational costs in 2012. More should be done to ensure that Malta lives up to the basic responsibilities bestowed upon it by geography, history and circumstance.
29 European Defence Agency (2015) ‘Defence Data Portal’. See: http://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/
defence-data-portal.
30 European Defence Agency (2015) ‘Defence Data of Malta in 2012’. See: http://eda.europa.eu/info-hub/
Secondly, should a crisis in the Mediterranean occur then Malta might have a polit- ical, cultural and historical added value in dealing with crisis-hit countries. For example, after the Libya crisis the Maltese Chief of Defence and his Libyan counter- part met in February 2012 to discuss bilateral naval exercises with Libyan forces off the coast of Tripoli. Malta sent its Maritime Squadron Diciotti Class (P61) offshore patrol vessel and the exercises were made on explosive ordinance disposal, vessel protection, seamanship, vessel boarding techniques, diving, etc. Malta and Libya also agreed to an 88-week training programme for 33 Libyan military officials in order to develop border control and search, Operational Maritime Law and rescue capabili- ties conducted through Malta’s Maritime Safety and Security Training Centre. In this sense, the skills of the AFM should not be underestimated as ‘[a]ll AFM officers and senior non-commissioned officers have attended courses abroad and have qualified at some of the best military academies and schools around the world.’31 Indeed, not every EU member state would have been a position to deal with the Libyan forces in such a manner – Malta’s historical and political links to Libya mattered.
Thirdly, even though Malta plays an extremely minor role in CSDP operations, it has been able to develop its domestic crisis management response mechanisms. One should not forget that Malta is well-versed in maritime operations given the frequency with which refugees, asylum seekers and illegal immigrants arrive on Maltese shores. During the Libya crisis – a crisis which was largely unanticipated – AFM officers were following developments during the ‘Arab Spring’ and drew up contingency plans and a number of likely scenarios for a larger crisis.32
In the wake of the crisis Malta triggered a number of crisis mechanisms. Firstly, the then Maltese government established a special crisis operations command centre, operating on a 24/7 basis, which functioned as the nerve centre for the crisis response. A governmental contingency centre was then triggered within the Justice Ministry. The national hospital, Mater Dei, also activated its ‘critical events proce- dure’ – which is usually reserved for national emergencies – to deal with civilian and military casualties emanating from Libya. This response was accompanied by measures such as implementing a national emergency code system, an online resource mapping system, efficient staff rotas (to avoid fatigue and stress), psycho- logical support for all staff, language experts, etc. It is incredible to think that, given Malta’s size and resources, a crisis response mechanism was put in place that tangibly benefitted European and international efforts during the Libya crisis. At the heart of Maltese debates about security and defence lie resources, geography and neutrality. Malta will never have the resources needed to be a big player in European defence, although it does use its expertise and added value were neces-
THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY: NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
sary and possible to play its part. In terms of operational commitment, therefore, Malta is not a free rider and it does try to act tall within its means; however, in terms of its defence spending it will, for the time being at least, look like a free rider. Malta cannot do anything about its geography but it can invest in equipment (vessels and aircraft) that can help it overcome geographical constraints. It is stuck at the heart of the Mediterranean and will therefore have to remain responsive to crises that will inevitably emanate from Africa. Perhaps here it should play a bigger political role in the EU Maritime Security Strategy, although much more EU financial support and solidarity is required. One Maltese politician recently said that it would be good for EUNAVFOR to deploy to the Mediterranean – such ideas are very welcome.33 Indeed,
other EU member states seem to forget that Malta is one of the EU’s most crucial frontier states and will require assistance to meet its responsibilities.
Finally, Malta will need to continue its national debate over neutrality. Security and defence, by its very nature, is not neutral and Malta no longer finds itself in the midst of a Cold War. It has – by virtue of its EU membership – made a clear political state- ment that it is bound to the West. Additionally, crises are flaring up on Malta’s doorstep: Libya remains in flames and the growing threat from ISIL in that country should not be overlooked. Malta does not need to surrender its neutrality to play its part in defeating a barbaric terrorist organisation, even if any role played by the country would be humanitarian rather than military. In this context, Malta should recognise that being a member of NATO’s PfP does not guarantee the country any protection in the face of threats to its essential security (there is no Article 5 for Malta). True, under Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (the “mutual defence clause”) other EU member states are obliged to assist and aid Malta in the event of armed aggression on its territory. Yet building trust on defence matters means a country has to play its role when other countries are in need – it is a credi- bility issue. Being a security ‘free rider’ on other EU members reflects badly on Malta. Indeed, the country needs to recognise that it cannot haul up anchor and move to a safer place if things go bad so it should play its security role to the fullest, albeit within its means.
33 Malta Independent (2015) ‘Roberta Metsola raises possibility of EU Naval Force in the Mediterranean’, (12
Feb). See: http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2015-02-12/local-news/Roberta-Metsola-raises-possi- bility-of-EU-Naval-Force-in-the-Mediterranean-6736130495.
Sten RYNNING & Jon RAHBEK-CLEMMENSEN
Denmark is the only EU member state that stands outside of the Union’s CSDP, which explains why the CSDP plays an ambiguous role in Danish defence and security thinking. Staying out of any future EU defence cooperation schemes was one of the conditions that the large parliamentary majority in Copenhagen had to swallow to sway public opinion to stay within the EU after it had suffered a defeat in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty referendum. Denmark also stands outside of the euro and the common justice and home affairs policy, and Denmark cannot participate in the development of a common citizenship policy.
This special opt-out position is robust. Policy elites, including both the incumbent government and the leading opposition parties, favour joining the CSDP but polls give the no-side a handsome lead. When the government in 2000 sought to reverse the Euro (common currency) opt-out by referendum, it suffered a clear defeat. Danish policy elites have thus learned a hard lesson. But they are bracing for a new attempt to revise the opt-outs – this time in 2016 with a referendum on common justice and home affairs. If it results in a victory for the pro-EU parties, they might be encouraged to seek to reverse the CSDP opt-out soon thereafter, say, in 2018-2019. However, if the 2016 referendum goes south, a Danish CSDP entry is largely off the table for the next decade.
Denmark’s self-inflicted absence from the CSDP is in many ways puzzling. The EU embraces all the crisis management and comprehensive security thinking that enjoys wide backing in Denmark. Moreover, the commitment to large scale development assistance (Denmark is among the highest contributors in the world when measured according to GDP) continues, and development and governance issues remained prominent throughout the hey-days of military activism – in the early 2000s when Denmark contributed forces to both the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Through these years of military activism, and even when casualty numbers ran high, the Danish public followed the lead provided by a largely unified parliamentary scene. The Danish military contribution mattered, parliamentarian leaders argued, a view the public endorsed to become one of the most bellicose in Europe. The only exception was the combat phase of the Iraq War – in early 2003 – when the parlia- mentary scene fragmented and public opinion divided. Interestingly, this intimate relationship between elite and public opinion does not exist in regard to the EU. Here, public opinion tends to defy the elite. The 2014 EU parliamentary elections saw the EU sceptic right-wing party – the Danish Peoples’ Party – come out in front of the
THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY: NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
The military reality is that the Danish armed forces long ago prepared for a new multi-national era. The Danish Armed Forces have completed a change from territo- rial defence to an expeditionary force, which is able and willing to participate in out- of-area combat missions. Denmark also supports the multinational trend at the level of command (with investments in NATO’s Multinational Force North-East corps HQ) and defence planning (with support of NATO’s Smart Defence, tacit support of the EU’s attempt to open defence markets, and support for regional structures such as NORDEFCO). Of course, Denmark is as unwilling to sacrifice its national sovereignty as any other European state, which effectively brakes defence specialisation among countries, but the principle of multi-nationality is deeply entrenched nonetheless. As long as the CSDP opt-out exists, though, there can be no multinationality on Denmark’s part in respect to military work in the EU. If the EU takes on a military mission, Denmark is out. For a little while, during the Bush years when Atlanticism was the name of the game, it did not matter all that much. Now it does, and it is explicitly recognised in Copenhagen. Militarily speaking, Denmark has identified three key strategic partners – the United States, Britain and France. France, obviously, is a carrier of the CSDP. More broadly speaking, the Danish foreign minister has repeatedly singled out Germany as one of Denmark’s absolute most important political partners. To make these partnerships work, Denmark will need to engage its partners fully in both NATO and the EU.
As mentioned, there is a political recognition of this condition, and there is some movement on the issue of revising the opt-outs. However, it is a slow motion train, and there is a risk that it will wreck once again in 2016.